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JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Utah Real Estate Brokers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-1 et 
seq. ("UREBA"), bars the claims of Appellee Ira Sachs ("Sachs") presented in the case 
below. This is a legal issue that this Court reviews for correctness, according no 
deference to the Utah Court of Appeals' decision. Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 884 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1994). 
2. Whether the Utah Statute of Frauds bars the claims Sachs presented in the 
case below. This is a legal issue that this Court reviews for correctness, according no 
deference to the Utah Court of Appeals' decision. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
The following rules and statutes are determinative or of central importance to this 
appeal: 
1. Utah Real Estate Brokers Act ("UREBA"), Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-1 et 
seq. (2005), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
2. Utah Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (2004), a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
3. Utah R. Civ. P. 56, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
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4. Utah Admin. Code R. 162-1-2 (1.2.24) (2007), a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit D. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
Sachs alleges that he entered into a contract implied in fact or at law with 
appellants Joseph S. Lesser ("Lesser"), Loeb Investors Co. XL ("Loeb") and United Park 
City Mines Company ("UPCM") (collectively "Appellants") to find a purchaser for 
UPCM, whose only assets of any significance were its 8,300 acres of real property 
located in Summit and Wasatch Counties and its entitlements to develop two real estate 
projects known as Flagstaff Mountain and Bonanza Flats. Sachs further alleges that he 
"found" Gerald Jackson ("Jackson"), a real estate developer, who formed Capital Growth 
Partners, LLC (Capital Growth") to purchase UPCM. Finally, Sachs alleges that 
Appellants breached the alleged finder's fee agreement when they refused to pay him a 
finder's fee after Capital Growth purchased all of UPCM's outstanding common stock. 
Appellants dispute that an implied finder's fee agreement ever existed, but even 
assuming Sachs could prove the existence of an implied finder's fee agreement, his 
claims are unenforceable because he was not a licensed real estate broker in Utah. Under 
UREBA, an unlicensed person may not maintain an action to recover a finder's fee with 
respect to "real estate" transactions, which, by definition, include "business opportunities 
involving real estate." 
The Utah Statute of Frauds also bars Sachs' claims because the parties never 
entered into an express finder's fee agreement. Under the Utah Statute of Frauds, a 
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finder's fee agreement is void as a matter of law unless reflected in a writing, signed by 
the party to be charged. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts. 
On January 26, 2005, Sachs filed his Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
("Complaint"). (R. 1-27.) The Complaint alleges the following five Counts: (a) Count I-
Declaratory Judgment; (b) Count II-Breach of Contract; (c) Count Ill-Quantum Meruit-
Contract Implied in Law; (d) Count IV-Quantum Meruit-Contract Implied in Fact; and 
(e) Count V-Intentional Interference with Economic Relations. (R. 16-21.) 
On March 31, 2005, Loeb and Lesser filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Loeb Motion") seeking to dismiss Sachs' claims on the grounds that: (1) no express or 
implied finder's fee agreement was ever made; (2) Sachs' claims were barred because he 
did not have a real estate license; (3) Sachs' claims were barred by the Statute of Frauds; 
and (4) Sachs failed to state a claim for intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations. (R. 1082-84.) On April 8, 2005, UPCM filed its Motion for 
Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of all five Counts against UPCM alleged in the 
Complaint on the same grounds. ("UPCM Motion"). (R. 1206-1208.) 
The trial court heard oral argument on the UPCM Motion and the Loeb Motion on 
December 12, 2005. On February 6, 2006, the trial court issued its Minute Entry 
Decision granting the Motions in their entirety. (R. 2208-12.) The trial court held, 
among other things, that Sachs' claims are barred by UREBA as a matter of law because: 
(1) it is undisputed that Sachs did not have a real estate license; (2) UPCM's principal 
business was the leasing, development and sale of real property; (3) UPCM's only asset 
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of significance was its real property; and (4) Utah law requires a real estate license to 
recover a finder's fee in connection with the sale of "real estate" which, by statutory 
definition, includes "business opportunities involving real estate." (R. at 2208-12.) 
The trial court also ruled that Sachs' contract and quantum meruit claims are 
barred by the Utah Statute of Frauds as a matter of law because: (1) it is undisputed that 
the alleged finder's fee agreement relates to the sale or purchase of real estate as the only 
significant asset owned by UPCM; (2) it is undisputed that no writing exists that would 
satisfy the requirements of the Utah Statute of Frauds; and (3) quantum meruit and unjust 
enrichment claims cannot rescue claims otherwise precluded by the Utah Statute of 
Frauds.1 (R. at 2208-12.) 
The trial court entered an Order Granting the Motions for Summary Judgment on 
February 15, 2006 ("Final Judgment") and dismissed Sachs' claims with prejudice. (R. 
2213-22.)2 
Sachs filed his Notice of Appeal on March 16, 2006. (R. 2224-25.) The appeal 
was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals on March 23, 2006. (R. 2228.) The Utah 
Court of Appeals heard oral argument on March 26, 2007. 
1
 The trial court also ruled that Sachs' claim for intentional interference with 
prospective and economic relations fails as a matter of law. Sachs did not appeal that 
ruling. 
The trial court had previously granted Capital Growth's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed all of Sachs' claims against Capital Growth with 
prejudice on September 13, 2005. Sachs did not appeal that ruling. 
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On May 17, 2007, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an Opinion affirming in part 
and reversing and remanding in part. (Sachs v. Lesser, 2007 UT App 169, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit E). Specifically, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed 
the trial court's ruling that Sachs' express contract claim failed as a matter of law because 
there was no meeting of the minds on the essential term of the fee to be paid. (Sachs, 
2007 UT App 169, Tf 1). The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling that 
Sachs' implied contract claims also failed as a matter of law on the ground that, when 
viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to Sachs, there were disputed issues of fact as to who was responsible for 
procuring a buyer for UPCM. (Sachs, 2007 UT App 169, U 32). The Utah Court of 
Appeals further determined that UREBA and the Statute of Frauds do not bar Appellee's 
claims and, accordingly, remanded Appellee's implied contract claim to the trial court. 
(Sachs, 2007 UT App 169,1142, 52, 54). 
III. Statement of Facts. 
1. Sachs is a resident of Park City, Utah, and was a shareholder of UPCM 
prior to June, 2003. (R. at 2, 1114, 1141.) 
2. Loeb is a New York partnership with its principal place of business in New 
York, New York. (R. at 2, 1114.) At all relevant times, Loeb owned a controlling 
interest in UPCM. (R. at 4, 1114.) Lesser is the managing partner of Loeb. Lesser is the 
former chairman of UPCM's Board of Directors. (R. at 2, 1114.) 
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3. UPCM is a Delaware corporation whose "principal business . . . is the 
leasing, development and sale of real property located in or near Park City, Utah." (R. at 
2-3,1114-15.) 
4. UPCM owns the surface estate to more than 8,300 acres of land, of which 
approximately 5,300 acres are leased to Deer Valley and the Park City Mountain Resort 
for skiing and related purposes. (R. at 3, 1115.) This real property, including the 
entitlements to develop it, is UPCM's "only asset of any significance whatsoever." (R. at 
1210,1257.) 
5. In or around 1999, UPCM was in the process of developing two real estate 
projects known as the Flagstaff Mountain Resort Project in Summit County and the 
Bonanza Mountain Resort Project in Wasatch County (collectively the "Projects"). (R. at 
3-4, 1115, 1210.)3 
6. In early 2001, an article appeared in the Park Record newspaper that 
discussed the failure of a joint venture between UPCM and DMB Associates, Inc. 
("DMB") to develop the Projects. (R. at 5, 1211, 1255.) 
7. Sachs understood from reading the newspaper article that "it was apparent 
that someone would come in and pick up the ball" for development of the Projects. (R. at 
1211,1267.) 
3
 UPCM's hard-fought efforts to develop the Flagstaff Mountain Resort Project 
are chronicled in this Court's decision in United Park City Mines, Co. v. Stichting 
Mayflower Mountain Fond, 2006 UT 35, 140 P.3d 1200. 
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8. Upon learning that a joint venture for development of the Projects had 
failed, Sachs contacted Hank Rothwell ("Rothwell"), president of UPCM, because Sachs 
thought the Granite Land Company ("Granite"), which had an established business 
relationship with Sachs, would be a "natural partner" with UPCM in a joint venture to 
develop the Projects. (R. at 5, 1116, 1211.) 
9. In March 2001, Sachs arranged a meeting between UPCM and Granite to 
discuss a potential joint venture. (R. at 1116, 1144, 1211.) At the time he arranged the 
meeting, Sachs understood, based on his conversations with Rothwell, that UPCM was 
"interested in selling . . . all or part of [UPCM]" and that UPCM was "hopeful that 
Granite might purchase all or part of it." (R. at 1212, 1264, 1266-67.) 
10. During the meeting, a finder's fee was never discussed. (R. at 1116, 1145-
46.) In fact, Sachs admits he never had any direct discussions with Rothwell or anyone 
else at UPCM about his purported interest in getting paid a finder's fee by UPCM in 
connection with a possible transaction with Granite. (R. at 1213, 1270, 1280-81.) 
11. Sachs also arranged a meeting with Lesser to discuss a potential joint 
venture between Granite and UPCM. (R. at 5, 1117, 1171-72, 1175-76, 1181, 1212, 
1269, 2042, 2048, 2098-99.) 
12. On May 2, 2001, Sachs, Lesser and Lesser's business associate met for 
lunch in New York City. (R. at 5, 1117, 1150, 1177, 1212.) 
13. Sachs claims that during the lunch meeting, Lesser requested that he locate 
a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM. (R. at 5-6.) 
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14. Sachs and Lesser did not discuss a finder's fee during the lunch. (R. at 
1117-18, 1153,1213.) 
15. On May 17, 2001, upon the advice of his attorney, Sachs sent a letter to 
Rothwell stating as follows: 
I am delighted that my introducing United Park 
City Mines to Granite Land Company appears to be 
heading in the right direction and I am pleased that the 
confidentiality letter has been signed. I certainly will 
continue to do everything in my power to bring 
together a mutually satisfactory agreement between 
these two parties. I took the opportunity to express 
this commitment to your chairman, Joe Lessor [sic], 
when he invited me to lunch at the Sky 8 Room in 
New York in early May. 
I perceive this venture as joining two entities 
with the potential of creating one of the nation's 
premier skiing and real estate developments. In other 
words, I think that both parties are in the right place at 
the right time. I hope you agree. 
In that lunch with Joe Lessor [sic], I was 
delighted to find that he seems to share our enthusiasm 
for this joint venture. I hope that this feeling is 
generally shared by the rest of your board. Most 
potential JV land development partners would still 
require Granite Construction to do the development 
infrastructure. This JV partner comes with that 
compatibility. Joe gave me his encouragement to "get 
the job done." 
I write this letter to remind you that I will 
expect a modest finder's fee if an agreement comes to 
fruition. This could be cash, a couple of prime 
developed lots in the new project, or some other 
consideration acceptable to both of us. While I believe 
that we have an understanding as to this finder's fee, I 
do think that matters of this sort ought to be out on the 
table early on, and I hope that you feel the same. 
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Please let me know if you have any questions 
about such a finder's fee. 
I look forward to continuing our quest to link 
these two parties for everyone's benefit, including the 
shareholders who overwhelming [sic] expressed their 
approval. 
( R a t 1118, 1195, 1213.) 
16. Sachs never discussed the specific amount of a finder's fee with Lesser, 
Rothwell or anyone affiliated with UPCM. (R. at 6, 1213.) Sachs also admits that 
neither Lesser nor anyone else affiliated with Loeb ever told Sachs that he would be paid 
a finder's fee for finding a buyer. (R. at 1119, 1157.) 
17. Sachs claims that on May 18, 2001, after receiving his letter of May 17, 
2001, Lesser called him and stated that he was no longer interested in a joint venture and 
that he wanted UPCM sold. (R. at 1119, 1155-56.) 
18. On May 18, 2001, Sachs wrote a letter to Rothwell stating: 
I understand, after a conversation yesterday 
with Lessor [sic], that his preference would be to sell 
the company rather than enter into a joint venture. I 
had referred to a joint venture in yesterday's letter 
because I had understood that you would consider such 
a proposition (and that is obviously what Granite 
seeks), and because a joint venture purchaser might 
also work for everyone. 
Happily, if your company's preference is sale 
[sic], Granite, as I suggested in yesterday's letter, is 
still an excellent prospect. Another investor, together 
with Granite, would make an excellent purchaser. I 
am happy to re-direct my focus to obtaining such a 
joint venture purchaser. 
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(Ra t 1119, 1196.) 
19. Rothwell never responded to Sachs' letters of May 17 and 18, 2001. (R. at 
1214, 1277.) 
20. The contemplated agreement with Granite referenced in Sachs' letters of 
May 17 and 18, 2001, never came to fruition. (R. at 1120, 1192, 1214, 1277.) 
21. On June 2, 2001, an article appeared in the Park Record entitled "Merger 
Rumblings Heard at UPCM." The article stated that UPCM "was exploring strategies to 
raise money in order to fund the construction of [the Projects]" including "a sale or 
exchange of UPCM's capital stock, assets, projects or business to one or more parties...." 
(R. at 1214, 1267, 1285.) 
22. Sachs first contacted Jackson regarding UPCM the same week the article 
appeared in the Park Record. (R. at 7, 1214, 1273.) 
23. When Sachs contacted Jackson, Jackson already knew that UPCM was for 
sale through discussions he had had with Rothwell, his long-time friend, and through the 
newspaper articles in the Park Record. (R. at 1120, 1169, 1198, 1214.) 
24. On June 4, 2001, Sachs sent Jackson a facsimile coversheet regarding "JV 
Granite Const" requesting that Jackson call him "after your talk with Hank Rothwell." 
(R. at 1215, 1287.) 
25. Sachs continued to contact Jackson regarding Jackson's contemplated 
purchase of UPCM. (R. at 9, 1120.) 
26. After June 4, 2001, Sachs called Jackson on several occasions to inquire 
about Jackson's negotiations with UPCM. Jackson testified that "Sachs called . . . so 
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many times that it was a nuisance [but I] was not going to share any information with 
him." In fact, Jackson viewed Sachs as an outsider to the entire transaction. (R. at 2056-
57,2138-39.) 
27. Although Sachs was represented by counsel at the time, he did not send 
UPCM, Lesser or Loeb a letter or any other document indicating that he considered 
Jackson to be his "client" or that he expected to receive a finder's fee in the event of a 
transaction between UPCM and Jackson. (R. at 1974.) 
28. On February 21, 2002, Capital Growth, a new company that Jackson helped 
form, formally offered to purchase UPCM for approximately $81.3 million. (R. at 11, 
1215.) 
29. Sachs never attended any meetings between UPCM and Jackson, was never 
asked to sign a confidentiality agreement with UPCM and never participated in any 
negotiations with UPCM. In fact, Sachs learned of Capital Growth's agreement to 
purchase UPCM like the rest of the world, through a newspaper article. (R. at 1977, 
2021-22.) 
30. On February 23, 2002, the Salt Lake Tribune published an article regarding 
Capital Growth's proposed purchase of UPCM. (R. at 1215, 1279, 1288.) 
31. The day after the article appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune, Sachs sent a fax 
to Roth well regarding "completion of task." This was the first time Sachs notified 
UPCM that he considered Jackson to be his "client." (R. at 1215, 1279, 1289.) 
32. According to Sachs, between June 2001 and February 2002, the "only" 
thing he did to find a purchaser for UPCM "was make periodic telephone calls" to 
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Jackson. (R. at 1215, 1279.) Sachs spent no more than ten hours total attempting to find 
a buyer for UPCM. (R. at 1121,1159.) 
33. On or about June 16, 2003, UPCM and Capital Growth completed a revised 
merger whereby UPCM became a wholly owned subsidiary of Capital Growth. Capital 
Growth paid approximately $67.2 million for UPCM's shares. (R. at 14, 1215.) 
34. On August 19, 2003, Rothwell sent Sachs a facsimile staling that: 
Ira-United Park does not agree with your agency argument. 
Gerry [Jackson] and I had discussed UP for years! We 
viewed you as a representative of Granite Construction only! 
(R. at 1452, 2062.) 
35. Sachs did not have a Utah real estate license at any relevant time. Sachs' 
real estate license in New York lapsed at least 15 to 20 years ago. (R. at 1121, 1162.) 
36. Sachs has never held a license to sell securities. (R. at 1162.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Sachs' claims are now based entirely upon an alleged implied finder's fee 
agreement to locate a purchaser for UPCM. By his complaint, Sachs seeks a three 
percent (3%) commission of UPCM's $67.2 million sale price. The Court should reverse 
the court of appeal's decision because Sachs' claims are barred as a matter of law by 
UREBA and the Utah Statute of Frauds. 
Sachs was not licensed to sell real estate at any relevant time. The principal 
business of UPCM was the leasing, development, and sale of real property located in or 
near Park City, Utah, and this real property was UPCM's only asset of any significance. 
UREBA specifically precludes the recovery of compensation for finding a buyer of a 
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business whose assets consist of real estate. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(14) ("real estate' 
includes 'business opportunities involving real estate'"). Moreover, contrary to the 
decision of the court of appeals, the transaction at issue was a business opportunity 
involving real estate. 
The alleged finder's fee agreement was not in writing. Therefore, Sachs' claims 
also are barred by the Utah Statute of Frauds. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 ("every 
agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation" must be in writing). Because the relevant portions of the statute of frauds 
and UREBA relate to the same class of persons and things, and have the same basic 
purpose, these statutes should be construed to be in pari materia and construed with 
reference to one another and harmonized if possible. 
Because the statute of frauds does not define "real estate," it is appropriate to refer 
to the definition of "real estate" contained in UREBA, thereby harmonizing the statute of 
frauds with UREBA. Applying this definition, Sachs' claims barred. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Utah's Real Estate Broker Act Bars Unlicensed "Finders" of Business 
Opportunities Involving Real Property from Bringing Actions for 
Commissions. 
UREBA specifically provides that "[n]o person may bring or maintain an 
action in any court . . . for the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation for any 
act . . . which is prohibited under this chapter . . . unless the person was duly 
licensed . . . at the time." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(1) (2003). 
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UREBA further precludes an unlicensed person from acting in the capacity 
of a "principal real estate broker," id § 61-2-1. A principal real estate broker includes 
any person who, inter alia, "sells or lists for sale, buys, exchanges, or auctions real 
estate," id. § 61-2-2(12)(a), or who "assists or directs in the procurement of prospects" 
for the transfer of real estate.4 
"Real estate" is, in turn, defined expansively to include "leaseholds and 
business opportunities involving real property." Id. § 61-2-2(14). There is no de 
minimus exception: "one ac t . . . requires the person . . . to be licensed." IdL § 61-2-4. 
Sachs contends that Appellants promised him an unspecified commission 
for finding a buyer for UPCM, a company whose only significant asset was 
approximately 8,300 acres of land in and around Park City, Utah.5 (R. at 2-3, 1114-15, 
1210, 1257.) Sachs alleges that he was the procuring cause of UPCM's sale. (R. at 1215, 
1279, 1288.) That sale, the terms of which were negotiated and concluded without 
Sachs' involvement, was consummated as corporate merger, in which Capital Growth 
purchased all outstanding shares of UPCM's common stock. (R. at 14, 1215.) It is 
4
 In Diversified General Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, 584 P.2d 848 (Utah 
1978), this Court held that UREBA applies to those who perform the ads described in 
UREBA, regardless of whether they are "brokers," or "finders." A person whose sole 
responsibility is to "locate a buyer for the property and bring him to" the seller "fall[s] 
precisely within the statutory definition of a real estate broker." 584 P.2d at 849, 852. 
5
 While Appellants dispute Sachs' contract, promissory estoppel/reliance, and 
implied contract claims on multiple grounds, the writ of certiorari did not include those 
issues. 
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undisputed that Sachs never held a real estate broker license in Utah or anywhere else. 
(R. at 1121, 1162.) 
In reversing the trial court's conclusion that Sachs' claims were barred 
because he was unlicensed at the time he allegedly found the buyer, the Court of Appeals 
held that the term "business opportunities involving real property" does not apply to (1) 
existing, ongoing businesses, nor to (2) transactions involving the sale of stock. Sachs v. 
Lesser, 2007 UT App 169, ffif 39-42, 44 n.21, 46-48, 163 P.3d 662. 
In arriving at its erroneous interpretation, the Court of Appeals (1) violated 
elementary rules of statutory construction by allowing its analysis of UREBA's plain 
language to be influenced by its erroneous view of the legislative history; (2) in the 
process, relied on an incomplete record of UREBA's legislative history; (3) prioritized its 
conclusion about the historical place of corporations at the expense of the legislature's 
expressed intent; (4) ignored the Real Estate Commission's considered interpretation of 
the term "business opportunity," even though the Commission is authorized to 
promulgate regulations interpreting UREBA; (5) relied upon cases from other 
jurisdictions that interpreted statutes distinctly different than UREBA and simultaneously 
dismissed case law from jurisdictions whose real estate broker statutes closely parallel 
UREBA; (6) delivered an interpretation of UREBA that renders statutory terms 
superfluous; and (7) interpreted UREBA in a manner that subverts the statute's essential 
purpose. Each of these reversible errors is discussed below. 
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11. The Ordinary Meaning of "Business Opportunities Involving Real Property" 
Includes the Transaction at Issue. 
The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the phrase "business 
opportunities involving real property" is ambiguous. A construction "according to its 
ordinary and accepted meaning," Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d 
867, 871 (Utah 1995), demonstrates the phrase is not "susceptible to two interpretations," 
Bluffdale Mt. Homes, LC v. Bluffdale City. 2007 UT 57, % 69, 582 Utah Adv. Rep. 41. 
Utah courts are required to interpret statutory terms "according to the 
context and the approved usage of the language." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11; see also 
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Svs.. Inc.. 2001 UT 29,1f 12-13, 24 P.3d 928. However, 
"technical words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate 
meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar 
and appropriate meaning or definition." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11. Additionally, the 
Utah legislature has provided default definitions for certain regularly used terms, 
including the terms "'[l]and,' 'real estate,' and 'real property.'" Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-
12. For purposes of the default definitions, these three terms are synonymous, meaning 
"land, tenements, hereditaments, water rights, possessory rights, and claims." Id. § 68-3-
12(2)(k). These default definitions are controlling unless they are "inconsistent with the 
manifest intent of the Legislature . . . or repugnant to the context of the statute." Id. § 68-
3-12(2). 
UREBA, however, expands the definition of "real estate" to "include[] 
leaseholds and business opportunities involving real property." Utah Code Ann. §61-2-
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2. As such, UREBA defines the term "real estate" more broadly than the ordinary and 
customary definition of that term and, consequently, signals the legislature's intention to 
apply UREBA's licensing requirements to a wider class of real estate-related 
transactions. Currently, UREBA does not separately define the term "business 
opportunities," id. § 61-2-2, and the term has no particular "peculiar and appropriate 
meaning in law," id § 68-3-11. For example, there is no entry for the term "business 
opportunity" in Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999), the Dictionary of Modern Legal 
Usage (1990), or Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3d ed.). Because the statute does not 
define the term, and since it has no particular meaning in law, it must be construed 
"according to . . . the approved usage of the language." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11. 
This Court frequently consults standard dictionary definitions to assess the 
"ordinary meaning" of an otherwise undefined term. See, e.g., Emergency Physicians 
Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72,120, 586 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(consulting Webster's Third New International Dictionary for the definition of "facility"); 
State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ^ 19, 137 P.3d 726 (consulting Merriam-Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary's definition of "marry"). An application of standard dictionary 
definitions establishes that the term "business opportunities" means "good commercial 
prospects" according to the ordinary English definition. The word "business" functions 
as an adjective modifying the noun "opportunities." The word "opportunity" means "[a] 
good position, chance, or prospect, as for advancement or success." Webster's 
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 1359 (2001). "Business" 
is defined as "a person, partnership, or corporation engaged in commerce, manufacturing, 
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or a service." Id. at 283; see also Black's Law Dictionary 192 (7th ed. 1999) (defining 
"business" as "[a] commercial enterprise carried on for profit"). Therefore, a "business 
opportunity" is, in ordinary parlance, "a good commercial prospect." 
UREBA further modifies the term with the participial phrase "involving 
real property." Because the term "real property" is not defined under UREBA, it must be 
attributed its default definition. Thus, the phrase "business opportunities involving real 
property" means "good commercial prospects involving land, tenements, hereditaments, 
water rights, possessory rights, and claims." S!ee Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(k). 
UPCM—a business that principally leases, develops, and sells real property 
and whose asset of any significance whatsoever is thousands of acres of developable real 
property—was in and of itself a good commercial prospect involving land. Thus, 
locating a buyer for UPCM, regardless of what form the sale assumed, necessarily 
involved the "procurement of prospects for" the sale of a "business opportunity] 
involving real property." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(12). 
III. Alternatively, the Term "Business Opportunities Involving Eteal Property" 
Should Be Construed According to Its Previous Statutory Definition 
If this Court concludes the phrase "business opportunities involving real 
property" is ambiguous, the legislative history of the key provisions of UREBA compels 
this Court to apply a definition consonant with the previous statutory definition. See 
Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah 1990) ("When interpreting an 
ambiguous statute, we first try to discover the underlying intent of the legislature, guided 
by the meaning and purpose of the statute as a whole and the legislative history."). 
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A. The Legislative History of UREBA Indicates "Business Opportunity" 
Includes Ongoing Businesses. 
1. The Legislative History of UREBA Prior to the 1985 Amendment. 
The legislature first enacted laws regulating real estate brokers in 1921. 
See An Act to Define Real Estate Brokers and Real Estate Salesmen, 1921 Utah Laws 
304, 304-09, Ch. 110. By 1943, UREBA defined "real estate" to "include leaseholds and 
other interests less than leaseholds." Utah Code Ann. § 82-2-2 (1943). In 1959, this 
Court recognized that this definition "clearly indicate[d] the intention of the legislature 
that a broad coverage be given to the term 'real estate5 for the purposes of this Act." 
Chase v. Morgan, 339 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah 1959). 
Four years after this Court acknowledged the already broad scope of 
UREBA and expansive definition of "real estate," the legislature further expanded the 
definition of "real estate" to include "business opportunities." Real Estate Broker Act, 
1963 Utah Laws 521, 522, Ch. 146, § 1. The legislature defined the term "business 
opportunity" to "include an existing business, business and the good will attached thereto 
or any one or combination thereof." Id 
In 1983, the Utah Legislature created a new executive agency to administer 
and enforce UREBA, moving responsibility for enforcing UREBA from the Securities 
Commission (now the Division of Securities) to the newly created Division of Real 
Estate (the "Division") within the Department of Business Regulation (now the 
Department of Commerce). See Division of Real Estate Amendments—Sunset Review 
Act, 1983 Utah Laws 1020, 1022, Ch. 257, § 5. The 1983 legislation extensively revised 
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the material provisions of UREBA, including, among others, the procedures for licensing 
brokers and the enforcement powers of the Division. See generally id. 
The 1983 amendment also revised the definition of "real estate" to 
"include[] leaseholds, business opportunities, and all timeshare interests (including but 
not limited to fee simple, club membership, limited partnership, and beneficiary interests 
in a timeshare trust)." Id. at 1021. In addition, the 1983 act clarified that the term 
"business opportunity" meant "an existing business, a business and its good will, a 
business franchise, or any combination of them." Id It is worth noting that this 
definition is harmonious with the ordinary English definition of the term. 
2. In 1985, the Legislature Deleted the Definition for "Business 
Opportunity" But Retained the Term in the Definition of "Real 
Estate". 
In 1985, the legislature again amended UREBA. Real Estate Amendments, 
1985 Utah Laws 308, Ch. 162. The court of appeals concluded this legislation was the 
watershed in which the legislature intended to eliminate existing businesses from the 
definition of business opportunities. A careful analysis of the legislative history, 
however, reveals the court of appeals based its conclusion on a material 
misunderstanding of the 1985 legislation. According to the court of appeals, "[i]n 1985, 
the Utah Legislature contracted the scope of the real estate broker's act [when]. . . it 
deleted 'existing business, business and the good will attached thereto or any one of a 
combination thereof from the expansive definition of 'business opportunity.'" Sachs, 
2007 UT App 169, f 48; see also kL «|fl[ 39, 44 n.21. Rather than deleting certain phrases 
from the definition of "business opportunities," as claimed by the court of appeals, the 
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1985 legislation actually deleted the definition of "business opportunities" entirely. 1985 
Utah Laws at 309. This is no small distinction: deleting portions of a definition indicates 
something very different than deleting the whole definition. 
While the 1985 legislation erased the definition of "business opportunities" 
from UREBA, the definition of "real estate" continued to include that term: '"Real estate' 
includes leaseholds, business opportunities, and all timeshare interests (including but not 
limited to fee simple, club membership, limited partnership, and beneficiary interest in a 
timeshare trust) involving real property." IdL The only amendment to the definition of 
"real estate" contained in the 1985 legislation was the addition of the terminal qualifier 
"involving real property." Id. 
B. The Legislative History and Stated Purpose for the 1985 Legislation Do 
Not Support the Court of Appeal's Construction. 
While the court of appeals "assume[d]" that the legislature intended to 
exclude "existing businesses, businesses and their good will, [and] business franchises" 
from the definition of "business opportunities," Sachs, 2007 UT App 1693 f 39, the 
legislative history establishes this assumption is incorrect. 
When the legislature first created the Real Estate Division in 1983, it 
charged it with responsibility for the "administration and enforcement o f UREBA. 
Division of Real Estate Amendments—Sunset Review Act, 1983 Utah Laws 1020, 1022, 
Ch. 257, § 5. Apparently, the Division came to believe that certain statutory phrasing 
needed fine-tuning. As the sponsor of the 1985 amending legislation, Representative 
Richard J. Bradford, explained on the floor of the House of Representatives when he 
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introduced the legislation (Second Substitute H.B. No. 284), "the initiative for it came 
from the Department of Business Regulation, the Real Estate Division. It is an attempt to 
clarify and clean up the existing statute regulating the real estate industry in Utah." Floor 
Debate, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 22, 1985) (House audograph discs nos. 8 & 9) 
(statements of Rep. Bradford) (emphasis added) (a true and correct transcript of the 
recording of the floor debate on Sec. Sub. H.B. No. 284 in the House of Representatives 
is attached hereto as Exhibit F.) See also id. ("[T]he bill, as I've indicated before, is an 
attempt to clarify and to clean up language in the statute."). 
Senator Brent C. Overson, who spoke in favor of the bill in the Senate, 
echoed Representative Bradford's statements and further explained the narrow purpose of 
the legislation. Senator Overson stated: 
This bill comes from the Real Estate Division. It has been 
worked out with the real estate industry and it is basically to 
amend the real estate statutes to clarify some things we did 
back in 1983 with respect to the establishing the three classes 
of licensing for brokers and also add some other definitions 
so that the statute is clear.[6] It further defines the 
Commission and Division role. It clarifies their working 
relationship. It clarifies the license application language and 
also it clarifies the issue of non-resident licenses. The current 
statute is quite ambiguous and this cleans up that quite a bit. 
It clarifies the issue of fiduciary duty and also establishes that 
forms provided by the Real Estate Commission, Office of the 
Attorney General, are those which are to be used by real 
estate brokers. 
The 1985 legislation added definitions for "concurrence," "director," 
"division," and "executive director." Real Estate Amendments, 1985 Utah Laws 308, 
Ch. 162, § 2. 
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Floor Debate, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 27, 1985) (Senate recording disc no. 124) 
(statements of Sen. Overson) (a true and correct transcript of the recording of the floor 
debate on Sec. Sub. H.B. No. 284 in the Senate is attached hereto as Exhibit G.) 
These statements from the sponsors of the 1985 legislation demonstrate that 
the Court of Appeal's assumption about the intent of the legislature is erroneous. First, 
the legislature did not intend the amendments to have any substantive effect. Rather, the 
legislation was only intended to "clarify and to clean up language in the statute," and, in 
particular, to clarify the changes made by the 1983 legislation. Utah v. Yates, 834 P.2d 
599, 602 (Utah 1992) (recognizing that the presumption that amendments are "intended 
to change existing legal rights and liabilities" only applies to "amendments] not 
expressly characterized as a clarification"). 
Second, the legislative history nowhere suggests that the legislature 
intended to substantively modify UREBA by removing the definition of "business 
opportunities." Indeed, at no time during the floor debates in House of Representatives 
or Senate was that particular change ever raised or addressed. Justice Nehring's 
concurring opinion in Utah Public Employees Ass'n v. Utah, 2006 UT 9, f 93, 131 P.3d 
208, speaks directly to the Court of Appeal's rather bold assumption: 
Neither the sponsor of the [1985] amendment nor anyone who 
rose in the legislature to speak to the merits of the amendment 
indicated that it would bring about any modification of the 
substance of the pre-amendment language. Yet, the [Court of 
Appeal's] reading of the [1985] amendment requires a 
dramatic interpretive shift to a meaning squarely at odds with 
the legislative history. 
For precisely this reason, the Court of Appeal's interpretation is erroneous. 
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C. The Court of Appeals Erred When It Determined That the 1985 
Legislation Substantively Altered the Meaning of the Term "Business 
Opportunities." 
Based on the 1985 legislation (and, admittedly, without the benefit of the 
floor debates), the court of appeals "assume[d]... that the legislature intended to 
redefine the phrase 'business opportunities' to no longer mean existing businesses, 
businesses and their good will, or business franchises." Sachs, 2007 UT App 169, % 39. 
The court of appeal's "assumption" is flawed for at least two reasons: (1) the case law it 
relied upon does not support the conclusion, and, more importantly, (2) the legislative 
history negates it. 
The court of appeals cited Sindt v. Retirement Board, 2007 UT 16, 570 
Utah Adv. Rep. 71, for the proposition that courts must presume the legislature's removal 
of a term from a statute is intended to have substantive effect. In Sindt, the plaintiff 
argued that he was entitled to participate in the state's retirement system due to his 
service as a constable. Id. ^ 6. During the period Mr. Sindt was a constable, the 
legislature amended the retirement system statute several times. When Mr. Sindt began 
his tenure, the statute specifically included the word "constable" in its definition of 
"employee," but a later-enacted statute did not contain that term. IdL fl 7, 13. This Court 
recognized that it could "not ignore the legislature's decision to remove the term," idL 
Tf 13, and held that the "'omission of the [term] in the revised statute logically can mean 
nothing but that the legislature's purpose deliberately was to remove' constables from 
coverage in the state retirement system," id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 
Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1983)). 
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While the inference Sindt draws from the legislature's removal of the term 
"constable" was proper in that case, here, the legislature did not remove the term 
"business opportunities" from the definition of real estate, it simply deleted the definition 
of "business opportunity." Had the legislature intended to remove the term "business 
opportunities" from the definition of "real estate," it would have done so in 1985—or 
when it amended UREBA in 1987, 1989, 1991, 1996, 1997, 2003, and 2005. The 
retention of the term "business opportunities" for the past twenty-two years, and through 
seven statutory amendments, indicates the legislature intended to retain "business 
opportunities" within the definition of "real estate." See Robert H. Hinckley, Inc. v. State 
Tax Commission, 404 P.2d 662, 667-68 (Utah 1965) (noting that "it does not necessarily 
follow from the fact that the 1937 amendment deleted the provision that the vendor had 
the option of collecting from the vendee or absorbing the tax himself that the legislature 
intended to prohibit or make it unlawful for a vendor to absorb or pay the tax himself); 
State v. Alta Club, 232 P.2d 759, 761-62 (Utah 1951) ("In order to evaluate the 
correctness of [the attorney general's] assertion, it is necessary first to determine the 
meaning of the deleted phrase in its context in the unamended act. . . ."); Sulzen v. 
Williams, 1999 UT App 76, ffi[ 20-23, 977 P.2d 497 (determining the intended effect of 
an amendment deleting portions of a statute by examining (1) the legislature's "expressed 
purpose" for the amendment, (2) the "provision's legislative history," and (3) the 
"policies underlying the provision"); Cf Doe v. Utah Department of Public Safety, 782 
P.2d 489 (Utah 1989) (holding that the deletion of "superfluous assurances of the effect 
of expunction does not negate the fact that offenses are expunged"). 
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More importantly, as discussed in Part III.B, supra, the history of the 1985 
legislation disproves the court of appeal's "assumption" about the legislature's intent. 
Given that the expressed purpose of the legislation was merely intended to "clarify and to 
clean up language" in the statute, and, in particular, "to clarify some things [the 
legislature] did back in 1983," the court of appeals erred in concluding the legislature 
intended to exclude existing businesses from the definition of "business opportunity." 
IV. The Judiciary Should Defer to the Real Estate Commission's Reasonable 
Interpretation of the Term "Business Opportunities". 
The Real Estate Commission, pursuant to the rulemaking "authority granted 
by Section 61-2-5.5," defined "business opportunity" to mean "[t]he sale, lease, or 
exchange of any business which includes an interest in real estate." Utah Admin. Code 
rr. 162-1-1(1.1), 162-1-2(1.2.4) (2007). This construction of the term "business 
opportunity" is consistent with the prior statutory definition as well as the ordinary 
English definition. Whether or not this is the best possible interpretation, it is well within 
"the tolerable limits of reason." Williams, 754 P.2d at 50. 
An administrative agency's interpretation of statutory language is entitled 
to deference "on the basis of [either] an explicit or implicit grant of discretion contained 
in the governing statute." Morton Int'l Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 
1991). Here, the legislature explicitly granted the Real Estate Commission (the 
"Commission") rulemaking authority to administer UREBA, or, alternatively, implicitly 
granted the Commission authority to define the term "business opportunity" by removing 
the definition of the term from the statute. 
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When the legislature created the Real Estate Division, it simultaneously 
created the Commission to administer and determine policy for the Division. See 
Division of Real Estate Amendments—Sunset Review Act, 1983 Utah Laws 1020, 1022-
23, Ch. 257, § 6 ("The commission shall . . . promulgate rules relating to the licensing 
and conduct of real estate principal brokers, brokers, and salesman . . . ."). The 
Commission is authorized, indeed mandated, to "make rules for the administration of th[e 
Division of Real Estate ] chapter that are not inconsistent with th[e] chapter, 
including[,]... licensing of.. . principal brokers." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-5.5 (2007).7 
Section 61-2-5.5 constitutes an "explicit.. . grant of discretion contained in the 
governing statute." Morton Inf I Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991); 
see also Williams v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988) (An agency's 
"interpretation of the operative provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to 
administer . . . [is] only set aside if... imposed arbitrarily or capriciously or [if it is] 
beyond the tolerable limits of reason."). 
Alternatively, the authority granted the Commission by Section 61-2-5.5, 
coupled with the removal of the definition for "business opportunity," implicitly granted 
the Commission discretion to enact rules interpreting that term. Although Appellants 
believe that the meaning of the term "business opportunity" is discernible, either from its 
plain language or by applying traditional rules of statutory construction, if this Court 
n 
Although minor stylistic changes have been made, this provision was 
substantively identical in 2001 and 2002, the years in which Sachs purportedly located a 
buyer for UPCM. 
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disagrees, then the legislature implicitly granted the Commission discretion to define the 
term. As Morton International explained, when legislative intent cannot be "derived 
through traditional methods of statutory construction,... it is appropriate to conclude 
that the legislature has delegated authority to the agency to decide the issue." 814 P.2d at 
589. Pursuant to this delegation of authority, the Commission has promulgated a 
reasonable definition for the term "business opportunity." 
Under the Commission's definition of "business opportunity," which is 
entitled to deference, the sale of UPCM was a business opportunity since it was 
indisputably a "sale . . . of a[] business which includes an interest in real estate." (R. at 2-
3, 111445, 1210, 1257.) 
V. Appellants' Definition of the Term "Business Opportunity" Is Consistent 
with Comparable Statutes from Other States. 
Although the standard tools of statutory construction and the plain meaning 
ascribed by the Commission disambiguate the term "business opportunity," statutes and 
judicial constructions from other states corroborate the meaning derived from these 
sources. 
A survey of case law and statutes from other jurisdictions confirms that the 
term "business opportunities" includes the sale of an existing business Ihrough the 
transfer of its stock. See, e.g., Coonev v. Ritter, 939 F.2d 81, 84-88 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(finding New Jersey's real estate broker statute applied to sale of stock); Shochet Secur., 
Inc. v. First Union Corp., 663 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that sale of 
business through stock purchase was a sale of a business opportunity under Florida's 
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licensing law, but holding statute unconstitutional due to procedural defects (it was 
subsequently re-enacted)); Broughall v. Black Forest Dev. Co., 593 P.2d 314, 316 (Colo. 
1978) ("[T]he statute obviously was [intended] to align Colorado with the majority New 
Jersey rule which requires a finder . . . to have a real estate broker's license if the sale of 
the business includes a transfer of any interest in real estate."); Lieff v. Medco Prof 1 
Servs. Corp., 973 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (same); Everett v. Goodloe, 602 
S.E.2d 284, 289 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (The "sale of all of the stock of the corporation was 
in legal effect a sale of all of its assets, and the mere fact that the parties found it more 
convenient to transfer all of the stock rather than to make a conveyance of its assets does 
not change the substance of the transaction." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Burks 
v. Elevation Outdoor Adver., LLC, 220 S. W.3d 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that 
alleged oral agreement to pay commission for arranging for sale of business whose most 
important asset was leaseholds required license); Springer v. Rosauer, 641 P.2d 1216, 
1219 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) ("A person authorized to find a buyer for all of the stock of a 
corporation for compensation has been held to be a real estate business opportunity 
broker within the meaning of this statute."); Schmitt v. Coad, 604 P.2d 507, 509 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1979) ("Although a sale of corporate stock is . . . a sale of securities, it does not 
o 
follow that it may not also constitute a sale of a ' . . . business opportunity . . . . ' " ) . 
8
 See also, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 54-2004 ("'Business opportunity' means and 
includes an established business, good will of an established business, or any interest 
therein, or any one (1) or combination thereof, where a sale or transfer of an interest in 
land including, but not limited to, an assignment of a lease, is involved in the 
transaction."); Cf. Shortt v. Knob City Inv. Co., 292 S.E.2d 737, 741 (N.C. Ct. App. 
(continued...) 
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The Court of Appeal's reliance on Gruber v. Owens-Illinois Inc., 899 F.2d 
1366 (3d Cir. 1990), is misplaced. Although the court found that Pennsylvania's real 
estate broker's act did not apply to a sale of a business completed through a stock 
transfer, Pennsylvania's licensing act does not define "real estate" to include "business 
opportunities," as does UREBA. See 63 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 455.201 (1990) (defining "real 
estate," in pertinent part, as "[a]ny interest or estate in land, whether corporeal, 
incorporeal, freehold or nonfreehold, whether the land is situated in this Commonwealth 
or elsewhere including leasehold interests and time share and similarly designated 
interests").9 
(...continued) 
1982) (The "sale of 100 percent of the stock in defendant constituted a sale by the 
defendant corporation of the property in question."). 
Like UREBA, New Hampshire's real estate broker licensing statute defines "real estate" 
to include "business opportunities which involve any interest in real estate." N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 331-A:2. Like UREBA, New Hampshire's statute does not provide a 
definition for "business opportunities." See icl In Blackthorne Group, Inc. v. Pines of 
Newmarket, Inc., 848 A.2d 725, 731 (N.H. 2004), the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
held that because "the sale of the defendant's business indisputably involved real estate, 
[New Hampshire's real estate broker licensing] Act applied to the sale." 
9
 All but one of cases that the Court of Appeals cited on this issue, see Sachs, 
2007 UT App 169, f 43 n.19, are similarly inapposite. See Abramson v. Gulf Coast 
Jewelry & Specialty Co., 445 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1971) (Alabama's statute did not apply 
to business opportunities, see Ala. Code § 34-27-1 to -11 (1975)); Cambridge Co. v. Ariz. 
Lawn Sprinklers, Inc., 801 P.2d 504, 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (Arizona's statute did not 
define real estate to include business opportunities, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2101(32) (1990) 
("'Real estate' includes leasehold-interests and any estates in land . . . regardless of 
whether located in this state."); additionally, the court found the "completed 
transaction . . . expressly exclude[d] transfer of the leasehold interest," the only real estate 
involved.); Frier v. Terry, 323 S.W.2d 415 (Ark. 1959) (Arkansas' real estate broker 
statute did not apply to transactions involving "business opportunities," see Ark. Code 
Ann. §§ 17-35-101, 102 (1987) (renumbered and re-codified from Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-
(continued...) 
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VI. The Court of Appeal's Definition of "Business Opportunities" Renders the 
Term Inoperative and Superfluous or Leads to Absurd Results. 
The Court of Appeal's construction of the phrase "business opportunities55 
leaves the term without any effect or consequence, in violation of the rule requiring 
courts to "avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or 
inoperative.55 Hall v. Dep5tof Corr., 2001 UT 34, ^ 15, 24 P.3d 958. 
While the Court of Appeal's premise—that the terms "business 
opportunity55 and "ongoing business55 are not synonymous—is correct, the Court of 
Appeal's conclusion—that the term "business opportunity55 does not include "existing 
businesses,55 Sachs, 2007 UT App 169, f 39—does not follow from its premise. The term 
"business opportunity55 is expansive and covers far more than mere existing businesses, 
including prospective businesses; subsidiaries, divisions, or units of existing businesses; 
business franchises; and business goodwill.10 
(...continued) 
1302 (1947)).); Turnpike Motors, Inc. v. Newbury Group, Inc., 528 N.E.2d 1176 (Mass. 
1988) (Massachusetts5 statute did not apply to "business opportunities55 and defined "real 
estate55, in pertinent part, as "any and every estate or interest in land and the 
improvements thereon,55 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, § 87PP (1987).); Moody v. Hurricane 
Creek Lumber Co., 625 P.2d 1306, 1307-11 (Or. 1981) (The real estate broker statute did 
not apply to "business opportunities55 and Oregon had a completely separate business 
broker licensing statute, which contained an exception for isolated transactions; 
additionally, the transaction did not involve the sale of stock, but an asset purchase.); 
Evans v. Prufrock Rests., Inc., 757 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (discussed infra). 
10
 The Court of Appeal's restrictive view of the term "business opportunities55 is 
evident from its opinion: "Had the legislature defined real estate to include businesses 
involving real property, we would agree that UREBA is applicable. The plain language 
of the statute, however, includes only business opportunities.55 (Sachs, 2007 UT App 
169,13 8 (emphasis added).) 
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The Court of Appeal's construction is simply untenable. The ordinary 
English definition of "business opportunity"—"a good commercial prospect"— 
encompasses ongoing businesses as well as numerous other business-related transactions 
comprising something less than an existing business. 
If the term "business opportunity" does not include existing businesses, 
business goodwill, or business franchises, the term can rationally have no substantive 
meaning at all. Saying that an apple is not a "rounded red, yellow, or green edible fruit" 
is to negate the term entirely; concluding that a term specifically excludes its ordinary 
meaning leaves only an empty shell. However, since the legislature is presumed to have 
"used each word [in a statute] advisedly," courts are required to "give effect to each 
term." Utah State Bar, 905 P.2d at 871. 
VII. The Court of Appeals Erred by Determining That the Sale Did Not Fall 
Under the Licensing Statute Because of the Form of the Transaction, 
The lynchpin in the Court of Appeal's analysis is the observation that "the 
business opportunity at issue is the purchase of all of UPCM's capital stock" and that 
corporate shares "constitute a property interest quite distinct from the capital or tangible 
assets of the corporation." Sachs, 2007 UT App 169, fflf 40, 42. 
While the Court of Appeals is correct about the traditional nature of 
corporate equity interests, it relies heavily on conventional notions of real estate in its 
reasoning. Although the legislature defined "real estate" under UREB A to include non-
standard forms, such as business opportunities, the Court of Appeals held that a sale of 
securities can never be a sale of real estate. As the Washington Court of Appeals aptly 
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stated, "[although a sale of corporate stock is . . . a sale of securities, it does not follow 
that it may not also constitute a sale of a ' . . . business opportunity . . . . ' " Schmitt v. 
Coad, 604 P.2d 507, 509 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). It is the legislature's prerogative to 
define the sale of stock in a corporation holding real property assets as a sale of a 
business opportunity involving real property and, therefore, a sale of real estate. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal's reliance on the form of the transaction 
rests on an anachronism. The only evidence in the record on this issue establishes that 
the decision to consummate the transaction as a sale of stock, rather than, for example, as 
an asset purchase, was not made until well after Sachs allegedly found a buyer for UPCM 
and concluded his involvement. (R. at 7, 14, 1214-15, 1273, 1279, 1977,2021-22.) At 
the time Sachs allegedly found Jackson, no one—including Sachs—knew what form the 
transaction would ultimately assume. That Sachs knew the real value of the company 
lied in its vast portfolio of developable real property is amply demonstrated by the fact 
that the prospective purchasers he contacted were all in the real estate development 
industry. (R. at 5, 1116, 1211.) 
VIIL The Court of Appeal's Interpretation of UREBA Renders the Statute 
Constitutionally Suspect. 
Violating UREBA carries a criminal penalty: "[ajny individual violating 
this chapter . . . is . . . guilty of a class A misdemeanor" and is subject to "imprisonment 
[up to] six months." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-17. This Court has consistently followed 
the "fundamental rule of statutory construction that 'if a legislative act is susceptible of 
two constructions, one conformable to the constitutional provision on the subject and the 
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other not, [it] will adopt the one that is conformable, and reject the one that is not.5" 
Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, f 42, 163 P.3d 623 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. 
Holman, 202 P. 1096, 1098 (Utah 1921)). The Court of Appeal's interpretation of 
UREBA, however, introduces significant equal protection and due process concerns, 
whereas Appellants' interpretation avoids such problems. 
When the after-the-fact discretionary "action of a third party" is a "factor 
which determines whether guilt attaches" under a criminal statute, "[s]uch a discretion is 
at odds with constitutional due process and equal protection of the laws." Colorado v. 
Vinnola, 494 P.2d 826, 831 (Colo. 1972); accord Tolbert v. Alabama, 321 So. 2d 227, 
23 1 (Ala. 1975). Yet, the Court of Appeal's construction of UREBA permits just this 
situation because a person may become subject to UREBA, and its criminal penalties, as 
a consequence of decisions of third parties made after that person has completed his 
services. Under the Court of Appeal's construction, an unlicensed person who merely 
introduces an owner of a business with real property assets to a willing buyer, but plays 
no role in determining how the transaction is ultimately structured, may or may not 
become subject to UREBA's criminal penalties depending on whether the buyer and 
seller consummate the deal as an asset purchase or as a stock purchase. 
11
 See Diversified General Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, 584 P.2d 848, 850 
(Utah 1978) (holding that UREBA applies to a person who "'bringfs] the [buyer and 
seller] together in an amicable frame of mind'" even if that person has no role in 
"'working out the terms of their agreement.'" (quoting Corson v. Keane, 72 A.2d 314, 
316 (N.J. 1950)). 
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In contrast, Appellants' interpretation erects a bright-line rule that avoids 
such due process concerns: under Appellants' interpretation, finders are on notice that 
they need a real estate license if the business opportunity involves real property, 
regardless of how the transaction is ultimately consummated. 
IX. The Court of Appeal's Interpretation Is Contrary to the Policy of UREBA 
and Invites Abuse by Elevating Form Above Substance. 
The Court of Appeal's interpretation also undermines the "real purpose of 
the real estate broker's legislation," which is "the protection of the public from dishonest 
or unscrupulous persons whose business is dealing in transactions whose objects are the 
consummation of real estate deals." Seal v. Powell 345 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah 1959). The 
Court of Appeal's interpretation creates a loophole that can be exploited by precisely the 
same unscrupulous persons the legislation was designed to guard against. Should the 
Court of Appeal's interpretation stand, it would permit unlicensed brokers to avoid the 
statute by structuring real estate transactions to take advantage of the loophole, using the 
Court of Appeal's opinion as a blueprint for avoiding UREBA. 
For example, an unscrupulous and unlicensed broker might suggest to a 
seller of residential property that, in his experience, it is easier to sell in a weak housing 
market by structuring the deal as a transfer of interests in a limited liability company. 
The broker then forms a limited liability company for the trusting seller and brokers a 
sale of the residential property as a transfer of all of the membership interests in the 
limited liability company. By such an easy artifice, this broker could, under the Court of 
Appeal's construction, avoid UREBA's sanctions and accomplish, in substance, exactly 
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what UREBA prohibits. Because "[jurisprudential pragmatism prevents the exaltation 
of legalities to a sacrosanct status in disregard of realities," this Court should reject an 
approach that permits, indeed invites, such a result. Kingston Dev. Co,, v. Kenerlv, 208 
S.E.2d 118, 122 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974). 
X. The Court of Appeals Erred By Concluding That Utah's Statute of Frauds 
Does Not Apply to the Alleged Agreement Because the Transaction Was 
Effected as a Transfer of Stock. 
A. The Statute of Frauds Applies to Sachs' Alleged Oral Agreement. 
Under Utah's Statute of Frauds, "every agreement authorizing or employing an 
agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation" is "void" unless it is "in 
writing" and "signed by the party to be charged with the agreement." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-5-4(1). This provision applies with equal force to purported "finder's agreements." 
Machan Hampshire Props., Inc. v. W. Real Estate & Dev. Co., 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (The statute of frauds "applies broadly to agreements requiring 
compensation for brokering real estate, including finder's agreements, and not just to 
contracts employing brokers to purchase or sell real estate for compensation."); C.J. 
Realty. Inc. v. WiUev, 758 P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (The statute of frauds "applies 
to the commission agreements of real estate brokers generally and not just to contracts 
employing brokers to 'purchase or sell real estate for compensation.'"). 
To satisfy the statute of frauds, a finder's fee agreement "must contain all the 
essential terms and provisions of the contract to which the parties have agreed." Machan, 
779 P.2d at 234. At a minimum, the writing must identify "the finder, the finder's 
clients, the property owner who will owe a commission to the finder if a transaction is 
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closed . . . , and the commission rate." C.J. Realty, Inc., 758 P.2d at 928. Further, the 
"writings must so clearly evidence the fact that a contract was made, and what its terms 
are, 'that there is no serious possibility that the assertion of the contract is false.'" 
Machan, 779 P.2d at 235 (quoting 2A Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 512 
at 547 (1950)). 
It is undisputed that no writing satisfying each of the requirements of the statute of 
frauds exists. Rather, Sachs bases his right to a commission on an alleged unwritten 
agreement, an agreement Appellants vehemently deny. 
B. The Statute of Frauds Must Be Construed in Harmony with UREBA. 
The section of the statute of frauds addressing "agreements] authorizing or 
employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation," Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1), relates to the same subject matter as the licensing provisions of 
UREBA, which apply to a broker "employed by . . . the owner of real estate or by a 
prospective purchaser" to "sell[] or . . . buy[] . . . real estate . . . with the expectation of 
receiving valuable consideration," id. § 61-2-2(12). "Statutes are considered to be in pari 
materia and thus must be construed together when they relate to the same person or thing, 
to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or object." Utah County 
v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985). 
Because the relevant portions of the statute of frauds and UREBA relate to the 
same class of persons (real estate brokers) and things (compensation for selling real 
estate), and have the same basic purpose (the prevention of fraud by unscrupulous 
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brokers), "those statutes should be construed to be in pari materia [and] construed with 
reference to one another and harmonized if possible." Id. (footnotes omitted). Because 
the statute of frauds does not define "real estate," it is appropriate to refer to the 
definition of "real estate" contained in UREBA, thereby harmonizing the statute of frauds 
with UREBA. 
As such, because the unwritten agreement Appellee seeks to enforce purportedly 
employed him to sell real estate—particularly, a business opportunity involving real 
property—for compensation, the agreement is void. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully request that the Court reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. In addition, Appellants respectfully request that the 
Court remand this case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to enter an order 
affirming the Order and Judgment entered by the district court. 
12
 Compare Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah 1976) (The broker 
provision of the statute of frauds is for the "purpose of protecting the owners of land from 
fraudulent and fictitious claims for commissions.") with Seal v. Powell 345 P.2d 432, 
433 (Utah 1959) (UREBA's purpose is "the protection of the public from dishonest or 
unscrupulous persons whose business is dealing in transactions whose objects are the 
consummation of real estate deals."). 
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717 SECURITIES DIVISION — REAL ESTATE DIVISION 61-1-30 
(4) For the purposes of this section, an offer to sell or to buy 
is accepted in this state when acceptance: 
(a) is communicated to the offeror in this state; and 
(b) has not previously been communicated to the of-
feror, orally or in writing, outside this state, and accep-
tance is communicated to the offeror in this state, 
whether or not either party is then present in this state, 
when the offeree directs it to the offeror in this state 
reasonably believing the offeror to be in this state and it is 
received at the place to which it is directed or at any post 
office in this state in the case of a mailed acceptance. 
(5) An offer to sell or to buy is not made in this state when: 
(a) the publisher circulates or there is circulated on his 
behalf in this state any bona fide newspaper or other 
publication of general, regular, and paid circulation which 
is not published in this state, or which is published in this 
state but has had more than Vz of its circulation outside 
this state during the past 12 months; or 
(b) a radio or television program originating outside 
this state is received in this state. 
(6) Section 61-1-2 and Subsection 61-1-3(3), as well as 
Section 61-1-17 so far as investment advisers are concerned, 
apply when any act instrumental in effecting prohibited 
conduct is done in this state, whether or not either party is 
then present in this state. 
(7) (a) Every application for registration under this chap-
ter and every issuer which proposes to offer a security in 
this state through any person acting on an agency basis in 
the common-law sense shall file with the division, in such 
form as it prescribes by rule, an irrevocable consent 
appointing the division or the director to be his attorney 
to receive service of any lawful process in any noncriminal 
suit, action, or proceeding against him or his successor, 
executfor, or administrator which arises under this chap-
ter or any rule or order hereunder after the consent has 
been filed, with the same force and validity as if served 
personally on the person filing the consent. 
(b) A person who has filed such a consent in connection 
with a previous registration or notice filing need not file 
another. 
(c) Service may be made by leaving a copy of the 
process in the office of the division, but it is not effective 
unless the plaintiff, who may be the division in a suit, 
action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the 
service and a copy of the process by registered mail to the 
defendant or respondent at his last address on file with 
the division, and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance 
with this subsection is filed in the case on or before the 
return day of the process, if any, or within such further 
time as the court allows. 
(8) (a) When any person, including any nonresident of this 
state, engages in conduct prohibited or made actionable 
by this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, and he has 
not filed a consent to service of process under Subsection 
(7) and personal jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be 
obtained in this state, that conduct shall be considered 
equivalent to his appointment of the division or the 
director to be his attorney to receive service of any lawful 
process in any noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding 
against him or his successor executor or administrator 
which grows out of that conduct and which is brought 
under this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, with 
the same force and validity as if served on him personally. 
(b) Service may be made by leaving a copy of the 
process in the office of the division, but it is not effective 
unless the plaintiff, who may be the division in a suit, 
action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the 
takes other steps which sire reasonably calculated to give 
actual notice, and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance 
with this subsection is filed in the case on or before the 
return day of the process, if any, or within such further 
time as the court allows. 
(9) When process is served under this section, the court, or 
the director shall order such continuance as may be necessary 
to afford the defendant or respondent reasonable opportunity 
to defend. , 1997 
61-1-27. Construction of chapter. 
This chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact 
it and to coordinate the inteipretation and administration of 
this chapter with the related federal regulation. > 1983 
61-1-28. Citation of chapter. 
This chapter may be cited as the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act. 1983 
61-1-29. Savings clause. 
If any provision of this chapter or its application to any 
person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not 
affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can 
be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
1983 
61-1-30. Prior law repealed — Savings clause. 
(1) The Securities Act, Title 61, Chapter 1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended! by Chapter 129, Laws of Utah 
1957, is hereby repealed except as saved in this section. 
(2) Prior law exclusively governs all suits, actions, prosecu-
tions, or proceedings which are pending or may be initiated on 
the basis of facts or circumstances occurring before <the effec-
tive date of this chapter, except that no civil suit or action may 
be maintained to enforce any liability under prior law unless 
brought within any period of limitation which applied when 
$ie cause of action accrued and in any event within two years 
after the effective date of this chapter. 
(3) All effective registrations under prior law, all adminis-
trative orders relating to such registrations, and all conditions 
imposed upon such registrations remain in effect so long as 
they would have remained in effect if this chapter had not 
been passed. They are considered to have been filed, entered, 
or imposed under this chapter, but are governed by prior law. 
(4) Prior law applies* in respect of any offer or sale made 
within one year after the effective date of this chapter pursu-
ant to an offering begun in good faith before its effective date 
on the basis of an exemption available under prior law. 
(5) Judicial review of all a<lministrative orders as to which 
review proceedings'have not been instituted by the effective 
date of this chapter are governed by Section 61-1-23, except 
that no review proceeding may be instituted unless the 
petition is filed within any period of limitation which applied 
to a review proceeding when the order was entered and in any 
event within 60 days after the effective date of this chapter. 
1983 
CHAPTER 2 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
Section 
61-2-1. License required. 
61-2-2. Definitions. 
61-2-3. Exempt persons and transactions. 
61-2-4. One act for compensation qualifies person as 
broker or sales agent. 
61-2-5. Division of Real Estate created — Functions — 
11-2-1 SECURITIES DIVISION — REAL ESTATE DIVISION 718 
ection 
1-2-5.5. 
1-2-6. 
1-2-7. 
1-2-7.1. 
11-2-7.2. 
Jl-2-8. 
51-2-9. 
31-2-10. 
51-2-11. 
61-2-11.5. 
61-2-12. 
61-2-13. 
61-2-13.5. 
61-2-14. 
61-2-15, 61 
61-2-17. 
61-2-18. 
61-2-19. 
61-2-20. 
61-2-21. 
61-2-22. 
61-2-23. 
61-2-24. 
61-2-25. 
61-2-26. 
61-2-27. 
Real Estate Commission created — Functions 
— Appointment — Qualification and terms 
of members — Expenses — Meetings. 
Licensing procedures and requirements. 
Form of license — Display of license. 
Change of information — Failure to notify — 
Notification to an applicant, licensee, or cer-
tificate holder. 
Reporting requirements. 
Discharge of associate broker or sales agent by 
principal broker — Notice. 
Examination and license fees — Background 
check — Renewal of licenses — Education 
requirements — Activation of inactive li-
censes — Recertification — Licenses of firm, 
partnership, or association — Miscellaneous 
fees. 
Restriction on commissions — Affiliation with 
more than one broker — Specialized licenses 
— Designation of agents or brokers. 
Investigations — Subpoena power of division 
— Grounds for disciplinary action. 
Investigations related to an undivided frac-
tionalized long-term estate. 
Disciplinary action — Judicial review. 
Grounds for revocation of principal broker's 
license —Automatic inactivation of affiliated 
associate brokers' and sales' agents licenses. 
Court-ordered discipline. 
List of licensees to be available. 
•2-16. Repealed. 
Penalty for violation of chapter. 
Actions for recovery of compensation re-
stricted. 
Repealed. 
Rights and privileges of real estate licensees. 
Remedies and action for violations. 
Separability. 
Repealed. 
Mishandling of trust funds. 
Sales agents — Affiliated with broker as inde-
pendent contractors or employees — Pre-
sumption. 
Rulemaking required for offer or sale of an 
undivided fractionalized long-term estate — 
Disclosures — Management agreement. 
Exclusive brokerage agreement. 
61-2-1. License required. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to engage in the business, 
act in the capacity of, advertise, or assume to act as a principal 
real estate broker, associate real estate broker, or a real estate 
sales agent within this state without a license obtained under 
this chapter. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person outside the state to engage 
in the business, act in the capacity of, advertise, or assume to 
act as a principal real estate broker, associate real estate 
broker, or a real estate sales agent with respect to real estate 
located within the state without a license obtained under this 
chapter. 1996 
61-2-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Associate real estate broker" and "associate bro-
(12) for valuable consideration, who has qualified under 
this chapter as a principal real estate broker. 
(2) "Branch office" means a principal broker's real es-
tate brokerage office other than the principal broker's 
main office. 
(3) "Commission" means the Real Estate Commission 
established under this chapter. 
(4) "Concurrence" means the entities given a concur-
ring role must jointly agree for action to be taken. 
(5) "Condominium" or "condominium unit" is as defined 
in Section 57-8-3. 
(6) "Condominium homeowners' association" means all 
of the condominium unit owners acting as a group in 
accordance with declarations and bylaws. 
(7) (a) "Condominium hotel" means one or more condo-
minium units that are operated as a hotel. 
(b) "Condominium hotel" does not mean a hotel 
consisting of condominium units, all of which are 
owned by a single entity. 
(8) "Director" means the director of the Division of Real 
Estate. 
(9) "Division" means the Division of Real Estate. 
(10) "Executive director" means the director of the 
Department of Commerce. 
(11) "Main office" means the address which a principal 
broker designates with the division as the principal bro-
ker's primary brokerage office. 
(12) "Principal real estate broker" and "principal bro-
ker" means any person: • 
(a) (i) who sells or lists for sale, buys, exchanges, 
or auctions real estate, options on real estate, or 
improvements on real estate with the expecta-
tion of receiving valuable consideration; or 
(ii) who advertises, offers, attempts, or other-
wise holds himself out to be engaged in the 
business described in Subsection (12)(a)(i); 
(b) employed by or on behalf of the owner of real 
estate or by a prospective purchaser of real estate 
who performs any of the acts described in Subsection 
(12)(a), whether the person's compensation is at a 
stated salary, a commission basis, upon a salary and 
commission basis, or otherwise; 
(c) who, with the expectation of receiving valuable 
consideration, manages property owned by another 
person or who advertises or otherwise holds himself 
out to be engaged in property management; 
(d) who, with the expectation of receiving valuable 
consideration, assists or directs in the procurement of 
prospects for or the negotiation of the transactions 
listed in Subsections (12)(a) and (c); and 
(e) except for mortgage lenders, title insurance 
agents, and their employees, who assists or directs in 
the closing of any real estate transaction with the 
expectation of receiving valuable consideration. 
(13) (a) "Property management" means engaging in, 
with the expectation of receiving valuable consider-
ation, the management of property owned by another 
person or advertising or otherwise claiming to be 
engaged in property management by: 
(i) advertising for, arranging, negotiating, of-
fering, or otherwise attempting or participating 
in a transaction calculated to secure the rental or 
leasing of real estate; 
(ii) collecting, agreeing, offering, or otherwise 
attempting to collect rent for the real estate and 
accounting for and disbursing the money col-
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(b) "Property management" does not include: 
(i) hotel or motel management; 
(ii) rental of tourist accommodations, includ-
ing hotels, motels, tourist homes, condominiums, 
condominium hotels, mobile home park accom-
modations, campgrounds, or similar public ac-
commodations for any period of less than 30 
consecutive days, and the management activities 
associated with these rentals; or 
(iii) the leasing or management of surface or 
subsurface minerals or oil and gas interests, if 
the leasing or management is separate from a 
sale or lease of the surface estate. 
(14) "Real estate" includes leaseholds and business 
opportunities involving real property. 
(15) "Real estate sales agent" and "sales agent" mean ' 
any person affiliated with a licensed principal real estate 
broker, either as an independent contractor or an em-
ployee as provided in Section 61-2-25, to perform for 
valuable consideration any act set out in Subsection (12). 
(16) (a) "Regular salaried employee" means an individ-
ual who performs a service for wages or other remu-
neration, whose employer withholds federal employ-
ment taxes under a contract of hire, written or oral, 
express or implied. 
(b) "Regular salaried employee" does not include a 
person who performs services on a project-by-project 
basis or on a commission basis. 
(17) "Reinstatement^ means restoring a license that 
has expired or has been suspended. 
(18) "Reissuance" means the process by which a li-
censee may obtain a license following revocation of the 
license. 
(19) "Renewal" means extending a license for an addi-
tional licensing period on or before the date the license 
expires. l 
(20) (a) "Undivided fractionalized long-term estate" 
means an ownership interest in real property by two 
or more persons that is a: 
(i) tenancy in common; or 
(ii) any other legal form of undivided estate m 
real property including: 
(A) a fee estate; 
(B) a life estate; or 
(C) other long-term estate. 
(b) '"Undivided fractionalized long-term estate" 
does not include a joint tenancy. 2005 
-2-3. Exempt persons and transactions. 
1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), a license 
under this chapter is not required for: 
(i) any person who as owner or lessor performs the 
acts described in Subsection 61-2-2(12) with refer-
ence to property owned or leased by that person; 
(ii) a regular salaried employee of the owner or 
lessor of real estate who, with reference to nonresi-
dential real estate owned or leased by the employer, 
performs the acts enumerated in Subsections 61-2-
2(12)(a) and (b); 
(iii) a regular salaried employee of the owner of 
real estate who performs property management ser-
vices with reference to real estate owned by the 
employer, except that the employee may only manage 
property for one employer; 
(iv) a person who performs property management 
services for the apartments" at which that person 
resides in exchange for free or reduced rent on that 
person's apartment; * 
subject to the declaration of condominium that estab-
lished the homeowners' association, except that the 
employee may only manage property for one condo-
minium homeowners' association; and 
(vi) a regular salaried employee of a licensed prop-
erty management company who performs support 
services, as'prescribed by rule, for the property man-
agement company, 
(b) Subsection (l)(a) does not exempt from licensing: 
(i) employees engaged in the, sale of properties 
regulated under Title 57, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform 
Land Sales Practices Act and Title 57, Chapter 19, 
Timeshare and Camp Resort Act; 
(ii) employees engaged in the sale of cooperative 
interests regulated under Title 57, Chapter 23, Real 
Estate Cooperative Marketing Act; or x 
(iii) any person whose interest as an owner or 
lessor was obtained by him or transferred to him for 
the purpose of evading the application of this chapter, 
and not for any other legitimate business reason. 
(2) A license under this chapter is not required for: 
(a) isolated transactions by persons holding a duly 
executed power of attorney from the owner; 
(b) services rendered by an attorney at law in perform-
ing his duties as an attorney at law; 
(c) a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, administrator^ 
executor, or any person acting under order of any court; 
(d) a trustee or its employees under a deed of trust or a 
will; or 
(e) any public utility, its officers, or, regular salaried^ 
employees, unless performance of any of the acts set out 
in Subsection 61-2-2(12) is in connection with the sale, 
purchase, lease, or other disposition of real estate or 
investment in real estate unrelated to the principal busi-
ness activity of that public utility. 
(3) (a) Except as providedrin Subsection (3)(b), a license 
under this chapter is not required for any person regis-
tered to act as a broker-dealer, agent, or investment 
advisor under the Utah and federal securities laws in the 
sale or the offer for sale of real estate if: 
(i) the real estate is a necessary element of a 
"security" as that term is defined by the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securitie s Exchange Act of 1934; and 
(ii) the security is registered for sale pursuant to 
the Securities Act of 1933 or by Title 61, Chapter 1, 
Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
(b) The exemption in Subsection (3)(a) does not apply to 
exempt or resale transactions. ' 1996 
61-2-4. One act for compensation qualifies person as 
1
 broker or sales agent. 
Except as provided in Section 61-2-3, one act, for valuable 
consideration, of buying, selling, leasing, managing, or ex-
changing real estate for another, or of offering for another to 
buy, sell, lease, manage, or exchange real estate, requires the 
person performing, offering, or attempting to perform the act 
to be Kcensed as a principal real estate broker, an associate 
real estate broker, or a real estate sales agent as set forth in 
this chapter. 1996 
61-2-5. Division of Real Estate created — Functions — 
Director appointed — Functions. 
* (1) There is created within the Department of Commerce a 
Division of Real Estate. It is responsible for the administra-
tion and enforcement of: 
(a) this chapter; 
(b) Title 57, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Land Sales 
Practices Act: 
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(d) Title 57, Chapter 23, Real Estate Cooperative Mar-
keting Act; 
(e) Chapter 2a, Real Estate Education, Research, and 
Recovery Fund; 
(f) Chapter 2b, Real Estate Appraiser Licensing and 
Certification Act; and 
(g) Chapter 2c, Utah Residential Mortgage Practices 
Act. 
(2) The division is under the direction and control of a 
director appointed by the executive director of the department 
with the approval of the governor. The director holds the office 
of director at the pleasure of the governor. 
(3) The director, with the approval of the executive director, 
may employ personnel necessary to discharge the duties of the 
division at salaries to b fixed by the director according to 
standards established by the Department of Administrative 
Services. 
(4) On or before October 1 of each year, the director shall, in 
conjunction with the department, report to the governor and 
the Legislature concerning the division's work for the preced-
ing fiscal year ending June 30. 
(5) The director, in conjunction with the executive director, 
shall prepare and submit to the governor and the Legislature 
a budget for the fiscal year next following the convening of the 
Legislature. 2000 
61-2-5.1. Procedures — Adjudicative proceedings. 
The Division of Real Es ta te shall comply with the proce-
dures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administra-
tive Procedures Act, in i ts adjudicative proceedings. 1997 
61-2-5.5. Real Estate Commission created — Functions 
— Appointment — Qualification and terms of 
members — Expenses — Meetings. 
(1) There is created within the division a Real Estate 
Commission. The commission shall: 
(a) make rules for the administration of this chapter 
that are not inconsistent with this chapter, including: 
(i) licensing of: 
(A) principal brokers; 
(B) associate brokers; 
(C) sales agents; 
(D) real estate companies; and 
(E) branch offices; 
(ii) prelicensing and postlicensing education cur-
ricula; 
(iii) examination procedures; 
(iv) the certification and conduct of: 
(A) real estate schools; 
(B) course providers; and 
(C) instructors; 
(v) proper handling of funds received by real estate 
licensees; 
(vi) brokerage office procedures and recordkeeping 
requirements; 
(vii) property management; 
(viii) standards of conduct for real estate licensees; 
and 
(ix) rules made under Section 61-2-26 regarding an 
undivided fractionalized long-term estate; 
(b) establish, with the concurrence of the division, all 
fees as provided in this chapter and Title 61, Chapter 2a, 
Real Estate Recovery Fund Act; 
(c) conduct all administrative hearings not delegated 
by the commission to an administrative law judge or the 
division relating to the: 
(i) licensing of any applicant; 
(ii) conduct of any licensee; or 
(d) with the concurrence of the director, impose sanc-
tions against licensees and certificate holders as provided 
in Section 61-2-11; 
(e) advise the director on the administration and en-
forcement of any matters affecting the division and the 
real estate sales and property management industries; 
(f) advise the director on matters affecting the division 
budget; 
(g) advise and assist the director in conducting real 
estate seminars; and 
(h) perform other duties as provided by: 
(i) this chapter; and 
(ii) Title 61, Chapter 2a, Real Estate Recovery 
Fund Act. 
(2) (a) The commission shall be comprised of five members 
appointed by the governor and approved by the Senate. 
(b) Four of the commission members shall: 
(i) have at least five years' experience in the real 
estate business; and 
(ii) hold an active principal broker, associate bro-
ker, or sales agent license. 
(c) One commission member shall be a member of the 
general public. 
(d) No more than one commission member may be 
appointed from any given county in the state. 
(3) (a) Except as required by Subsection (3)(b), as terms of 
current commission members expire, the governor shall 
appoint each new member or reappointed member to a 
four-year term ending June 30. 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection 
(3)(a), the governor shall, at the time of appointment or 
reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that 
the terms of commission members are staggered so that 
approximately half of the commission is appointed every 
two years. 
(c) Upon the expiration of the term of a member of the 
commission, the member of the commission shall continue 
to hold office until a successor is appointed and qualified. 
(d) A commission member may not serve more than one 
consecutive term. 
(e) Members of the commission shall annually select 
one member to serve as chair. 
(4) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any 
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpired 
term. 
(5) (a) A member shall receive no compensation or benefits 
for the member's services, but may receive per diem and 
expenses incurred in the performance of the member's 
official duties at the rates established by the Division of 
Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(b) A member may decline to receive per diem and 
expenses for the member's service. 
(6) (a) The commission shall meet at least monthly, 
(b) The director may call additional meetings: 
(i) at the director's discretion; 
(ii) upon the request of the chair; or 
(iii) upon the written request of three or more 
commission members. 
(7) Three members of the commission constitute a quorum 
for the transaction of business. 2005 
61-2-6. Licensing procedures and requirements. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (5), the commis-
sion shall determine the qualifications and requirements 
of applicants for: 
(i) a principal broker license; 
(ii) an associate broker license; or 
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determine the honesty, integrity, truthfulness, reputation, 
and competency of each applicant for an initial license or 
for renewal of an existing license. 
(c) (i) The division, with the concurrence of the com-
mission, shall require an applicant for: 
(A) a sales agent license to complete an ap-
proved educational program not to exceed 90 
hours; and 
(B) an associate broker or principal broker 
license to complete an approved educational pro-
gram not to exceed 120 hours. 
(ii) The hours required by this section mean 50 
minutes of instruction in each 60 minutes. 
(hi) The maximum number of program hours 
available to an individual is ten hours per day. 
(d) The division, with the concurrence of the commis-
sion, shall require" the applicant to pass an examination 
approved by the commission covering: 
(i) the fundamentals of: 
(A) the English language; 
(B) arithmetic; 
(C) bookkeeping; and 
(D) real estate principles and practices; 
(ii) the provisions of this chapter; 
(iii) the rules established by the commission; and 
(iv) any other aspect of Utah real estate license 
law considered appropriate. 
(e) (i) Three years'full-time experience as a real estate 
sales agent or its equivalent is required before any 
applicant may apply for, and secure a principal bro-
ker or associate broker license in this state. 
(ii) The commission shall establish by rule, made 
in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Ad-
ministrative Rulemaking Act, the criteria by which 
the commission will accept experience or special 
education in similar fields of business in lieu of the 
three years' experience. 
(2) (a) The division, with the concurrence of the commis-
sion, may require an applicant to furnish a sworn state-
ment setting forth evidence satisfactory to the division of 
the applicant's reputation and competency as set forth by 
rule. 
(b) The division shall require an applicant to provide 
the applicant's Social Security number, which is a private 
record under Subsection 63-2-302(l)(h). 
(3) (a) A nonresident principal broker may be licensed in 
this state by conforming to all the provisions of this 
chapter except that of residency. 
(b) A nonresident associate broker or sales agent may 
become licensed in this state by: 
(i) conforming to all the provisions of this chapter 
except that of residency; and 
(ii) being employed or engaged as an independent 
contractor by or on behalf of a nonresident or resident 
principal broker who is licensed in this state. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection 61-2-9(l)(e)(iv), an 
applicant who has had a real estate license revoked: 
(i) shall be relicensed as prescribed for an original 
application; and 
(ii) may not apply for a new license until at least 
five years after the day on which the license is 
revoked, 
(b) In the case of an applicant for a new license as a 
principal broker or associate broker, the applicant is not 
entitled to credit for experience gained prior to the revo-
cation of a real estate license. 
(i) review a class or category of applications for 
initial or renewed licenses; 
(ii) determine whether an applicant meets the li-
censing criteria in Subsection (1); and 
(iii) approve or deny a license application without 
concurrence by the commission, 
(b) (i) If the commission delegates to the division the 
authority to approve or deny an application without 
concurrence by the commission and the division de-
nies an application for licensure, the applicant who is 
denied licensure maty petition the commission for 
review of the denial of licensure. 
(ii) An applicant who is denied licensure pursuant 
to this Subsection (5) may seek agency review by the 
executive director x>nly after the commission has 
reviewed the division's denial of the applicant's appli-
cation. 2005 
61-2-7. Form of license — Display of license. 
The division shall issue to each licensee a wall license 
showing the name and address of the licensee. The seal of the 
state shall be affixed to each license. Each license shall contain 
any other matter prescribed by the division and shall be 
delivered or mailed to the address furnished by the licensee. 
The wall licenses of principal brokers, associate brokers, and 
sales agents who are affiliated with an office shall be kept in 
the office to be made available1 on request. 1991 
61-2-7.1. Change of information — Failure to notify — 
Notification to an applicant, licensee, or cer-
tificate holder. 
(1) An applicant, licensee, or certificate holder shall send 
the division a signed statement in the form required by the 
division notifying the division within ten business days of any 
change of: 
(a) principal broker? 
(b) principal business location; 
(c) mailing address; 
(d) home street address; 
(e) an individual's name; or 
(f) business name. 
(2) The division may charge a fee established in accordance 
with Section 63-38-3.2 for processing any notification of 
change submitted by an applicant, licensee, or certificate 
holder. 
(3) (a) When providing the division a business location or 
home street address, a physical location or street address 
must be provided. 
(b) When providing a mailing address, an applicant, 
licensee, or certificate holder may provide a post office box 
or other mailjdrop location. 
(4) Failure to notify the division of a change described in 
Subsection (1) is separate grounds for disciplinary action 
against the applicant, licensee, or certificateholder. 
(5) An applicant, licensee, or certificate holder is considered 
to have received any notification that has been sent to the last 
address furnished to the division by the applicant, licensee, or 
certificate holder. 2005 
61-2-7.2. Reporting requirements. 
Principal brokers, associate brokers, and Sales agents shall 
send the division a signed statement notifying the division of 
the following within ten business days: 
(1) conviction of any criminal offense; or 
(2) filing a personal or brokerage bankruptcy. 2000 
61-2-8. Discharge of associate broker or sales agent by 
principal broker.— Notice. 
If an associate broker or sales agent is discharged by a 
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e discharge. The principal broker shall address a communi-
tion to the last-known residence address of that associate 
oker or sales agent advising him that notice of his termina-
3n has been delivered or sent to the division. It is unlawful 
r any associate broker or sales agent to perform any of the 
:ts under this chapter, directly or indirectly, from and after 
ie date of receipt of the termination notice until affiliation 
ith a principal broker has been established. 2000 
L-2-9. Examination and license fees — Background 
check — Renewal of licenses — Education 
requirements — Activation of inactive li-
censes — Recertification — Licenses of firm, 
partnership, or association — Miscellaneous 
fees. 
(1) (a) Upon filing an application for a principal broker, 
associate broker, or sales agent license examination, the 
applicant shall pay a nonrefundable fee as determined by 
the commission with the concurrence of the division under 
Section 63-38-3.2 for admission to the examination. 
(b) A principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent 
applicant shall pay a nonrefundable fee as determined by 
the commission with the concurrence of the division under 
Section 63-38-3.2 for issuance of an initial license or 
license renewal. 
(c) Each license issued under this Subsection (1) shall 
be issued for a period of not less than two years as 
determined by the division with the concurrence of the 
commission. 
(d) (i) Any new sales agent applicant shall: 
(A) submit fingerprint cards in a form accept-
able to the division at the time the license appli-
cation is filed; and 
(B) consent to a fingerprint background check 
by the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation regard-
ing the application. 
(ii) The division shall request the Department of 
Public Safety to complete a Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation criminal background check for each new 
sales agent applicant through the national criminal 
history system (NCIC) or any successor system. 
(iii) The cost of the background check and the 
fingerprinting shall be borne by the applicant. 
(iv) Funds paid to the division by an applicant for 
the cost of the background check shall be nonlapsing. 
(e) (i) Any new sales agent license issued under this 
section shall be conditional, pending completion of 
the criminal background check. If the criminal back-
ground check discloses the applicant has failed to 
accurately disclose a criminal history, the license 
shall be immediately and automatically revoked. 
(ii) Any person whose conditional license has been 
revoked under Subsection (l)(e)(i) shall be entitled to 
a post-revocation hearing to challenge the revocation. 
The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(iii) The division director shall designate one of the 
following to act as the presiding officer in a post-
revocation hearing described in this Subsection (l)(e): 
(A) the division; or 
(B) the division with the concurrence of the 
commission. 
(iv) The decision on whether relief from the revo-
cation of a license under this Subsection (l)(e) will be 
granted shall be made by the presiding officer. 
(v) Relief from a revocation under this Subsection 
(1\{**\ mow V»o oroYifo/1 rvnltr i-f* 
(I) did not occur; or 
(II) is the criminal history of another per-
son; 
(B) (I) the revocation is based on a failure to 
accurately disclose a criminal history; and 
(II) the applicant had a reasonable good 
faith belief at the time of application that 
there was no criminal history to be disclosed; 
or 
(C) the division failed to follow the prescribed 
procedure for the revocation. 
(vi) If a revocation under this Subsection (l)(e) is 
upheld after a post-revocation hearing, the person 
may not apply for a new license until at least 12 
months after the day on which the final decision 
upholding the revocation is issued. 
(2) (a) (i) A license expires if it is not renewed on or before 
its expiration date. 
(ii) As a condition of renewal, each active licensee 
shall demonstrate competence: 
(A) by viewing an approved real estate educa-
tion video program and completing a supplemen-
tary workbook; or 
(B) by completing 12 hours of professional 
education approved by the division and commis-
sion within each two-year renewal period. 
(iii) The division with the concurrence of the com-
mission shall certify education which may include: 
(A) state conventions; 
(B) home study courses; 
(C) video courses; and 
(D) closed circuit television courses. 
(iv) The commission with concurrence of the divi-
sion may exempt a licensee from the education re-
quirement of this Subsection (2)(a) for a period not to 
exceed four years: 
(A) upon a finding of reasonable cause, includ-
ing military service; and 
(B) under conditions established by rule made 
in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) For a period of 30 days after the expiration date of 
a license, the license may be reinstated uponu 
(i) payment of a renewal fee and a late fee deter-
mined by the commission with the concurrence of the 
division under Section 63-38-3.2; and 
(ii) providing proof acceptable to the division and 
the commission of the licensee having completed the 
hours of education or demonstrated competence as 
required under Subsection (2)(a). 
(c) After the 30-day period described in Subsection 
(2)(b), and until six months after the expiration date, the 
license may be reinstated by: -
(i) paying a renewal fee and a late fee determined 
by the commission with the concurrence of the divi-
sion under Section 63-38-3.2; 
(ii) providing to the division proof of satisfactory 
completion of 12 hours of continuing education: 
(A) in addition to the requirements for a 
timely renewal; and 
(B) on a subject determined by the commission 
by rule made in accordance with Title 63, Chap-
ter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act; 
and 
(iii) providing proof acceptable to the division and 
the commission of the licensee having: 
(&} rnnrmlpfori the hnnrq of pdnrfltirnv nr 
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(d) A person who does not renew that person's license 
within six months after the expiration date shall be 
relicensed as prescribed for an original application. 
(3) (a) As a condition for the activation of an inactive 
license that was in an inactive status at the time of the 
licensee's most recent renewal, the licensee shall supply 
the division with proof of: 
(i) successftd completion of the respective sales 
agent or broker licensing examination within six 
months prior to applying to activate the license; or 
(ii) the successful completion of 12 hours of contin-
uing education that the licensee would have been 
required to complete under Subsection (2)(a) if the 
license had been on active status at the time of the 
licensee's most recent renewal, 
(b) The commission may, in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, es-
tablish by rule: 
(i) the nature or type of continuing education re-
quired for reactivation of a license; and 
(ii) how long prior to reactivation the continuing 
education must have been completed. 
(4) (a) A principal broker license may be granted to a 
corporation, partnership, or association if the corporation, 
partnership, or association has affiliated with it an indi-
vidual who: 
(i) has qualified as a principal broker under the 
terms of this chapter; and 
(ii) serves in the capacity of a principal broker, 
(b) Application for the license described in Subsection 
(4)(a) shall be made in accordance with the rules adopted 
by the division with the concurrence of the commission. 
(5) The division may charge and collect reasonable fees 
determined by the commission with the concurrence of the 
division under Section 63-38-3.2 to cover the costs for:-
(a) issuance of a new or duplicate license; 
(b) license histories or certifications; 
(c) certified copies of official documents, orders, and 
other papers and transcripts; 
(d) certifying real estate schools, courses, and instruc-
tors, the fees for which shall, notwithstanding Section 
13-1-2, be deposited in the Real Estate Education,- Re-
search, and Recovery Fund; and 
(e) other duties required by this chapter. 
(6) If a licensee submits or causes to be submitted a check, 
draft, or other negotiable instrument to the division for 
payment of fees, and the check, draft, or other negotiable 
instrument is dishonored, the transaction for which the pay-
ment was submitted is void "and will be reversed by the 
division if payment of tKe applicable fee is not received in full. 
(7) (a) The fees under this chapter and the additional 
license fee for the Real Estate Education, Research, and ^  
Recovery Fund under Section 61-2a-4 are in lieu of all 
other license fees or assessments that might otherwise be 
imposed or charged by the state or any of its political 
subdivisions, upon, or as a condition of, the privilege of 
conducting the business regulated by this chapter, except 
that a political subdivision within the state may charge a 
business license fee on a principal broker if the principal 
broker maintains a place of business within the jurisdic-
tion of the political subdivision, 
(b) Unless otherwise exempt, each licensee under this 
chapter is subject to all taxes imposed under Title 59, 
Revenue and Taxation. 2005 
61-2-10* Restriction on commissions — Affiliation with 
more than one ]broker — Specialized licenses 
— Designation of agents or brokers. 
acts specified in this chapter from any person except the 
principal broker with whom he is affiliated and licensed. 
(2) An inactive associate broker or sales agent is not autho-
rized to conduct real estate transactions until the inactive 
associate broker or sales agent becomes affiliated with a 
licensed principal broker and submits the required documen-
tation to the division. An inactive" principal broker is not 
authorized to conduct real estate transactions until the prin-
cipal broker's license is activated with the division. 
(3) No sales agent or associate broker may affiliate with 
more than one principal broker at the same time. 
(4) (a) Except as provided by rule, a principal broker may 
not be responsible for more than one real estate brokerage 
at the same time. 
(b) In addition to issuing principal broker, associate 
broker, and sales agent licenses authorizing the perfor-
mance of all of the acts set forth in Subsection 61-2-2(12), 
the division may issue specialized sales licenses and 
speciahzed property management licenses with the scope 
of practice limited to the specialty. An individual may hold 
a specialized license in addition to a license to act as a 
principal broker, an associate broker, or a sales agent. The 
commission may adopt irules pursuant to Title 63, Chap-
ter 46a, Utah Administrative Procedures Act, for the 
administration of this provision, including prelicensing 
and postlicensing education requirements, examination 
requirements, affiliation with real estate brokerages or 
property management companies, and other ^licensing 
procedures. 
(c) An individual may not be a principal broker of a 
brokerage and a sales agent or associate broker for a 
different brokerage at the same time. 
(5) Any owner, purchaser, lessor, or lessee who engages the 
services of a principal broker may designate which, sales 
agents or associate brokers affiliated with that principal 
broker will also represent that owner, purchaser, lessor, or 
lessee in the purchase, sale, lease, or exchange of real estate, 
or in exercising an option rel ating to real estate. 1996 
61-2-11. Investigations — Subpoena power of division 
— Grounds for disciplinary action. 
The division may investigate or cause to be investigated the 
actions of any principal broker, associate broker, sales agent, 
real estate school, course provider, or school instructor li-
censed or certified by this state, or of any applicant for 
licensure or certification, or of any person who acts in any of 
those capacities within this state. The division is empowered 
to subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require by sub-
poena duces tecum the production of books, papers, contracts, 
records, other documents, or information considered relevant 
to the investigation. The division may serve subpoenas by 
certified mail. Each failure to respond to a subpoena is 
considered as a separate violation of this chapter. The com-
mission, with the concurrence of the director, may impose a 
civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $500 per violation, 
impose educational requirements, and suspend, revoke, place 
on probation, or deny renewal, reinstatement, or reissuance of 
any license or any certification if at any time the licensee or 
certificate holder, whether acting as an agent or on his own 
account, is found guilty of: 
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation; 
(2) making any false promises of a character likely to 
influence, persuade, or induce; 
(3) pursuing a continued and flagrant course of misrep-
resentation, or of making false promises through agents, 
sales agents, advertising, or otherwise; 
(4) acting for more than one party in a transaction 
without the informed consent of all parties; 
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(b) representing or attempting to represent a bro-
ker other than the principal broker with whom the 
person is affiliated; or 
(c) representing as sales agent or having a contrac-
tual relationship similar to that of sales agent with 
other than a licensed principal broker; 
(6) (a) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for 
or to remit any monies coming into the person's 
possession that belong to others; 
(b) commingling the funds described in Subsection 
(6)(a) with the person's own; or 
(c) diverting the funds described in Subsection 
(6)(a) from the purpose for which they were received; 
(7) paying or offering to pay valuable consideration, as 
defined by the commission, to any person not licensed 
under this chapter, except that: 
(a) valuable consideration may be shared with a 
licensed principal broker of another jurisdiction or as 
provided under the Professional Corporation Act or 
the Limited Liability Company Act; and 
(b) the valuable consideration to be paid to a 
licensee for the performance of any of the acts speci-
fied in this chapter may be paid by the licensee's 
principal broker to the licensee's Sub-Chapter S cor-
poration; 
(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal 
broker, associate broker, or sales agent in such manner as 
to safeguard the interests of the public; 
(9) failing to voluntarily furnish copies of all documents 
to all parties executing the documents; 
(10) failing to keep and make available for inspection 
by the division a record of each transaction, including: 
(a) the names of buyers and sellers or lessees and 
lessors; 
(b) the identification of the property; 
(c) the sale or rental price; 
(d) any monies received in trust; 
(e) any agreements or instructions from buyers 
and sellers or lessees and lessors; and 
(f) any other information required by rule; 
(11) failing to disclose, in writing, in the purchase, sale, 
or rental of property, whether the purchase, sale, or rental 
is made for himself or for an undisclosed principal; 
(12) regardless of whether the crime was related to real 
estate, being convicted of a criminal offense involving 
moral turpitude within five years of the most recent 
application, including a conviction based upon a plea of 
nolo contendere, or a plea held in abeyance to a criminal 
offense involving moral turpitude; 
(13) advertising the availability of real estate or the 
services of a licensee in a false, misleading, or deceptive 
manner; 
(14) in the case of a principal broker or a licensee who 
is a branch manager, failing to exercise reasonable super-
vision over the activities of the principal broker's or 
branch manager's licensees and any unlicensed staff; 
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, an order of 
the commission, or the rules adopted by the commission 
and the division; 
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to 
the licensee's principal in a real estate transaction; 
(17) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest 
dealing; 
(18) unprofessional conduct as defined by statute or 
rule; or 
MQl «jn<5-npn<sinr» rpvnratinn «mrrpndpr ar rflnrpllfltirm 
jurisdiction, based on misconduct in a professional capac-
ity that relates to character, honesty, integrity, or truth-
fulness. 2005 
61-2-11.5. Investigations related to an undivided frac-
tionalized long-term estate. 
In addition to any action authorized by Section 61-2-11, in 
relationship to the offer or sale of an undivided fractionalized 
long-term estate: 
(1) the division may make any public or private inves-
tigation within or outside of this state as the division 
considers necessary to determine whether any person has 
violated, is violating, or is about to violate this chapter or 
any rule or order under this chapter; 
(2) to aid in the enforcement of this chapter or in the 
prescribing of rules and forms under this chapter, the 
division may require or permit any person to file a 
statement in writing, under oath or otherwise as to all 
facts and circumstances concerning the matter to be 
investigated; and 
(3) for the purpose of the investigation described in 
Subsection (1), the division or any employee designated by 
the division may: 
(a) administer oaths and affirmation; or 
(b) take any action permitted by Section 61-2-11 
including: 
(i) subpoena witnesses and compel their atten-
dance; 
(ii) take evidence; and 
(iii) require the production of any books, pa-
pers, correspondence, memoranda, agreement, or 
other documents or records relevant or material 
to the investigation. 2005 
61-2-12. Disciplinary action — Judicial review. 
(1) (a) On the basis of a violation of Section 61-2-11, the 
division shall give notice to the licensee or certificate 
holder and commence an adjudicative proceeding before: 
(i) imposing an educational requirement; 
(ii) imposing a civil penalty; or 
(iii) taking any of the following actions related to a 
license or certificate: 
(A) revoking; 
(B) suspending; 
(C) placing on probation; or 
(D) denying the renewal, reinstatement, or 
reissuance. 
(b) If the licensee is an active sales agent or active 
associate broker, the division shall inform the principal 
broker with whom the licensee is affiliated of the charge 
and of the time and place of any hearing. 
(c) If the presiding officer at a hearing determines that 
any licensee or certificate holder is guilty of a violation of 
this chapter, the division by written order may: 
(i) with regard to the license or certificate: 
(A) suspend; 
(B) revoke; 
(C) place on probation; or 
(D) deny renewal, reinstatement, or reissu-
ance; or 
(ii) impose a civil penalty, 
(2) (a) Any applicant, certificate holder, licensee, or person 
aggrieved, including the complainant, may obtain agency 
review by the executive director and judicial review of any 
adverse ruling, order, or decision of the division. 
(b) If the applicant, certificate holder, or licensee pre-
vails in the appeal and the court finds that the state 
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Title 78, Chapter 27a, Small Business Equal Access to 
Justice Act. 
(c) (i) An order, ruling, or decision of the division shall 
take effect and become operative 30 days after the 
service of the order, ruling, or decision unless other-
wise provided in the order. 
(ii) If an appeal is taken by a licensee, the division 
may stay enforcement of an order, ruling, or decision 
in accordance with Section 63-46b-18. 
(iii) The appeal shall be governed by the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(3) The commission and the director shall comply with the 
rocedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Admin-
strative Procedures Act, in all adjudicative proceedings. 2005 
1-2-13. Grounds for revocation of principal broker's 
license —Automatic inactivation of affiliated 
associate brokers' and sales' agents licenses. 
(1) Any unlawful act or any violation of this chapter com-
oitted by any real estate sales agent or associate broker 
mployed or engaged as an independent contractor by or on 
lehalf of a licensed principal broker or committed by any 
mployee, officer, or member of a licensed principal broker is 
ause for the revocation, suspension, or probation of the 
•rincipal broker's license, or for the imposition of a fine 
gainst the principal broker in an amount not to exceed $500 
ler violation. 
(2) The revocation or suspension of a principal broker 
icense automatically inactivates every associate broker or 
ales agent license granted to those persons by reason of their 
iffiliation with the principal broker whose license was revoked 
r suspended, pending a change of broker affiliation. A prin-
ipal broker shall, prior to the effective date of the suspension 
r revocation of his license, notify in writing every licensee 
filiated with him of the revocation or suspension of his 
icense. 1991 
(1-2-13.5. Court-ordered discipline. 
The division shall promptly withhold, suspend, restrict; or 
einstate the use of a license issued under this chapter if so 
irdered by a court. 1997 
(1-2-14. List of licensees to be available. 
The division shall make available at reasonable cost a list of 
he names and addresses of all persons licensed by it under 
his chapter. 1983 
(1-2-15,61-2-16. Repealed. 1973 
(1-2-17. Penalty for violation of chapter. 
(1) Any individual violating this chapter, in addition to 
>eing subject to a license sanction or a fine ordered by the 
ommission, is, upon conviction of a first violation, guilty of a 
lass A misdemeanor. Any imprisonment shall be for a term 
lot to exceed six months. If the violator is a corporation, it is, 
ipon conviction of a first violation, guilty of a class A misde-
meanor. 
(2) Upon conviction of a second or subsequent violation, an 
ndividual is guilty of a third degree felony. Imprisonment 
hall be for a term not to exceed two years. If a corporation is 
onvicted of a second or subsequent violation, it is guilty of a 
hird degree felony. 
(3) Any officer or agent of a corporation, or any member or 
Lgent of a partnership or association, who personally partici-
>ates in or is an accessory to any violation of this chapter by 
nch corporation, partnership, or association, is subject to the 
>enalties prescribed for individuals. 
(4) If any person receives any money or its equivalent, as 
ommission, compensation, or profit by or in consequence of a 
not more than three times the iimount of money received, as 
may be determined by the court This penalty may be sued for 
in any court of competent jurisdiction, and recovered by any 
person aggrieved for his own use and benefit. 
(5) All fines imposed by the commission and the director 
under this chapter shall, notwithstanding Section 13-1-2, be 
deposited into the Real Estate Education, Research, and 
Recovery Fund to be used in a manner consistent with the 
requirements of the Real Estate Recovery Fund Act. 1993 
61-2-18. Actions for recovery of compensation re-
stricted. 
(1) No person may bring or maintain an action in any court 
of this state for the recovery of a commission, fee, or compen-
sation for any act done or service rendered which is prohibited 
under this chapter to other th*ui licensed principal brokers, 
unless the person was duly licensed as a principal broker at 
the time of the doing of the act or rendering the service. 
(2) No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own 
name for the recovery of a fee, commission, or compensation 
for services as a sales agent or associate broker unless the 
action is against the principal broker with whom he is or was 
licensed. Any action for the recovery of a fee, commission, or 
other compensation may only be instituted and brought by the 
principal broker with whom the sales agent or associate 
broker is affiliated. 1985 
61-2-19. Repealed. 1983 
61-2-20. Rights and privileges of real estate licensees. 
'Real estate licensees may fill out only those legal forms 
approved by the commission and the attorney general, and 
those forms provided by statute, with the following exceptions: 
(1) Principal brokers and associate brokers may fill out 
any documents associated vrith the closing of a real estate 
transaction. 
(2) Real estate licensees may fill out real estate forms 
prepared by legal counsel of thfe buyer, seller, lessor, or 
lessee. 
(3) If the commission and the attorney general have not 
approved a specific form for the transaction, principal 
brokers, associate brokers, and sales agents may fill out 
real estate forms prepared by any legal counsel, including 
legal counsel retained by ;the brokerage to develop these 
forms. 1993 
61-2-21. Remedies and action for violations. 
(1) (a) If the director has reason to believe that any person 
has been, is engaging in, or is about to engage in acts 
constituting violations of this chapter, and if it appears to 
the director that it would be in the pubhc interest to stop 
such acts, the director shall issue and serve upon the 
person an order directing that person to cease and desist 
irom those acts. 
(b) Within ten days after receiving the order, the per-
son upon whom the order is served may request an 
adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) Pending the hearing, any cease and desist order 
shall remain in effect. 
(d) If a request for a hearing is made, the division shall 
follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chap-
ter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
[2) (a) After the hearing, if the commission and the director 
agree that the acts of the person violate this chapter, the 
director: 
(i) shall issue an order making the order issued 
under Subsection (1) permanent} and 
(ii) may impose a finer. 
(b) If no hearing is requested and if the person fails to 
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name of the Department of Commerce and the Division of 
Real Estate, in the district court in the county in which 
the acts occurred or where the person resides or carries on 
business, to enjoin and restrain the person from violating 
this chapter. 
(c). The district courts of this state shall have jurisdic-
tion of these suits. 
(d) Upon a proper showing in an action brought under 
this section related to an undivided fractionaHzed long-
term estate, the court may: 
(i) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or 
mandatory injunction; 
(ii) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus; 
(iii) enter a declaratory judgment; 
(iv) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defen-
dant or the defendant's assets; 
(v) order disgorgement; 
(vi) order rescission; 
(vii) impose a fine of not more than $500 for each 
violation of this chapter; and 
(viii) enter any other relief the court considers just. 
(e) The court may not require the division to post a 
bond in an action brought under this Subsection (2). 
(3) The remedies and action provided in this section may 
t interfere with, or prevent the prosecution of, any other 
medies or actions including criminal proceedings. 2005 
-2-22. Separability. 
If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any 
ovision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
mainder of this chapter shall not be affected thereby. 1985 
-2-23. Repea led . 1988 
-2-24. Mishandl ing of trust funds. 
(1) The division may audit principal brokers' trust accounts 
other accounts in which a licensee maintains trust funds 
Lder this chapter. If the division's audit shows, in the opinion 
the division, gross mismanagement, commingling, or mis-
e of funds, the division, with the concurrence of the commis-
si, may order a complete audit of the account by a certified 
Lblic accountant at the licensee's expense, or take other 
tion in accordance with Section 61-2-12. 
(2) The licensee may obtain agency review by the executive 
rector or judicial review of any division order. 
(3) If it appears that a person has grossly mismanaged, 
mmingled, or otherwise misused trust funds, the division, 
ith or without prior administrative proceedings, may bring 
l action in the district court of the district where the person 
sides or maintains a place of business, or where the act or 
•actice occurred or is about to occur, to enjoin the acts or 
•actices and to enforce compliance with this chapter or any 
Je or order under this chapter. Upon a proper showing, the 
urt shall grant injunctive relief or a temporary restraining 
der, and may appoint a receiver or conservator. The division 
not required to post a bond in any court proceeding. 1996 
L-2-25. Sales agents — Affiliated with broker as inde-
pendent contractors or employees — Pre-
sumption. 
A sales agent may be affiliated with a licensed principal real 
»tate broker either as an independent contractor or as an 
nployee. The relationship between sales agent and broker is 
"esumed to be an independent contractor relationship unless 
Lere is clear and convincing evidence that the relationship 
as intended by the parties to be an employer employee 
Jationship. 2003 
L-2-26. Rulemaking required for offer or sale of an 
undivided fractionalized long-term estate — 
long-term estate shall comply with the disclosure require-
ments imposed by rules made by the commission under 
this section. 
(b) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission shall 
make rules as to the timing, form, and substance of 
disclosures required to be made by a licensee or certificate 
holder under this section. 
(2) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Admin-
istrative Rulemaking Act, the commission shall make rules 
imposing requirements for a management agreement related 
to an undivided fractionaHzed long-term estate that makes 
the offer or sale of the undivided fractionaHzed long-term 
estate treated as a real estate transaction and not treated as 
an offer or sale of a security under Chapter 1, Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. 
(3) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Admin-
istrative Rulemaking Act, the commission shaU make rules 
establishing: 
(a) the disclosures required in the sale or offer of an 
undivided fractionalized long-term estate that is subject 
to a master lease; 
(b) requirements for the management of a master lease 
on an undivided fractionaHzed long-term estate; and 
(c) the requirements on the structure of a master lease 
on an undivided fractionaHzed long-term estate. 2005 
61-2-27. Exclusive brokerage agreement. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Client" means a person who makes an exclusive 
brokerage agreement with a principal broker under Sub-
section (l)(c). 
(b) "Closed" means that: 
(i) aU documents required to be executed under the 
contract are executed; 
(ii) aU monies required to be paid by either party 
under the contract are paid in the form of collected or 
cleared funds; 
(iii) the proceeds of any new loan are deHvered by 
the lender to the seUer; and 
(iv) all appHcable documents are recorded in the 
office of the county recorder for the county in which 
the property is located. 
(c) "Exclusive brokerage agreement" means a written 
agreement between a cHent and a principal broker: 
(i) (A) to Hst for sale, lease, or exchange: 
(I) real estate; 
(II) an option on real estate; or 
(III) an improvement on real estate; or 
(B) for representation in the purchase, lease, 
or exchange of: 
(I) real estate; 
(II) an option on real estate; or 
(III) an improvement on real estate; 
(ii) that gives the principal broker the sole right to 
act as the agent or representative of the cHent for the 
purchase, sale, lease, or exchange of: 
(A) real estate; 
(B) an option on real estate; or 
(C) an improvement on real estate; and 
(iii) that gives the principal broker the expectation 
of receiving valuable consideration in exchange for 
the principal broker's services. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a principal 
broker subject to an exclusive brokerage agreement shaU: 
(i) accept deHvery of and present to the cHent offers 
and counteroffers to buy, lease, or exchange the 
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(iii) answer any question the client has concerning: 
(A) an offer; 
(B) a counteroffer; 
(C) a notice; and 
(D) a contingency. 
(b) A principal broker subject to an exclusive brokerage 
agreement need not comply with Subsection (2)(a) after: 
(i) an agreement for the sale, lease, or exchange of 
the real estate, option on real estate, or improvement 
on real estate is: 
(A) signed; 
(B) all contingencies related to the sale, lease, 
or exchange are satisfied or waived; and 
(C) the sale, lease, or exchange is closed; or 
(ii) the exclusive brokerage agreement expires or 
terminates. 
(3) A principal broker who violates this section is subject to 
Section 61-2-17. 2005 
CHAPTER 2a 
REAL ESTATE RECOVERY FUND 
Section 
61-2a-l. Citation. 
61-2a-2. Purpose. 
61-2a-3. Education, Research, and Recovery Fund. 
61-2a-4. Additional license fee — Purpose. 
61-2a-5. Notice to division — Judgment against real es-
tate licensee — Fraud, misrepresentation, or 
deceit — Verified petition for order directing 
payment from fund — Limitations and proce-
dure. 
61-2a-6. Real Estate Division — Authority to act upon 
receipt of petition. 
61-2a-7. Court determination and order. 
61-2a-8. Insufficient funds to satisfy judgments — Proce-
dure and interest. 
61-2a-9. Division subrogated to judgment creditor — Au-
thority to revoke license. 
61-2a-10. Failure to comply with all provisions constitutes 
a waiver. 
61-2a-ll. Director of Department of Commerce — Author-
ity to take disciplinary action not limited. 
61-2a-12. Moneys accumulated — Excess set aside — Pur-
pose. 
61-2a-l. Citation. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Real 
Estate Recovery Fund Act." 1975 
61-2a-2. Purpose. 
The purposes of this chapter are as follows: 
(1) To establish a Real Estate Education, Research, and 
Recovery Fund that shall reimburse the public out of the 
fund for damages up to $10,000 caused by real estate 
licensees in a real estate transaction. This chapter applies 
< to damages caused by individual licensees. Reimburse-
ment may not be made for judgments against corpora-
tions, partnerships, associations, or other legal entities. 
(2) To provide revenue for improving the real estate 
profession through education and research with the goal 
of making real estate salesmen more responsible to the 
public. 1989 
61-2a-3. Education, Research, and Recovery Fund. 
There is created a restricted special revenue fond to be 
known as the "Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery 
fund. At the commencement of each fiscal year, $100,000 shall 
be available in the fund for satisfying judgments rendered 
against persons licensed under Title 61, Chapter 2, Division of 
Real Estate. 2002 
61-2a-4. Additional license fee — Purpose. 
(1) Each person who applies for or renews a real estate 
principal broker or associate broker license shall pay, in 
addition to the application or renewal fee, a reasonable annual 
fee of up to $18, as determined by the Division of Real Estate 
with the concurrence of the Real Estate Commission. 
(2) Each person who applies for or renews a real estate 
sales agent license shall pay in addition to the application or 
renewal fee a reasonable annual fee of up to* $12, as deter-
mined by the division with the concurrence of the commission. 
(3) Notwithstanding Section 13-1-2, the additional fees 
under this section shall be paid into the Real Estate Educa-
tion, Research, and Recovery Fund to be used for the purposes 
of this chapter. 1993 
61-2a-5. Notice to division — Judgment against real 
estate licensee — Fraud, misrepresentation, 
or deceit — Verified petition for order direct-
ing payment from fund — Limitations and 
procedure. * 
(1) A person may bring a cl'aim against the Real Estate 
Education, Research, and Recovery Fund only if he sends a 
signed notification to the Division of Real Estate at the time he 
files an action against a real estate licensee alleging fraud, 
misrepresentation, or deceit.. Within 30 days of receipt of the 
notice, the division shall have an unconditional right to 
intervene in the action. If the person making a claim against 
the fund obtains a„ final judgment in a court of competent 
jurisdiction in this state against the licensee based upon 
fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit in any real estate transac-
tion, the person making the claim may, upon termination of all 
proceedings including appeals, file a verified petition in the 
court where the judgment was entered for an order directing 
payment from the Real Estate Education, Research, and 
Recovery Fund for the uncollected actual damages included in 
the judgment and unpaid. E,ecovery from the fund may not 
include pimitive damages, attorney's fees, interest, or court 
costs. Regardless of the number of claimants or parcels of real 
estate involved in a transaction, the liability of the fond may 
not exceed $10,000 for a single transaction and $50,000 for 
any one licensee. 
(2) A copy of the petition shall be served upon the Division 
of Real Estate of the Department of Commerce, and an 
affidavit of the service shall be filed with the court. 
(3) The court shall conduct a hearing on the petition within 
30 days after service. The petitioner shall recover from the 
fund only if he shows all of the following: 
(a) He is not the spouse of the judgment debtor or the 
personal representative of the spouse. 
(b) He has complied with this chapter. 
(c) He has obtained a final judgment in the manner 
prescribed under this section, indicating the amount of 
the judgment awarded. 
(d) He has proved the amount still owing on the judg-
ment at the date of the petition. 
(e) He has had a writ of execution issued upon the 
judgment, and the officer executing the writ has made a 
return showing that no property subject-to execution in 
satisfaction of the judgment could be found. If execution is 
levied against the property of the judgment debtor, the 
petitioner shall show that the amount realized was insuf-
ficient -to satisfy the judgment, and shall indicate the 
TabB 
UTAH CODE 
UNANNOTATED 
2004 
VOLUME 1 
Complete through the 
2004 THIRD SPECIAL SESSION 
LexisNexis( 
1269 FRAUD 25-5-4 
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6. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
CHAPTER 1 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES [REPEALED] 
25-1-1 to 25-1-16. Repealed. 1988 
CHAPTER 2 
SALE OF MERCHANDISE IN BULK [REPEALED] 
25-2-1 to 25-2-5* Repealed. 1965 
CHAPTER 3 
LEASES AND SALES OF LIVESTOCK [REPEALED] 
25-3-1 to 25-3-4* Repealed. 1965 
CHAPTER 4 
MARKETING WOOL [REPEALED] 
25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed. 1965 
CHAPTER 5 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Section 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and signed. 
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person. 
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another — 
'When not required to be m vmtmg. 
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written. 
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
25-5-9.- Agent may sign for principal. 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for 
a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, grant-
ing, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 1953 
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
Section 25-5-1 shall not be construed to affect the power of 
a fp^tator in the disno'sition of his real estate bv last will and 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one 
year, or ft>r the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall 
be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the 
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing. 1953 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and 
signed. 
(1) The following agreements are void unless the agree-
ment, or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in 
writing, signed by the party to be charged with the agreement: 
(a) every agreement that by its terms is not to be 
performed within one year from the making of the agree-
ment; 
(b) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or 
miscarriage of another; 
(c) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made 
upon consideration of raarriage, except mutual promises 
to marry; 
(d) every special promise made by an executor or ad-
ministrator to answer in damages for the liabilities, or to 
pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of his own 
estate; 
(e) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent 
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation; 
and 
(f) every credit agreement. 
(2) (a) As used in Subsection (l)(f) and this Subsection (2): 
(i) (A) "Credit a{*reement" means an agreement by 
a financial institution to: 
(I) lend, delay, or otherwise modify an 
obligation to repay money, goods, or things in 
action; 
(II) otherwise extend credit; or 
(III) make any other financial accommo-
dation. 
(B) "Credit agreement" does not include the 
usual and customary agreements related to de-
posit accounts or overdrafts or other terms asso-
ciated with deposit accounts or overdrafts, 
(ii) "Creditor* means a financial institution which 
extends credit or extends a financial accommodation 
under a credit agreement with a debtor. 
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seeks or obtains 
credit, or seeks or receives a financial accommoda-
tion, under a credit agreement with a financial insti-
tution. 
(iv) "Financial institution" means: 
{K) a state or federal\y chartered: 
(I) bank; 
(II) savings and loan association; 
(III) savings bank; 
(IV) industrial bank; or 
(V) credit union; or 
(B) any other institution under the jurisdic-
tion of the commissioner of Financial Institutions 
as provided in Title 7, Financial Institutions Act. 
(t>) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(e), a debtor 
or a creditor may not maintain an action on a credit 
agreement unless the agreement: 
(A) is in writing; 
(B) expresses consideration; 
(C) sets forth the relevant terms and condi-
tions; and 
;
 (D) is signed by the party against whom en-
forcement of the agreement would be sought 
;-5 FRAUD 1270 
not customarily obtain an additional signed agree-
ment from the debtor when granting the application. 
(c) The following actions do not give rise to a claim that 
i credit Agreement is created, unless the agreement 
satisfies the requirements of Subsection (2)(b): 
(i) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to 
a debtor; 
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or 
(iii) the creation for any purpose between a credi-
tor and a debtor of fiduciary or other business rela-
tionships. 
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a clearly stated 
typewritten or printed provision giving notice to the 
debtor that the written agreement is a final expression of 
the agreement between the creditor and debtor and the 
written agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of 
any alleged oral agreement. The provision does not have 
to be on the promissory note or other evidence of indebt-
edness that is tied to the credit agreement. 
(e) A credit agreement is binding and enforceable with-
out any signature by the party to be charged if: 
(i) the debtor is provided with a written copy of the 
terms of the agreement; 
(ii) the agreement provides that any use of the 
credit offered shall constitute acceptance of those 
terms; and 
(iii) after the debtor receives the agreement, the 
debtor, or a person authorized by the debtor, requests 
funds pursuant to the credit agreement or otherwise 
uses the credit offered. 2004 
-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person. 
To charge a person upon a representation as to the credit of 
third person, such representation, or some memorandum 
sreof, must be in writing subscribed by the party to be 
arged therewith. 1953 
-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another — 
When not required to be in writing. 
A promise to answer for the obligation of another in any of 
e following cases is deemed an original obligation of the 
omisor and need not be in writing: 
(1) Where the promise is made by one who has received 
property of another upon an undertaking to apply it 
pursuant to such promise, or by one who has received a 
discharge from an obligation in whole or in part in 
consideration of such promise. 
(2) Where the creditor parts with value or enters into 
an obligation in consideration of the obligation in respect 
to which the promise is made in terms or under circum-
stances such as to render the party making the promise 
the principal debtor and the person in whose behalf it is 
made his surety. 
(3) Where the promise, being for an antecedent obliga-
tion of another, is made upon the consideration that the 
party receiving it cancel the antecedent obligation, accept-
ing the new promise as a substitute therefor; or upon the 
consideration that the party receiving it releases the 
property of another from a levy or his person from 
imprisonment under an execution on a judgment obtained 
upon the antecedent obligation; or upon a consideration 
beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from either 
party to the antecedent obligation or from another person. 
(4) Where a factor undertakes for a commission to sell 
merchandise and to guarantee the sale. 
(5) When the holder of an instrument for the payment 
of money upon which a third person is or may become 
*£mf nf a rvrpredent debt of 
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written. 
Contracts made by telegraph shall be deemed to be con-
tracts in writing, and all communications sent by telegraph 
and signed by the person sending the same, or by his author-
ity, shall be deemed to be communications in writing. 1953 
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to 
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific perfor-
mance of agreements in case of part performance thereof. 
1953 
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal. 
Every instrument required by the provisions of this chapter 
to be subscribed by any party may be subscribed by the lawful 
agent of such party. 1953 
CHAPTER 6 
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
Section 
25-6-1. 
25-6-2. 
25-6-3. 
25-6-4. 
25-6-5. 
25-6-6. 
25-6-7. 
25-6-8. 
25-6-9. 
25-6-10. 
25-6-11. 
25-6-12. 
25-6-13. 
25-6-14. 
Short title. 
Definitions. 
Insolvency. 
Value — Transfer. 
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or 
after transfer. 
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before 
transfer. 
Transfer — When made. 
Remedies of creditors. 
Good faith transfer. 
Claim for relief— Time limits. 
Legal principles applicable to chapter. 
Construction of chapter. 
Applicability of chapter. 
Restricting transfers of trust interests. 
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25-6-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act." 1988 
25-6-2. Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means: 
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, con-
trols, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the 
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other 
than a person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discre-
tionary power to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has 
not exercised the power to vote; 
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstand-
ing voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, 
controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or 
a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or 
holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the out-
standing voting securities of the debtor, other than a 
person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power 
to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has 
not exercised the power to vote; 
(c) a person whose business is operated by the 
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Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 188 
scheduled appearance in another court on that the date of notice of entry of such judgment, 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or rather than from the date of judgment. Buck-
motion days between time objection was filed ner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124, 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re- 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank & 
fusal to set aside default judgment entered Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d). 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Hammon, 560 R2d 1375 (Utah 1977). Tblbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 R2d 703 (1965); 
_,. , , J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P2d 486 (Utah 
U n d e f f o S t u l e 73(h) the time for appeal ™»> ^ * * £ < ? > ™ ? ^ % S ^ l i m 
from a default judgment in a city court ran from L u n d * B r o w n > 2 0 0 0 OT 75> n R 3 d 2 7 7« 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for In ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham Opening default or default judgment claimed 
v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. to have been obtained because of attorney's 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial, 
265 et seq. or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. Failure to give notice of application for de-
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to fault judgment where notice is required only by 
liability against defaulting defendant, 8 custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
A.L.R.3d 1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary 
judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
189 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to 
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant 
to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the 
court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party 
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amend-
ment substituted "move for summary judg-
ment" for "move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor" 
in Subdivisions (a) and (b); in Subdivision (c), 
deleted "filed and served" before "in accordance 
with" and substituted "Rule T for "CJA 4-501"; 
substituted "If" for "Should it appear to the 
satisfaction of the court at any time that" at the 
beginning of the first sentence in Subdivision 
(g); and made stylistic changes throughout. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
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-1-1. Authority. 
l.i. The following administrative Rules, applicable to the Division of Real Estate, Department of Commerce have been 
tablished under the authority granted by Section 61-2-5.5, et seq. 
1.1.1. The Division shall charge and collect fees for the (a) issuance of a new or duplicate license; (b) issuance of license 
story or certifications; (c) issuance of certified copies of official documents, orders, and other papers and transcripts; (d) 
rtification of real estate schools, courses and instructors; and (e) costs of administering other duties. 
1.1.2. The authority to collect the above fees is authorized by Section 61-2-9(5) and Section 6i-2a- 4. 
•1-2. Definitions. 
1.2. Terms used in these rules are defined as follows: 
1.2.1. Active Licensee: One who: (a) has paid all applicable license fees; and (b) is affiliated with a principal brokerage. 
1.2.2. Branch Manager: An associate broker who manages a branch office under the supervision of the principal broker. 
1.2.3. Branch Office: A real estate office affiliated with and operating under the same name as a Principal Brokerage but 
ated at an address different from the main office. 
1.2.4. Business Opportunity: The sale, lease, or exchange of any business which includes an interest in real estate. 
1.2.5. Brokerage: A real estate sales brokerage or a property management company. 
1.2.6. Certification: The authorization issued by the Division to: (a) establish and operate a real estate school which 
provides courses approved for licensing requirements, (b) provide courses approved for renewal requirements, or (c) 
unction as a real estate instructor. 
1.2.7. Company Registration: A Registration issued to a corporation, partnership, Limited Liability Company, association 
>r other legal entity of a real estate brokerage. A Company Registration is also issued to an individual or an individual's 
>rofessional corporation. 
1.2.8. Continuing Education: Professional education required as a condition of renewal in accordance with Subsection 61-
i-9(2)(a). 
1.2.9. Credit hour: 50 minutes of instruction within a 60 minute period. 
1.2.10 DBA (doing business as): The authority issued by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code to transact 
msiness under an assumed name. 
1.2.11. Distance Education: education in which the instruction does not take place in a traditional classroom setting, but 
hrough other interactive instructional methods where teacher and student are separated by distance and sometimes by time, 
nchiding computer conferencing, video conferencing, interactive audio, interactive computer software, Internet-based 
nstruction, and other interactive online courses. 
1.2.12. Expired License: A license will be deemed "expired" when the licensee fails to pay the fees due by the close of 
msiness on the expiration date. If the expiration date falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday the effective date of expiration 
hall be the next business day. 
1.2.13. Inactivation: The placing of a license on an inactive status, either voluntarily or involuntarily. 
1.2.13.1. Voluntary inactivation means the process initiated by an active licensee terminating affiliation with a principal 
brokerage. 
1.2.13.2. Involuntary inactivation means the process of (a) inactivation of a sales agent or associate broker license resulting 
rom the suspension, revocation, or non-renewal of the license of the licensee's principal broker, or death of the licensee's 
>rincipal broker, or (b) inactivation of a sales agent or associate broker license by a principal broker when the licensee is 
raavailable to execute the transfer forms. 
1.2.14. Inactive Licensee: One who: (a) has paid all applicable license fees; and (b) is not affiliated with a principal 
>rokerage. 
1.2.15. Net listing means a listing wherein the amount of real estate commission is the difference between the selling price 
•f the property and a minimum price set by the seller. 
1.2.16. Non-resident Licensee: A person who holds a Utah real estate principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent 
icense whose primary residence is in a jurisdiction other than Utah. 
1.2.17. Principal Brokerage: The main real estate or property management office of a principal broker. 
1.2.18. Property Management: The business of providing services relating to the rental or leasing of real property, 
ncluding: advertising, procuring prospective tenants or lessees, negotiating lease or rental terms, executing lease or rental 
greements, supervising repairs and maintenance, collecting and disbursing rents. 
1.2.19 Provider: any person, professional organization, or other entity that is approved by the Division of Real Estate to 
each Division-approved continuing education courses. 
1.2.20. Regular Salaried Employees: For purposes of this Chapter, "regular salaried employee" shall mean an individual 
mployed other than on a contract basis, who has withholding taxes taken out by the employer. 
1.2.21. Reinstatement: To restore to active or inactive status, a license which has expired or been suspended. 
1.2.22. Reissuance: The process by which a licensee may obtain a license following revocation. 
1.2.23. Renewal: To extend an active or inactive license for an additional licensing period. 
1.2.24 School: For the purposes of Rules R162-8 and R162-9, "school" includes: 
(a) Any college or university accredited by a regional accrediting agency which is recognized by the United States 
)epartment of Education; 
(b) Any community college, vocational-technical school, state or federal agency or commission; 
(c) Any nationally recognized real estate organization, any Utah real estate organization, or any local real estate 
organization which has been approved by the Real Estate Commission; and 
(d) Any proprietary real estate school. 
1.2.25 Traditional Education: education in which instruction takes place between an instructor and students where all are 
tiysically present in the same classroom. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Ira SACHS, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Joseph S. LESSER, Loeb Investors Co. XL, United 
Park City Mines Company, 
Capital Growth Partners, and John Does 1-10, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20060257-CA. 
May 17, 2007. 
Background: Shareholder brought breach of 
contract action against company, its president, and 
the chairman of the board of directors, seeking to 
collect a finder's fee for finding buyer for all of 
company's stock. The District Court, Salt Lake 
Department, Tyrone E. Medley, J., granted 
defendants summary judgment. Shareholder 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, McHugh, J., held 
that: 
(1) no express contract formed between the parties 
due to a lack of a meeting of the minds as to the 
amount of compensation; 
(2) genuine issues of material fact existed as to 
whether there was a contract implied in fact, 
precluding summary judgment; 
(31 shareholder was not required to comply with the 
Real Estate Broker's Act's licensing requirements in 
finding stock buyer; and 
(4) statute of frauds did not apply to alleged finder's 
agreement. 
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. 
West Headnotes 
£11 Contracts €^>15 
95kl5 Most Cited Cases * 
A binding contract can exist only where there has 
been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their 
intention to be bound by its terms. 
[21 Contracts €=^9(1) 
95k9(l) Most Cited Cases 
A contract can be enforced only if the obligations of 
the parties are set forth with sufficient definiteness 
that it can be performed. 
[31 Contracts €^>9(1) 
95k9(l) Most Cited Cases 
Where a contract is so uncertain and indefinite that 
the intention of the parties in material particulars 
cannot be ascertained, the contract is void and 
unenforceable. 
[41 Brokers €=>7 
65k7 Most Cited Cases 
Generally, material terms of a broker or finder's 
agreement include, but are not necessarily limited to: 
(1) a description of the performance required of the 
finder or broker, and (2) the amount of commission 
or fee to be paid for the completed performance. 
[51 Brokers €=>40 
65k40 Most Cited Cases 
Shareholder and chairman of company's -board of 
directors never reached a meeting of the minds as to 
the amount of compensation shareholder would be 
due if he succeeded in finding a buyer for the 
company, and thus, no express contract formed 
between the parties. 
[61 Contracts €=>27 
95k27 Most Cited Cases 
[61 Implied and Constructive Contracts © ^ 3 0 
205Hk30 Most Cited Cases 
[61 Implied and Constructive Contracts €=>55 
205Hk55 Most Cited Cases 
Recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that no 
enforceable contract exists, and can take either of two 
forms; the first is a claim for a contract implied in 
fact, which is an actual contract established by 
conduct, while the second, is a claim for a contract 
implied in law or quasi-contract, which is not a 
contract at all, but rather an action in restitution. 
[71 Contracts € ^ 2 7 
95k27 Most Cited Cases 
Like express contracts, contracts implied in fact grow 
out of the intention of the contracting parties and in 
each case there must be a meeting of the minds 
before there can be a contract. 
[81 Contracts €=^>27 
95k27 Most Cited Cases. 
Unlike an express contract, recovery under a contract 
implied in fact does not necessarily require that the 
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parties agree on the contract price. 
[91 Contracts €=>27 
95k27 Most Cited Cases 
To prevail on a claim arising under a contract implied 
in fact, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant 
requested the plaintiff to perform the work; (2) the 
plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate him or 
her for those services; and (3) the defendant knew or 
should have known that the plaintiff expected 
compensation. 
£10] Contracts €=>29 
95k29 Most Cited Cases 
Generally speaking, the existence of an implied-in-
fact contract is a factual question committed to the 
sound discretion of the jury. 
f in Appeal and Error €=>863 
30k863 Most Cited Cases 
On a review of summary judgment on a contract 
implied in fact claim, the reviewing court retains the 
power to decide whether, as a matter of law, a 
reasonable jury could find that an implied contract 
exists. 
T121 Contracts €^>27 
95k27 Most Cited Cases 
[121 Contracts €^=>168 
95kl68 Most Cited Cases 
On a contract implied in fact claim, a plaintiff may 
only recover the amount the parties can be said to 
have reasonably intended as the contract price; if the 
parties have left that amount unexpressed, courts will 
infer the amount to be the reasonable value of the 
plaintiffs services. 
£131 Judgment €^181(31) 
228kl81(31) Most Cited Cases 
Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether 
there was a contract implied in fact between 
shareholder and chairman of company's board of 
directors and whether shareholder was responsible 
for procuring buyer for company, precluding 
summary judgment on shareholder's claim for a 
finder's fee based on the implied contract to find 
buyer for company. 
£141 Brokers €^>53 
65k53 Most Cited Cases 
A business finder becomes entitled to his fee if his 
introduction results in a transaction, irrespective of 
whether a third person brings the parties to 
Page 2 
agreement. 
£151 Brokers €=>53 
65k53 Most Cited Cases 
With a business finder, the causation, or procuring 
cause requirement for obtaining a finder's fee is 
satisfied by the mere introduction, even if 
negotiations are abandoned and later successfully 
resumed, provided the renewed negotiations are 
connected to and stem from the original introduction. 
£161 Brokers €=>2 
65k2 Most Cited Cases 
A "broker" not only introduces the parties to a 
business opportunity but also negotiates on behalf of 
one of the parties with the best interests of one such 
party being his charge. 
£171 Brokers €=>54 
65k54 Most Cited Cases 
A broker becomes entitled to his commission if, 
through his direct and continuous actions, he 
produces a buyer or seller who is ready, willing, and 
able to complete the transaction on the principal's 
terms. 
£181 Corporations €=>1.3 
101kl.3 Most Cited Cases 
fl81 Corporations €=^182.1(1) 
101kl82.im Most Cited Cases 
Because a corporation exists* as a distinct legal entity, 
when the corporation acquires property, the title vests 
in it as a separate entity distinct from its shareholders. 
fl91 Corporations €=^182.1(3) 
101kl82.H3) Most Cited Cases 
When a stockholder sells his stock, he is selling his 
proprietary interest in a going concern and not an 
interest in the corporate assets. West's U.CA. § 
16-10a-102(33). 
£201 Corporations €=^445.1 
101k445.1 Most Cited Cases 
Generally speaking, when all the assets of an ongoing 
business are purchased, the purchaser does not 
acquire the liabilities of the corporation as a stock 
purchaser would. 
£211 Corporations €=>182.1(1) 
101kl82.1(n Most Cited Cases 
£211 Corporations €^182.4(1) 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
163P.3d662 
163 P.3d 662,578 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,2007 UT App 169 
(Cite as: 163 P.3d 662) 
101kl82.4(l) Most Cited Cases 
The purchaser in a corporate asset transaction takes 
legal title to the property, but in a stock purchase 
transaction the corporation's assets remain titled in 
the corporation's name. 
T221 Brokers €^>3 
65k3 Most Cited Cases 
Shareholder did not find a participant in a business 
opportunity involving real property when he located a 
buyer for all of company's stock, which company 
existed for the sole purpose of owning and dealing in 
real estate, and thus, he was not required to comply 
with the Real Estate Broker's Act's licensing 
requirements; the stock buyer gained only a 
proprietary interest in a going concern and not an 
interest in the company's real property since the 
company continued to own, possess, and control the 
real property throughout and following the merger 
transaction. West's U.C.A. § § 61-2-2(141 61-2-18. 
[23] Brokers €^>3 
65k3 Most Cited Cases 
Agreements to broker corporate stock for 
compensation do not fall within the scope of statute 
of frauds provision regarding broker agreements to 
sell real estate. West's U.C.A. § 25-5-4QYe). 
[24] Brokers €=^43(2) 
65k43(2) Most Cited Cases 
Company's stock was considered personal property 
rather than realty, and thus, alleged agreement 
between shareholder and company, in which 
shareholder would receive finder's fee if he found a 
buyer for all of company's stock, was not subject to 
the statute of frauds. West's U.C.A. § 25-5-4(l)(e). 
*665 Kathrvn Collard, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Laura S. Scott, Shane D. Hillman. Jason D. Boren, 
and Anthony C. Kave, Salt Lake City, for Appellees. 
Before BENCH. P.J., McHUGH and THORNE. JJ. 
OPINION 
McHUGH. Judge: 
f 1 Plaintiff Ira Sachs appeals the district court's 
order granting summary judgment to Defendants 
Joseph S. Lesser, Loeb Investors Co. XL, and United 
Park City Mines Company on Sachs's claims to 
recover a finder's fee. We affirm in part and reverse 
and remand in part. 
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BACKGROUND FPNll 
FN1. We note that many of the facts are 
hotly disputed. When "there is a factual 
dispute, we view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party," Ouaid v. 
U.S. Healthcare. Inc., 2007 UT 27. T 8. 158 
P.3d 525. in this instance, Sachs; and "[w]e 
recite the facts accordingly," Sanders v. 
Leavitt. 2001 UT 78. % 1 n. 1.37 P.3d 1052. 
f 2 This appeal arises from a dispute over Sachs's 
claim to a finder's fee for a transaction culminating in 
the purchase of all the outstanding stock of United 
Park City Mines (UPCM) by Capital Growth 
Partners, L.L.C. (Capital). At the time these events 
began in 1999, UPCM was a publicly held 
corporation involved in the leasing, development, and 
sale of real property located in and around Park City, 
Utah. Loeb Investors Co. XL (Loeb) was the 
controlling shareholder of UPCM, and Defendant 
Joseph S. Lesser served as both the Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of UPCM and President of Loeb. 
Hank Rothwell was the President of UPCM. Sachs 
was a shareholder in UPCM and worked as a 
business consultant in Park City. 
f 3 In 1999, UPCM, acting under Rothwell's 
direction, entered into a letter of understanding with 
DMB Associates, Inc. (DMB), to form a joint venture 
to develop resort projects in Park City on a portion of 
UPCM's property. HFN21 The joint venture formed in 
June 2000. After attempts to agree on a business plan 
failed, the joint venture dissolved in January 2001, 
leaving UPCM obligated to pay DMB approximately 
$2.5 million in development costs and accrued 
interest. 
FN2. UPCM's only significant corporate 
asset is its real property holdings which 
include more than 8300 acres of land, of 
which approximately 5300 are leased to 
Deer Valley and Park City Mountain Resorts 
for skiing and related purposes. 
f 4 Upon learning that the joint venture between 
UPCM and DMB had failed, Sachs contacted one of 
his clients, Granite Land Company (Granite), and 
introduced Granite to UPCM as a potential joint 
venturer to take the place of DMB in developing the 
resort projects. Around March 2001, Granite and 
UPCM signed a confidentiality agreement allowing 
them to exchange information related to a possible 
joint venture. 
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f 5 On May 2, 2001, Sachs traveled to New York to 
meet with Lesser, the chairman of UPCM's board of 
directors. At the meeting, Lesser expressed his 
displeasure regarding Rothwell's handling of the 
failed UPCM joint venture with DMB. Lesser 
indicated that he represented eighty-five percent of 
UPCM's shareholders, and that those shareholders 
had lost faith in Rothwell and did not want to invest 
any more money in UPCM. Lesser then asked Sachs 
to locate a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM as 
quickly as possible, regardless of whether it was 
Granite, another party, or a combination. Although 
no specific amount of a finder's fee was discussed at 
the meeting, Lesser told Sachs that UPCM intended 
to engage Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, Inc. 
(Dresdner) as a broker and that Sachs would not be 
entitled to a commission if Dresdner found a buyer 
for UPCM. During the conversation, Lesser did not 
mention or exclude any other persons or entities that 
could be approached as potential joint venturers or 
purchasers for UPCM aside from Dresdner and its 
contacts. 
f 6 Following his meeting with Lesser, Sachs sent a 
letter to Rothwell on May 17, 2001, memorializing 
aspects of the New York *666 meeting. The letter 
included a reference to Sachs's expectation of a 
finder's fee for his services in locating a joint venturer 
for UPCM. The letter stated: 
I am delighted that my introducing [UPCM] to 
Granite ... appears to be headed in the right 
direction and I am pleased that the confidentiality 
letter has been signed. I certainly will continue to 
do everything in my power to bring together a 
mutually satisfactory agreement between these two 
parties. I took the opportunity to express this 
commitment to your chairman, [Lesser],... in early 
May. 
In that lunch with [Lesser], I was delighted to find 
that he seems to share our enthusiasm for this joint 
venture. I hope that this feeling is generally shared 
by the rest of your board.... [Lesser] gave me his 
encouragement to "get the job done." 
I write this letter to remind you that I will expect a 
modest finder's fee if an agreement comes to 
fruition. This could be cash, a couple of prime 
developed lots in the new project, or some other 
consideration acceptable to both of us. While I 
believe we have an understanding as to this finder's 
fee, I do think that matters of this sort ought to be 
out on the table early on, and I hope you feel the 
same. 
Please let me know if you have any questions 
concerning such finder's fee. 
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Later that same day, Rothwell transmitted the letter 
to Lesser. Lesser telephoned and informed Sachs that 
he did not want a joint venture partner for UPCM but 
was, instead, only interested in a purchaser. 
f 7 The next day, Sachs followed up on this 
telephone conversation by sending a second letter to 
Rothwell clarifying Lesser's preference for a 
purchaser. The second letter stated: 
I understand, after a conversation yesterday with 
[Lesser], that his preference would be to sell the 
company rather than enter into a joint venture.... 
Happily, if your company's preference is sale, 
Granite, as I suggested in yesterday's letter is still 
an excellent prospect. Another investor, together 
with Granite, would make an excellent purchaser. 
I am happy to re-direct my focus to obtaining such 
a joint venture purchaser. 
Obviously, I will keep you apprised of all 
proposals, whether for sale or for a joint venturing 
of die project. 
f 8 During this time, Sachs was also contacting 
several individuals regarding the purchase of UPCM. 
One of those people was Gerald Jackson, a real estate 
developer who had previously worked in Park City. 
During their initial conversation, Sachs conveyed to 
Jackscm what he had learned from Lesser in New 
York, including Lesser's disappointment with 
Rothwell and Lesser's strong desire to sell UPCM 
instead of enter into a joint venture. Jackson thanked 
Sachs for the information and expressed interest in 
buying UPCM. Jackson told Sachs that he would like 
to "take [the UPCM] deal down with some 
institutional and other investors." Because Lesser 
had told Sachs that all interested parties should be 
referred to Rothwell, Sachs asked Jackson to contact 
Rothwell. Sachs also suggested that Jackson sign a 
confidentiality agreement so that Jackson could 
obtain information relevant to the purchase of UPCM 
and would be registered as one of Sachs's contacts. 
In addition, Sachs invited Jackson to contact Granite 
and offered to inquire whether Granite was interested 
in joining Jackson in a bid to purchase UPCM. 
During this initial conversation, Jackson never 
informed Sachs that he was already acquainted with 
Rothwell through prioi business and social 
relationships or that he was already pursuing a 
purchase of UPCM directly with Rothwell. Rather, 
Jackson told Sachs that he would contact Rothwell 
and sign a confidentiality agreement. 
f 9 Shortly thereafter, Sachs contacted Rothwell and 
informed him of Jackson's interest in putting together 
a group of investors to purchase UPCM. Sachs told 
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Rothwell that Jackson became interested in 
purchasing UPCM upon learning from Sachs that 
Lesser was eager to sell. During this conversation, 
Rothwell never mentioned that he and Jackson were 
already engaged in negotiations concerning the sale 
of UPCM. As promised, Sachs also contacted Granite 
about *667 the possibility of affiliating with Jackson 
to purchase UPCM. And Jackson, acting on Sachs's 
suggestion, also contacted Granite. 
f 10 On June 4, 2001, Sachs wrote to Jackson 
asking to be updated when Jackson contacted 
Rothwell or entered into a confidentiality agreement 
with UPCM. Jackson responded by telephoning and 
informing Sachs that he had already contacted 
Rothwell. On July 9, 2001, Jackson, acting through 
Aspen Ranch Corp., entered into a confidentiality 
agreement with Dresdner, who by that time was 
UPCM's investment banking firm. On July 31, 2001, 
Jackson helped form Capital, a Utah limited liability 
company, for the express purpose of purchasing 
UPCM. 
f 11 From late July 2001, through the end of the 
year, Sachs frequently inquired about Jackson's 
progress in purchasing UPCM; however, Sachs was 
not personally involved in negotiating the deal. In 
late October 2001, Capital entered into a non-
disclosure agreement with Dresdner to pursue a 
proposed acquisition of all the outstanding shares of 
UPCM. Four months later, Capital formally offered 
to purchase UPCM from its current shareholders. 
After reading a newspaper article about the offer, 
Sachs sent a facsimile to Rothwell which stated 
"completion of task." 
f 12 About this time, in February 2002, Jackson 
telephoned Sachs and discussed Sachs's role in 
soliciting Jackson as a purchaser for UPCM. Jackson 
confirmed that Sachs was responsible for introducing 
Jackson to the deal and also stated that he had no 
problem with Sachs receiving a finder's fee on the 
transaction. Following this conversation with 
Jackson, Sachs began contacting Rothwell and Craig 
Terry, an attorney for UPCM, in an attempt to secure 
payment of a finder's fee for the transaction. 
<j[ 13 In June 2003, Capital purchased all the 
outstanding common stock of UPCM, by way of 
merger with its wholly owned subsidiary, CGP 
Acquisition, Inc. In the merger, UPCM, the surviving 
corporation, became a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Capital and retained all of its assets and liabilities, 
including its real estate assets. Following the 
completion of the transaction, Sachs continued to 
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seek a finder's fee from UPCM. On August 11, 2003, 
Sachs again spoke with Jackson who expressed 
surprise that Dresdner received a finder's fee for the 
transaction instead of Sachs. Jackson reiterated that 
Sachs, and not Dresdner, had solicited him as a 
purchaser. Shortly after this exchange, Sachs faxed 
additional requests for payment to Rothwell at 
UPCM. Rothwell eventually returned a facsimile 
with a notation that stated: "Ira [Sachs]~[UPCM] 
does not agree with your agency argument. [Jackson] 
and I had discussed [UPCM] for years! We viewed 
you as a representative of Granite... only!" IPN31 
FN3. In his deposition testimony, Lesser 
conceded that if Sachs had been responsible 
for introducing Jackson to UPCM, Sachs 
would have been entitled to a finder's fee. 
f 14 In January 2004, Sachs brought suit against 
Lesser, Loeb, UPCM, and Capital in an effort to 
collect a finder's fee for the sale of UPCM to Capital. 
Among other things, Sachs alleged breach of an 
express oral contract or, in the alternative, recovery 
under theories of contract implied in fact and contract 
implied in law. [FN41 Lesser, Loeb, and UPCM 
(collectively Defendants) moved for summary 
judgment. [FN51 The trial court granted Defendants' 
motion, finding the undisputed facts did not support 
Sachs's claim for breach of an express finder's fee 
agreement because there was no meeting of the 
minds on the essential terms of the contract, 
including the amount of the fee. The trial court found 
that Sachs's claim for contract implied in fact 
similarly failed for a lack of definiteness. *668 
Turning to Sachs's claim for contract implied in law, 
the trial court determined that Utah's statutes relating 
to the licensing of real estate brokers, see Utah Code 
Ann. S§ 61-2-1 to -27 (2006) (UREBA), and Utah's 
statute of frauds, see Utah Code Ann. § § 25-5-1 to -
9 (1998 & Supp.2006), barred Sachs's claim. 1TN61 
The trial court concluded that because Sachs was not 
a licensed real estate broker in Utah and there was no 
written memorandum of the parties' agreement, any 
claim for a finder's fee was barred by both UREBA 
and the statute of frauds as a matter of law. Sachs 
appealed. 
FN4. Although the trial court refers to 
Sachs's contract implied in law claim as a 
claim for quantum meruit, we use the term 
"quantum meruit" to refer to both branches 
of that doctrine: 1) contract implied in fact; 
and 2) contract implied in law. See Scheller 
v. Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971. 975 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). We refer to the theories 
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individually when only one is relevant to the 
discussion. 
FN5. Capital was granted summary 
judgment on the ground that the undisputed 
facts could not support Sachs's claim for 
corporate successor liability. Sachs does not 
appeal this determination; we therefore 
limit our review to the claims against 
Defendants. 
FN6. The trial court also determined that 
Sachs's claims for breach of express contract 
and recovery under contract implied in fact 
were similarly barred by UREBA and the 
statute of frauds. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
% 15 Sachs argues that the trial court erred in 
granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment. 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only where (1) 
'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact' and 
(2) 'the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.' " Poteet v. Wliite, 2006 UT 63, <f 7, 
147 P.3d 439 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 
Therefore, "[w]e review the district court's decision 
to grant summary judgment for correctness, granting 
no deference to the [district] court." Swan Creek Vill. 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, f 16, 134 
P.3d 1122 (second alteration in original) (quotations 
omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
f 16 On appeal, Sachs alleges multiple points of 
error. First, Sachs argues that summary judgment 
was inappropriate because material issues of fact 
remain unresolved with respect to his claims for 
express oral contract and contract implied in fact. 
Next, Sachs contends that the trial court erred when it 
determined that UREBA applied to an acquisition of 
all of UPCM's outstanding stock thereby barring his 
express oral contract, contract implied in fact, and 
contract implied in law. Finally, Sachs asserts the 
trial court erred when it concluded that the statute of 
frauds barred his claims. We affirm in part and 
reverse and remand in part. 
I. Express Contract 
f 17 Sachs argues that the trial court erred when it 
dismissed his express contract claim on the ground 
that no meeting of the minds occurred on the material 
terms of the contract. We affirm. 
m m m f 18 "A binding contract can exist only 
where there has been mutual assent by the parties 
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manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms. 
Furthermore, a contract can be enforced ... only if the 
obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient 
definiteness that it can be performed." Bunnell v. 
Bills. 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (1962) 
(footnote omitted), overruled on other grounds by 
Leish Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293 
(Utah 1982): see also Carter v. Sorenson, 2004 UT 
33, f 7, 90 P.3d 637 ("A contract ... must have 
definite terms ... or else it cannot be enforced by a 
court."). "[W]here a contract is so uncertain and 
indefinite that the intention of the parties in material 
particulars cannot be ascertained, the contract is void 
and unenforceable." Stangl v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316, 
1319 (Utah 1976): see also Utah Golf Ass'n v. City 
ofN. Salt Lake, 2003 UT 38, % 13, 79 P.3d 919 ("An 
unenforceable agreement to agree occurs when 
parties to a contract fail to agpree on material terms of 
the contract 'with sufficient definiteness to be 
enforced.' " (emphasis added) (quoting Cottonwood 
Mall Co, v. Sine. 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988))). 
[41 f 19 Generally, material terms of a broker or 
finder's agreement include, but are not necessarily 
limited to: (1) a description of the performance 
required of the finder or broker, and (2) the amount 
of commission or fee to be paid for the completed 
performance. See Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243,188 P. 
640, 642 (1920) (recognizing that material terms of a 
finder or broker's agreement include "the terms and 
conditions of his employment, if any, and the amount 
of his commission, etc."); CJ. Realty, Inc. v. Wit lev, 
758 P.2d 923. 928 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (outlining 
"critical terms of a finder's agreement" to include "the 
finder, the finder's clients, the *669 property owner 
who will owe a commission to the finder if a 
transaction is closed with any of the finder's clients, 
and the commission rate"). 
£51 f 20 Here, summary judgment was appropriate 
because the parties did not reach a meeting of the 
minds as to the amount of compensation due should 
Sachs succeed in finding a buyer for UPCM. See 
Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 
285, 290-91 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (recognizing, 
implicitly, that the amount of a finder's fee is an 
essential term of a finder's contract and determining 
• that the parties agreement on a "reasonable" fee 
would be sufficiently definite to enforce where prior 
contract and future contract gave guidance as to what 
the parties considered reasonable). Although it is 
undisputed that Sachs sent a letter on May 17, 2001, 
indicating his willingness to accept "a modest finder's 
fee" in the form of "cash, a couple of prime 
developed lots in the new project, or some other 
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consideration acceptable to both [parties,]" Sachs has 
failed to point to any facts that could support his 
contention that the parties actually agreed to the 
"modest" fee or to any other specific form or amount 
of compensation. Rather, it is undisputed that at the 
May 2, 2001 meeting, Sachs and Lesser did not 
discuss any specific amount of finder's fee. 
Additionally, Sachs admits that he did not have any 
specific compensation in mind when he drafted the 
letter and instead "was trying to draw [Rothwell] out 
to come up with something." It is also undisputed 
that, following the letter, the parties never agreed to 
the form or a specific amount of compensation. 
Therefore, Sachs's express contract claim fails as a 
matter of law because there was no meeting of the 
minds on the essential term of the fee to be paid. 
IPN71 
FN7. Sachs also argues that the May 17 
letter was a written offer that Lesser 
accepted when he told Sachs to find a buyer, 
not a joint venturer. We disagree. "A 
manifestation of willingness to enter into a 
bargain is not an offer if the person to whom 
it is addressed knows or has reason to know 
that the person making it does not intend to 
conclude a bargain until he has made a 
further manifestation of assent." 
Restatement (Second) Contracts § 26 
(1981). 
II. Contract Implied in Fact 
[6[f 21 We now turn to the question of whether 
summary judgment was proper on Sachs's contract 
implied in fact claim. "Recovery under quantum 
meruit presupposes that no enforceable contract 
exists," and can take either of two forms. Scheller v. 
Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971. 975 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). The first is a claim for a contract 
implied in fact, which "is an actual contract 
established by conduct." /& The second, is a claim 
for a contract implied in law or "quasi-contract," 
which is "not a contract at all, but rather an action in 
restitution." IcL_ 
% 22 The trial court granted summary judgment on 
Sachs's contract implied in fact claim on the same 
ground it disposed of the express contract claim-that 
there was no meeting of the minds on the essential 
terms of a finder's fee agreement. Sachs argues that 
the trial court erred because it is not necessary, under 
a contract implied in fact theory, to prove a meeting 
of the minds on each essential term of a finder's fee 
agreement. We agree. 
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f7][8ir91 f 23 Like express contracts, contracts 
implied in fact "grow out of the intention of the 
contracting parties and in each case there must be a 
meeting of the minds before there can be a contract." 
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 696 
n.l (Utah 1976) (plurality) (quotations omitted). 
However, unlike an express contract, recovery under 
a contract implied in fact does not necessarily require 
that the parties agree on the contract price. See 
Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 267-69 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987) (allowing recovery under contract 
implied in fact where express contract claim was 
defeated for failure to show a meeting of the minds as 
to contract price). Instead, to prevail on a claim 
arising under a contract implied in fact, a plaintiff 
must show: "(1) the defendant requested the plaintiff 
to perform the work; (2) the plaintiff expected the 
defendant to compensate him or her for those 
services; and (3) the defendant knew or should have 
known that the plaintiff expected compensation." 
Scheller, 753 P.2d at 975: accord Davies, 746 P.2d 
at 269. 
*670 n o i n n f 24 Generally speaking, "[t]he 
existence of an implied-in-fact contract is a factual 
question committed to the sound discretion of the 
jury-" Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 
303, 306 (Utah 1992). However, on a review of 
summary judgment, the court "retains the power to 
decide whether, as a matter of law, a reasonable jury 
could find that an implied contract exists." Idi 
accord Knight v. Salt Lake County, 2002 UT App 
100,^ 6,46P.3d247. Under this standard, summary 
judgment is appropriate only where "a reasonable 
jury cannot find that an implied contract exists." 
Sanderson. 844 R2d at 306. 
fl2iri31 f 25 Here, there are disputed facts as to 
whether there was a contract implied in fact. HFN81 
On two occasions, Lesser requested Sachs to find a 
buyer for UPCM. JFN91 The first time, at the meeting 
in New York and second when Lesser admonished 
Sachs that he wanted a buyer, not a joint venturer. 
Further, Sachs clearly expected to be compensated 
for his services and both UPCM and Loeb knew or 
should have known that. Sachs directly apprised 
UPCM of his expectation of a modest finder's fee 
when he sent the letter to Rothwell, the president of 
UPCM, on May 17, 2001. The letter, which 
specifically stated that ' ![ , Sachs,] will expect a 
modest finder's fee if an agreement comes to 
fruition," was transmitted to Lesser; so, it can be 
inferred that Lesser was also aware that Sachs 
expected a fee. When viewing these facts in a light 
most favorable to Sachs, as we must, see Ouaid v. 
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525, we cannot say that no reasonable jury could find 
that an implied-in-fact contract exists. Thus, the 
issue should not have been "take[n] from the jury" 
where, as here, "there is ... evidence upon which a 
reasonable jury could infer" the truth of the claim. 
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 
1293 (Utah Ct.App. 1996). 
FN8. Even if Sachs should prevail on his 
contract implied in fact claim, he may only 
recover "the amount the parties can be said 
to have reasonably intended as the contract 
price." Scheller, 753 P.2d at 975. If "the 
parties have left that amount unexpressed, 
courts will infer the amount to be die 
reasonable value of the plaintiffs services." 
Id^ If the trial court reaches the question of 
reasonable value, it should consider, among 
other things, that Sachs testified that he 
spent no more than ten hours identifying 
Jackson as a buyer for UPCM. 
FN9. We continue to state the facts in the 
light most favorable to Sachs, the non-
moving party, see Sanders, 2001 UT 78 at % 
1 n. 1, 37 P.3d 1052, but note that there are 
disputed questions of fact as to whether 
Lesser was acting in his capacity as the 
Chairman of the Board of UPCM, President 
of Loeb, or both, or neither, when he 
requested that Sachs find a buyer for UPCM. 
f 26 Defendants argue alternatively that we should 
affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants on Sachs's express and implied-in-fact 
contract claims because Sachs cannot prove that he 
was responsible for procuring Jackson as a buyer of 
UPCM. Because the role of a finder is much more 
limited than that of a broker, we disagree. 
ri4iri51 1 27 A "finder" is one who, for a fee, 
"find[s], introduce^] and bring[s] together parties to 
a business opportunity, leaving ultimate negotiations 
and consummation of [the] business transaction to the 
principals." Black's Law Dictionary 437 (abridged 
6thed.l991); see also Lezros v. Tarr, 44 Ohio St.3d 
1. 540 N.E.2d 257. 263 (1989). A business finder, 
therefore, becomes entitled to his fee "if his 
introduction results in a transaction, irrespective of 
whether a third person brings the parties to 
agreement." Legros, 540 N.E.2d at 262; see also 
Amerofina. Inc. v. U.S. Indus.. Inc., 232 Pa.Super. 
394. 335 A.2d 448. 452 (1975): cf. Diversified Gen. 
Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course. 584 P.2d 848. 850 
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(Utah 1978) (noting that depending on the terms of 
the agreement, a broker may "be required to effect a 
sale or merely produce a customer " (emphasis 
added)); C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willev, 758 P.2d 923. 
925 n. 1 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (holding recovery of 
commission possible where agreement required only 
that finder supply list of purchasers, one of whom 
buys property). JFNiOl 
FN10. With a finder, "the causation, or 
'procuring cause' requirement is satisfied by 
the mere introduction, even if negotiations 
are abandoned and later successfully 
resumed, provided the renewed negotiations 
are connected to and stem from the original 
introduction." Lezros v. Tarr, 44 Ohio St.3d 
1. 540 N.E.2d 257. 263 (1989): see also 
Amerofina, Inc. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 232 
Pa.Super. 394. 335 A.2d 448. 453 (1975) 
("[I]f a finder introduces a prospective buyer 
and seller who enter upon merger 
negotiations which are suspended and later 
resumed, the finder is still entitled to a fee if 
the renewed negotiations ... directly result 
from the original introduction." (second 
alteration in original) (quotations omitted)). 
*671 f!6iri71 f 28 Conversely, a broker "not only 
introduces the parties but also negotiates on behalf of 
one of the parties with the best interests of one such 
party being his charge." Lesros, 540 N.E.2d at 262. 
A broker becomes entitled to his commission if, 
through his direct and continuous actions, he 
produces a buyer or seller who is ready, willing, and 
able to complete the transaction on the principal's 
terms. See Butterfield v. Consolidated Fuel Co., 42 
Utah 499. 132 P. 559.561 (1913) ("Before the broker 
can be said to have earned Ms commissions, he must 
produce a purchaser who is ready and willing to enter 
into a contract upon his employer's terms." 
(quotations omitted)); see also Amerofina, 335 A.2d 
at 453 ("In the brokerage case the broker must be the 
procuring cause of a ready, willing [,] and able buyer 
who purchases on the terms and at the price 
designated by the principal."). 
f 29 Therefore, while both finders and brokers must 
demonstrate that they are the "procuring cause" of the 
transaction to recover their fee or commission, the 
term "procuring cause" has different meanings with 
respect to finders and brokers. These distinctions are 
important here because Sachs need only demonstrate 
that he introduced the parties who eventually 
consummated the transaction. See Link-Hellmuth, 
Inc. v. Carey. 101 Ohio App.3d 604.656 N.E.2d 358. 
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362 (1995) (noting that "[i]t is possible for a finder to 
accomplish his service by making only two phone 
calls and, if the parties later conclude a deal, he is 
entitled to his commission"); cf. Frederick May & 
Co. v. Dunn. 13 Utah 2d 40. 368 P.2d 266. 269 
(1962) ("The fact that the sale was consummated 
without participation by the [middleman] in the final 
negotiation does not preclude him from recovering 
his commission if the sale was otherwise procured by 
him."). 
% 30 Sachs's deposition testimony places in dispute 
whether, as a finder, he was the procuring cause of 
the sale of UPCM to Capital. See Nyman v. 
McDonald. 966 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct.App.1998) 
(" 'One sworn statement under oath [involving a 
material fact] is all that is necessary to create a 
factual issue, thereby precluding summary judgment.* 
Such sworn statements include deposition testimony 
that is before the trial court on summary judgment." 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Although 
it is undisputed that Jackson and Rothwell were 
acquainted, both professionally and socially, before 
the sale of UPCM to Capital, and that they both have 
testified that Rothwell introduced Jackson to the deal, 
Sachs has identified additional disputed facts that 
place Jackson's and Rothwell's testimonies into 
question. These facts, if believed, could support a 
finding that Sachs was the procuring cause of the 
transaction. 
f 31 First, Sachs claims that he independently 
developed proprietary information through 
correspondence and dialogue with Rothwell and 
Lesser that UPCM was for sale, not merely seeking 
joint venture partners, and that Lesser was 
dissatisfied with Rothwell's management of UPCM. 
Sachs conveyed this information to Jackson who 
expressed an interest in purchasing UPCM. Sachs 
then urged Jackson to contact Rothwell at UPCM, 
sign a confidentiality agreement, and register as 
Sachs's contact. During their initial conversation, 
Jackson never informed Sachs that he was already 
pursuing the deal directly with Rothwell. Sachs's 
deposition testimony also outlines persistent 
correspondence, by telephone, fax, and letter, with 
Jackson from before execution of the confidentiality 
agreement until after completion of the merger. 
f 32 Additionally, neither Jackson nor Rothwell 
have produced or recall any documentary evidence, 
predating Sachs's initial conversation with Jackson, 
that corroborates that Rothwell interested Jackson in 
the UPCM transaction. Jackson admits that he 
entered into the confidentiality agreement with 
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UPCM and contacted Granite only after speaking 
with Sachs and that he knew, at some point, that 
Sachs expected a commission. Nevertheless, Jackson 
did nothing to inform Sachs that he was already 
working *672 with Rothwell. According to Sachs, 
Jackson even made statements that he believed Sachs 
would receive a commission, and that he had no 
problem with that. While we recognize that these 
disputed facts do not directly contradict Rothwell's 
and Jackson's deposition testimonies, when viewed as 
a whole and in a light most favorable to Sachs, they 
are sufficient to place into dispute the question of 
whether Sachs or Rothwell was responsible for 
procuring Jackson as a buyer. fFNll] 
FN11. By so holding, we merely conclude 
that summary judgment was inappropriate. 
"We do not necessarily say that [Sachs's] 
claims have merit. They may not. 
However, in 'reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, we view the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.' " Francisconi v. Union Pacific R.R.. 
2001 UT App 350. <f 17 n. 4, 36 P.3d 999 
(quoting Tretheway v. Miracle Mortgage 
Inc.. 2000 UT 12. % 2. 995 P.2d 599). 
IE. Utah Real Estate Broker's Act 
f 33 Defendants also argue that summary judgment 
on Sachs's express contract claims as well as his 
quantum meruit claims, for both contract implied in 
fact and contract implied in law, was proper for the 
independent reason that Utah's real estate broker's act 
(UREBA or the Act), see Utah Code Ann. § § 61-2-1 
to -27, bars Sachs from collecting a finder's fee as a 
matter of law. It is undisputed that Sachs was not 
licensed in Utah as a real estate broker at the time he 
claims to have solicited Jackson as a buyer for 
UPCM. Defendants contend that, because UPCM's 
only significant asset was its real property holdings 
and its primary activities were the development and 
marketing of that real property, the sale of 100% of 
UPCM's stock falls within UREBA's definition of 
real estate and bars Sachs from collecting a 
commission on the sale. This is an issue of first 
impression in Utah and has been treated variously by 
the courts that have considered it. Based on the 
language and history of the Utah statute, the long-
held distinction between real and personal property, 
and the practical application of the Act, we hold that 
UREBA does not bar Sachs's claim. 
\ 34 UREBA includes both civil and criminal 
penalties for those acting as a principal real estate 
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broker without a license. First, under the civil prong 
ofUREBA, 
[n]o person may bring or maintain an action in any 
court of this state for the recovery of a commission, 
fee, or compensation for any act done or service 
rendered which is prohibited under [UREBA] to 
other than licensed principal brokers, unless the 
person was duly licensed as a principal broker at 
the time of the doing of the act or rendering the 
service. 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-2-18 (2006) (emphasis 
added). 
% 35 Second, the criminal prong of UREBA 
prohibits any person 'from Mengag[ing] in the 
business, act[ing] in the capacity of, advertis[ing], or 
assuming] to act as a principal real estate broker ... 
within this state without a license." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-2-1 (2006). A "[principal real estate broker" or 
"principal broker" is defined to include any person 
"who, with the expectation of receiving valuable 
consideration, assists or directs in the procurement of 
prospects for or the negotiation of," Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-2- 2(12)(d). certain transactions involving "real 
estate," id. § 61-2- 2(12)(a)(i). TFN121 When read 
together, these sections bar a person from 
maintaining a commission claim for procuring a 
buyer for real estate unless he was licensed at the 
time he engaged in the acts. IFN131 See Utah Code 
Ann. § § 62-2-1(1). -2(12), -18(1); Andalex Res.. 
Inc. v. Myers. 871 P.2d 1041. 1045 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1994) (noting that UREBA provides that "(1) 
if a party brings an action in a Utah court, (2) for 
compensation, (3) for acts resulting in the sale or 
exchange of real estate, (4) he or she must have the 
*673 requisite broker license in order to recover the 
commission"). 
FN12. The transactions include, but are not 
limited to, those in which any person "sells 
or lists for sale, buys, exchanges, or auctions 
real estate, options on real estate, or 
improvements on real estate with the 
expectation of receiving valuable 
consideration." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-
2(12)(a)(i) (emphasis added). 
FN13. Although the language of UREBA 
speaks in terms of real estate brokers, the 
statute's prohibitions apply with equal force 
to the activities of real estate finders. See 
CJ. Realty. Inc. v. Willed 758 P.2d 923. 926 
(Utah CtApp. 1988) (holding that Utah's real 
estate licensing statutes and statute of frauds 
apply equally to finders and brokers). 
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f 36 "Real estate" is defined by UREBA to 
"include[ ] leaseholds and business opportunities 
involving real property.'1 Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-
2(14) (emphasis added). The phrase "business 
opportunities involving real property" is not, 
however, defined within the Act. Defendants argue 
that the sale of UPCM to Capital falls within this 
definition. In reaching this conclusion, Defendants 
assume that the proper inquiry is whether the ongoing 
business being conveyed engages in commercial 
activities involving real property. In contrast, Sachs 
argues that the sale of UPCM fell outside UREBA's 
definition of real estate because only stock was sold. 
f 37 "When we interpret a statute, our 'primary goal 
... is to give effect to the legislative intent, as 
evidenced by the plain language, in light of the 
purpose the statute was meant to achieve.' " Utah 
State Tax Comm'n v. Stevenson. 2006 UT 84.1 32. 
150 P.3d 521 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 
Holm. 2006 UT 31. % 16. 137 P.3d 726). We reach 
this goal by first looking "to the plain language of a 
statute to determine its meaning, and interpret its 
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same 
chapter and related chapters." Id, (citation and 
quotations omitted). Only upon finding that the plain 
language is ambiguous do we proceed to "look to 
other interpretive tools." M_ (quotations omitted). 
f 38 The plain language of section 61-2-2 of the 
Utah Code defines " 'Real Estate' [to] include[ ] 
leaseholds and business opportunities involving real 
property." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(14). Neither 
the term "business opportunity" nor "business 
opportunity involving real property" is further 
defined in the chapter. Nevertheless, it is our task to 
give each word meaning, if possible. See State v. 
Barrett. 2005 UT 88. <f 29. 127 P.3d 682 ("We 
presume that the legislature used each word advisedly 
and give effect to each terna according to its ordinary 
and accepted meaning." (quotations omitted)). 
Defendants contend that the proper inquiry is whether 
the ongoing business engages in commercial 
activities involving real property. Had the legislature 
defined real estate to include businesses involving 
real property, we would agree that UREBA is 
applicable. The plain language of the statute, 
however, includes only business opportunities. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2- 2(14). And Defendants' 
interpretation would render the word "opportunities" 
meaningless, something we must avoid when 
possible. TEN 141 When we consider the plain 
language of the Act in its entirety, however, it is 
unclear from that language alone whether Sachs was 
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required to comply with UREBA when finding a 
buyer for all of UPCM's stock. 
FN14. "Determining the legislature's intent 
requires that 'we seek to render all parts [of 
the statute] relevant and meaningful, and we 
accordingly avoid interpretations that will 
render portions of a statute superfluous or 
inoperative.' " Carter v. University of Utah 
Med Ctr.. 2006 UT 78, f 9. 150 R3d 467 
(alteration in original) (quoting Hall v. 
Department ofCorr.. 2001 UT 34, % 15, 24 
P.3d 9581 
f 39 Although the plain language of the Act is 
ambiguous, we nevertheless find Defendants' 
interpretation conflicts with the legislature's intent as 
evidenced by the history of section 61-2-2. IPN151 
See Utah Code Ann. § 61-2- 2. Prior to 1985, the 
term "business opportunity" was defined in UREBA 
to "mean[ ] an existing business, a business and its 
good will, a business franchise, or any combination 
of them." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2- 2(5) (Supp.1983) 
(amended 1985). However, in 1985, the Utah 
Legislature deleted this definition from the chapter. 
See Real Estate Amendments, ch. 162, § 2, 1985 
Utah Laws 308, 309. We assume, therefore, that the 
legislature intended to redefine the phrase "business 
opportunities" to no longer mean existing businesses, 
businesses and their good will, or business franchises. 
See Sindt v. Retirement Bd.. 2007 UT 16, ^  13, 570 
Utah Adv. Rep. 71 ("We may not ignore the 
legislature's decision to remove the term."). Indeed, 
the omission of this language "logically can mean 
nothing but that *674 the legislature's purpose 
deliberately was to remove" those terms from the 
definition. IcL Thus, prior to 1985 it may have been 
proper, as Defendants urge, to substitute the terms 
"existing business" for the phrase "business 
opportunities" in the definition of real estate and then 
to inquire whether the existing business's activities 
involved real property. However, since the 1985 
amendments, this inquiry is no longer appropriate. 
Instead, the proper inquiry is to examine the specific 
character of the business opportunity and to 
determine whether that opportunity involved real 
property. 
FN15. Upon finding that the plain language 
of a statute is ambiguous, we are free to 
"look to other interpretive tools." Utah State 
Tax Comm'n v. Stevenson. 2006 UT 84, % 
32, 150P.3d521 (quotations omitted). 
f 40 Here, the business opportunity at issue is the 
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purchase of all of UPCM's capital stock. UPCM, as 
the surviving entity in the merger between UPCM 
and CGP Acquisitions, Inc., retained its corporate 
structure and all of its assets and liabilities, including 
its real property. Thus, no real estate changed hands 
as a result of the transaction. Stock or shares in a 
corporation are generally considered personal 
property FFN161 and represent only "[t]he 
shareholders' essential right to share in the profits and 
in the distribution of assets on liquidation in 
proportion to their interest in the enterprise." James 
D. Cox, Thomas Lee Hazen, & F. Hodge O'Neal, 1 
Corporations § 7.2 (2002). This interest "is in no 
sense an individual right in specific property" of the 
corporation; instead, " [shareholders are in the 
position of claimants against the corporation with an 
expectation of sharing in the profits and a right to 
distribution of residual assets upon winding up." Id.; 
cf. MacKav v. Hardv. 896 P.2d 626. 629 n. 4 (Utah 
1995) (describing shareholder's interest in corporate 
assets as only an equitable interest). 
FN16. An exception to the general rule 
arises with respect to stock in a mutual 
irrigation corporation, which has been held 
to represent an interest in real property. See 
Salt Lake City Cow, v. Cahoon, 879 P.2d 
248.252 (Utah 1994). 
ri8iri91f20ir211 f 41 Because a corporation exists 
as a distinct legal entity, when the corporation 
acquires property, the title vests in it as a separate 
entity distinct from its shareholders. Utah has long 
recognized that "[a] corporate entity [is] separate and 
apart from its stockholders" even where a single or 
small group of stockholders own a controlling 
interest in the corporation. JTN171 National Am. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Bainum. 28 Utah 2d 45, 497 P.2d 854. 
855-56 (1972): see also Transamerica Cash Reser\>e. 
Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water. Inc., 789 P.2d 24. 26 
(Utah 1990) (discussing legal separation of 
shareholder and corporation); 12B Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 
5771 (perm. ed. 2000) ("The owner of a majority, or 
all or nearly all of the stock of a corporation, whether 
an individual, a collection of individuals, or another 
corporation, does not own the property of the 
corporation."). Likewise, "[w]hen a stockholder sells 
his stock, he is selling his proprietary interest in a 
going concern and not an interest in the corporate 
assets." [FN181 Owens v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 
1233, 1239 (6th Cir.1977): cf. Utah Code Ann. § 
16-10a-102(33) (2005) (defining "shares" in a 
corporation to "mean[ ] the units into which the 
proprietary interests in a corporation are divided"). 
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FN17. UPCM was a public corporation and 
its shares were traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange. 
FN18. The distinctions between corporate 
stock and asset purchases are well 
recognized. Generally speaking, when all 
the assets of an ongoing business are 
purchased, "the purchaser does not acquire 
the liabilities of the corporation as a stock 
purchaser would." Bertha v. Remv Int'L 
Inc.. 414 RSrop.2d 869. 877 
(E.D.Wis.2006): see also Decius v. Action 
Collection Serv.. Inc.. 2004 UT App 484. % 
8.105 P.3d 956. Additionally, the purchaser 
in an asset transaction takes legal title to the 
property, i.e., "title to property transfers 
from one party to another [. Conversely,] in 
a stock purchase transaction the 
corporation's assets remain titled in the 
corporation's name." Bertha, 414 F.Supp.2d 
at 877. Because the sale of UPCM to 
Capital was accomplished exclusively 
through the sale of stock and involved no 
corporate assets, we do not address the 
applicability of Utah's real estate licensing 
provisions to a business opportunity 
accomplished through an asset transfer. 
r221 \ 42 Applying the foregoing principles, we 
hold that Capital gained only a "proprietary interest 
in a going concern and not an interest in [UPCM's 
real property] assets." Owens, 568 F.2d at 1239. 
UPCM continued to own, possess, and control the 
real property throughput and following the merger 
transaction. See, e.g., *675Utah Code Ann. § 16-
10A-1106(b) (2005) ( "The title to all real estate and 
other property owned by each corporation party to 
the merger is transferred to and vested in the 
surviving corporation without reversion or 
impairment."). Thus, even though UPCM, as an 
ongoing business, exists for the sole purpose of 
owning and dealing in real estate, Sachs did not find 
a participant in a business opportunity involving real 
property because 
[s]hares of stock, which represent the holder's 
partial but undivided ownership of the corporation, 
constitute a property interest quite distinct from the 
capital or tangible assets of the corporation.... The 
fact that the entire capital may be invested in real 
estate does not change the character of the shares 
of the corporation as personal property. 
Richard A. Lord, 17 Williston on Contracts § 51:2 
(4th ed.2006) (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Evans v. 
Prufrock Rests.. Inc.. 757 S.W.2d 804, 805- 06 
(Tex.Ct.App. 1988) (noting that when there is "no 
assignment of [corporate] assets, but instead ... a sale 
of capital stock" that the transaction is for a sale of 
personalty, not realty). 
f 43 In reaching this result, we join those 
jurisdictions that recognize a distinction between the 
sale of assets and the sale of stock for purposes of 
applying statutes regulating the activities of real 
estate brokers. See Gruber v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 
899 F.2d 1366, 1368-75 (3d Cir.1990) (interpreting 
Pennsylvania law and finding that sale of stock 
would be exempted from real estate licensing 
requirements), cited with approval by Winthrop & 
Co. v. Milgrom, 447 Pa.Super. 140, 668 A.2d 557, 
560-61 (1995). TFN191 In Gruber, the Third Circuit 
reasoned that "commercial transactions" 
characterized by the purchase of shares in an existing 
corporation through stock acquisitions "would be 
distorted if the corporate form of sale were ignored, 
particularly when it is recognized that the title and 
ownership of whatever real estate may be involved in 
the sale remains within the corporate body, under the 
corporate name, and never changes hands." [FN201 
Id. at 1374. We agree that this long recognized 
principle should not be ignored lightly, nor without 
clear direction from the Utah Legislature. 
FN19. See also, e.g., Abramson v. Gulf 
Coast Jewelry & Specialty Co., 445 F.2d 
802, 803 (5th Cir.1971) (per curiam) 
(finding that sale of stock fell outside 
Alabama's real estate licensing 
requirements); Bertlia, 414 F.Supp.2d at 
877-81 (finding Wisconsin's real estate 
licensing provisions inapplicable to sale of 
corporate stock); Cambridge Co. v. Arizona 
Lawn Sprinklers, Inc., 166 Ariz. 269, 801 
P.2d 504. 506 (Ct.App. 1990) (noting that "if 
a purchaser had acquired [the business's] 
corporate stock or if the transaction had 
involved a merger or consolidation, [the 
broker] could have legally participated in the 
transaction without holding a real estate 
license"); Frier v. Terry. 230 Ark. 302. 323 
S.W.2d 415, 419 (1959) ("[T]he mere fact 
the corporation or corporations own 
buildings situated on realty did not 
necessitate the holding by [the broker] of a 
real estate license in order to claim a 
commission on the sale of corporate 
stock."); Turnpike Motors, Inc. v. Newbury 
Group. Inc., 403 Mass. 291, 528 NJE.2d 
1176, 1177 (1988) ("We accept that the 
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sellers would have owed the full 
commission ... if corporate stock (and not 
assets) had been sold."); Moody v. 
Hurricane Creek Lumber Co., 290 Or. 729, 
625 P.2d 1306. 1310-11(1981) (holding that 
sale of stock of ongoing corporation was not 
calculated to result in the sale of real estate, 
and therefore fell outside real estate 
licensing requirements); Evans v. Prufrock 
Rests.. Inc.. 757 S.W.2d 804. 805-06 
(Tex.CtApp.1988) (same). 
FN20. Defendants argue that Gruber v. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc.. 899 R2d 1366 (3d 
Cir.1990). represents a distinct minority 
position. However, careful reading of the 
cases that have expressly considered the 
distinction between stock and asset 
purchases suggests that the courts are more 
evenly divided. Regardless of which 
position boasts the higher number of 
decisions, for the reasons stated in this 
opinion, we conclude that the Utah 
Legislature did not intend UREBA to apply 
to the sale of corporate stock. 
I 44 We acknowledge that some jurisdictions have 
interpreted similar acts of their legislatures as 
including the sale of a business through a stock 
transfer. See, e.g., Coonev v. Ritter Trans.. Inc., 939 
F.2d 81. 84-88 (3d Cir.1991) (finding New Jersey 
licensing act applicable to sale of stock); Shochet 
Secur.. Inc. v. First Union Corp.. 663 F.Supp. 1035. 
1037 (S.DJFla.1987) (finding sale of stock within 
Florida's licensing provisions); All Points Traders. 
Inc. v. Barrinston Assoc, 211 CaLApp.3d 723. 259 
CaLRptr. 780. 786 (1989) (holding that real estate 
broker's license is required when negotiating the sale 
of 100% of corporate stock); *616Lieff v. Medco 
Prof. Servs. Corp.. 973 P.2d 1276. 1278 
(Colo.Ct.App. 1998) (same): Everett v. Goodloe. 268 
Ga.App. 536. 602 S.E.2d 284. 289 (2004) (same); 
Shortt v. Knob City Inv. Co., 58 N.C.App. 123. 292 
S.E.2d 737. 740 (1982) (same): Schmitt v. Coad. 24 
Wash.App. 661. 604 P.2d 507. 510 (1979) (same). In 
some instances, there are statutory differences that 
support a contrary approach. fFN211 
FN21. The Colorado definition of real estate 
broker extends to transactions involving a 
business, a business opportunity, or any 
interest therein. See Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 
12-61-101(2)(i) (West 2006) (emphasis 
added). In contrast, the Utah Legislature 
deleted the reference to an interest in an 
"existing business" from the definition of 
business opportunity in UREBA in 1985. 
See Real Estate Amendments, ch. 162, § 2, 
1985 Utah Laws 308, 309. 
I 45 For example, California has held that a stock 
transfer is subject to its real estate broker licensing 
requirements. See All Points Traders, 259 Cal.Rptr. 
at 786 (holding that real estate broker's license is 
required when negotiating the sale of 100% of a 
corporation's stock). Historically, California had 
separate licensing requirements for business 
opportunity transactions and real estate transactions. 
See id. at 782. However, due to confusion "as to 
whether a business opportunity broker's license, a 
real estate license, or both were required, when a 
business opportunity transaction involved real 
estate," in 1965, the California Legislature "merged 
the real estate and business opportunity licenses 
under the supervision of [California's] Department of 
Real Estate." IcL. From its inception the business 
opportunities licensing requirements did not exempt 
incorporated businesses. JFN221 See id^ Therefore, 
after the merger of the licensing requirements, 
California courts continued to apply the real estate 
licensing requirements to the sale of businesses 
involving the transfer of stock whether or not those 
opportunities involved real property. See id^ The 
legislative trends noted in California, however, are 
inapposite to those experienced in Utah. 
FN22. California's real estate licensing 
statute is also broader than UREBA because 
it applies to all business opportunities, while 
Utah's applies only to business opportunities 
involving real property. Compare Cal. Bus. 
&Prof.Code. § 10131(a) (Deering 2007), 
with Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(14). 
f 46 In 1921, Utah enacted its first statute regulating 
real estate brokers and real estate salespeople. See 
An Act to Define Real Estate Brokers and Real Estate 
Salesmen, ch. 110, § § 1-16, 1921 Utah Laws 304, 
304-09. At that time, the enforcement of the act was 
entrusted to the state securities commission. See id. § 
4. The legislature amended the Act in 1939 to 
incorporate a definition for "real estate" that included 
"leaseholds and other interests not less than 
leaseholds" within the reach of the Act. Act of March 
7, 1939, ch. 106, § 1, 1939 Utah Laws 140, 140. In 
1963, the legislature again expanded the scope of the 
Act by amending the definition of real estate to 
include "leaseholds and business opportunities." An 
Act Relating to Real Estate Brokers, ch. 146, § 1, 
1963 Utah Laws 521, 522. Simultaneously, 
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"business opportunities" was defined to "include an 
existing business, business and the good will attached 
thereto or any one or a combination thereof." Id. At 
this point, Utah, like California, merged the licensing 
requirements for both business opportunity brokers 
and real estate brokers under the supervision of the 
securities commission. 
f 47 The legislature enacted the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act (UUSA) in 1963, which provided for 
the registration of broker-dealers, agents, investment 
advisors, and securities. See Uniform Securities Act, 
ch. 145, § 1, 1963 Utah Laws 494, 494-521. 
Initially, enforcement of both the real estate broker's 
licensing act and the UUSA was the responsibility of 
the state securities commission. In 1983, the scope of 
the real estate licensing provisions was extended, by 
amending the definition of real estate to "include [ ] 
leaseholds, business opportunities, and all timeshare 
interests (including but not limited to fee simple, club 
membership, limited partnership, and beneficiary 
interest in a time share trust)." Division of Real 
Estate Amendments-Sunset Review, ch. 257, § 1, 
1983 Utah Laws 1020, 1021. But, at that same time 
the Utah Legislature formed the Division of Real 
Estate within the Department of Business Regulation, 
effectively removing *677 real estate broker 
licensing and enforcement from the securities 
commission. See id. § 5. 
f 48 This reorganization split real estate licensing 
and enforcement from securities enforcement. 
Shortly thereafter, the legislature began collapsing 
the definition of real estate within the real estate 
licensing statute. In 1985, the Utah Legislature 
contracted the scope of the real estate broker's act in 
two ways. First, it narrowed the definition of real 
estate by including the limiting phrase "involving real 
property." See Real Estate Amendments, ch. 162, § 
2, 1985 Utah Laws 308, 309 (amending definition of 
real estate to include "leaseholds, business 
opportunities, and all timeshare interests ... involving 
real property " (emphasis added)). Second, it deleted 
"existing business, business and the good will 
attached thereto or any one of a combination thereof 
from the expansive definition of "business 
opportunity." Id. When taken together, these changes 
signal the Utah Legislature's intent, unlike California, 
to narrow the scope of the real estate licensing statute 
and to recognize securities transactions as a distinct 
regulatory subject. TFN231 
FN23. The intent to distinguish securities 
transactions from real estate transactions is 
also apparent in the legislature's creation of 
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exemptions that effectively abolish the need 
for dual licensing in transactions in which 
real estate is a necessary element of a 
security. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-3(3) 
(2006) (exempting licensed securities 
brokers from the real estate licensing 
requirements where the real estate in the 
transaction "is a necessary element of a 
'security' "); cf. id. § 61-l-13(l)(c)(ii)(G) 
(2006) (exempting licensed real estate 
brokers from the licensing requirements of 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act when the 
transaction is for a "bond or other evidence 
of indebtedness secured by a ... mortgage or 
deed of trust, or by an agreement for the sale 
of real estate"). 
Although it is unclear whether Sachs is a 
licensed securities broker, Defendants did 
not seek summary judgment on that ground. 
Thus, resolution of whether Sachs's claims 
are impacted by the application of federal or 
state securities laws is beyond the scope of 
this decision. See Payable Accounting 
Corp. v. McKinlev. 667 P.2d 15. 18 (Utah 
1983) (discussing securities transactions 
falling within scope of Federal and Utah 
securities laws); cf. Bertha. 414 F.Supp.2d 
at 877 (noting that legislative history 
suggests that stock sales are not covered by 
Wisconsin's real estate licensing statutes 
because they are "specifically governed by 
securities laws"); Sergeant v. Leonard, 312 
N.W.2d 54L 547-48 (Iowa 1981) 
(recognizing applicability of Iowa's blue sky 
laws to transfer of business through sale of 
its common stock). 
<j[ 49 Furthermore, the purposes of UREBA are not 
advanced by requiring a Utah real estate broker's 
license for finding a buyer for 100% of the common 
stock of a publicly traded company. UREBA was 
adopted "for the protection of members of the public 
who rely on licensed real estate brokers and 
salespeople to perform tasks that require a high 
degree of honesty and integrity." Global Recreation, 
Inc. v. Cedar Hills Dev. Co.. 614 P 2d 155, 158 (Utah 
1980) (finding that the purpose of UREBA is "not to 
protect real estate developers who seek relief from 
their own contractual obligations"). Further, this is 
not a case like Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Mvers, 871 
P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct.App.1994), where we held that 
the purpose of the Act cannot override its express 
statutory terms to exempt from regulation a 
transaction unambiguously covered by the Act. See 
id. at 1045 & n. 6. As discussed previously, the 
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language of UREBA is ambiguous and we may, 
therefore, look to "the purpose the statute was meant 
to achieve" in interpreting its language. See Utah 
State Tax Comm'n v. Stevenson, 2006 UT 84, f 32. 
150 P.3d 521. Thus, interpreting UREBA to have 
limited application is consistent with the purpose of 
the Act because it is highly unlikely that 
unsophisticated members of the public will be party 
to a merger which results in one corporation 
purchasing 100% of the common stock of another. 
\ 50 We also reject Defendants' argument that our 
decision today elevates form over substance. 
Essentially, Defendants contend that the 
sale of all the stock of [a] corporation [is] in legal 
effect a sale of all of its assets, and the mere fact 
that the parties found it more convenient to transfer 
all of the stock rather than to make a conveyance of 
its assets does not change the substance of the 
transaction. 
Everett v. Goodloe, 268 Ga.App. 536, 602 S.E.2d 
284. 289 (2004) (quoting Kingston Dev. Co. v. 
Kenerlv, 132 Ga.App. 346, 208 S.E.2d 118 (1974)). 
We cannot agree that *678 the sale of the stock of a 
corporation is legally equivalent to a sale of its assets. 
Nor do we believe that the distinction between the 
two types of transactions elevates form over 
substance. 
^ 5 1 Utah has long recognized the importance of the 
separate legal identity of corporations and has been 
unwilling to permit parties to ignore those 
distinctions. See Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Steele 
Ranch 533 P.2d 888. 891 (Utah 1975) ("[W]here 
persons organize[ ] a corporation to acquire the 
advantages flowing from its existence as a separate 
entity, they should not be able to disregard the 
corporate entity to gain an advantage for another 
purpose."). Here, Capital chose to structure its 
acquisition of UPCM as a stock rather than an asset 
purchase. " '[T]he difference in a buyer's assumption 
of liabilities when entering into a stock purchase 
agreement versus an asset purchase agreement is 
well-known in the business community.' " Bertha v. 
Remv Int'l Inc., 414 RSupp.2d 869, 881 
(E.D.Wis.2006) (quoting Columbia Propane, 2003 
WI 38. f 29. 261 Wis.2d 70. 661 N.W.2d 776). 
Defendants should not be permitted to enjoy the 
benefits of UPCM's separate corporate structure for 
some purposes while also claiming it elevates form 
over substance in an attempt to defeat Sachs's claim 
for a finder's fee. See Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d at 891. 
TFN241 
FN24. Defendants' position also raises 
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additional questions, including the amount 
of real property that must be owned by the 
subject corporation and the number of shares 
that must be transferred before the licensing 
requirements of UREBA would be triggered. 
For example, would the sale of a single 
share of UPCM stock over the New York 
Stock Exchange require a Utah real estate 
license? See, e.g., Coonev v. Ritter Tramp., 
Inc., 939 F.2d 81. 88 (3d Cir.1991) 
(allowing an unlicensed finder of a buyer for 
corporate stock to recover a commission "on 
so much of the purchase price as is 
attributable to the personalty" of the target 
corporation); Thomas v. Daubs, 291 
Ill.App.3d 682. 226 Ill.Dec. 15. 684 N.E.2d 
1011. 1015 (1997) (allowing an unlicensed 
finder of a buyer for corporate stock to 
recover a commission "when real estate is 
only incidental to the entire transaction"); 
March Group, Inc. v. Bellar, 908 S.W.2d 
956. 958-60 (Tenn.Ct. App. 1995) 
(addressing whether stock transaction 
conveying a "controlling interest" in a 
corporation with 43% of its assets in real 
property triggered real estate licensing 
requirements and recognizing a presumption 
that a stock purchase is incidental unless real 
estate is the principal corporate asset). 
IV. Statute of Frauds 
f23ir241 f 52 As a separate ground for summary 
judgment, Defendants argue that Sachs's claim to a 
finder's fee is unenforceable under the Utah Statute of 
Frauds because there is no written memorandum of 
the alleged agreement. Defendants rely on Utah 
Code section 25-5-4, which provides that "every 
agreement authorizing or employing an agent or 
broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation," is "void unless the agreement, or 
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in 
writing, signed by the party to be charged with the 
agreement[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1 )(e). 
Defendants argue that the definition of "real estate" in 
UREBA, which includes business opportunities 
involving real property, see Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-
2(14). is equally applicable to Utah's statute of 
frauds. Assuming, without deciding, that the statute 
of frauds utilizes the same definition of "real estate" 
as UREBA, Sachs's alleged finder's fee agreement 
falls outside the reach of that statute for the same 
reasons that UREBA is inapplicable. Specifically, 
section 25-5-4 of Utah's statute of frauds does not 
apply to brokerage agreements for the sale of 
exclusively personal property. And, as discussed in 
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more detail above, the stock in a corporation is 
personalty, not realty. See Evans v. Prufrock Rests.. 
Inc.. 757 S.W.2d 804. 805-06 (Tex.CtApp. 1988V 
This is true even where, as here, the corporation's 
only significant asset is its real property because 
ownership of stock is not the equivalent of an 
ownership interest in the corporation's assets. See 
Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors. 282 U.S. 19. 24. 
51 S.Ct. 15. 75 L.Ed. 140 (1930). Therefore, 
agreements to broker corporate stock for 
compensation do not fall within the scope of section 
25-5-4(H(e). HFN251 
FN25. Indeed, Utah Code section 70A-8-
112 specifically bars the application of 
Utah's statute of frauds to contracts for the 
sale or purchase of securities. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-8-112 (2002). 
*679 f 53 This interpretation is consistent with this 
court's decision in Mackintosh v. Hampshire, 832 
P.2d 1298 (Utah Ct.App.1992). In that case, the 
plaintiff sued to enforce an oral contract for services 
in exchange for a 10% interest in the profits of a 
partnership's real estate developments. See id. at 
1299. The partnership argued that the agreement was 
barred by the statute of frauds. We disagreed, 
reasoning that the plaintiff was claiming an interest 
only in the profits of the real estate project. See id. at 
1301. Thus, the claim was not for an interest in the 
real property itself and therefore did not fall within 
the statute of frauds. See id. at 1302. Similarly, the 
purchase of the shares of UPCM gave Capital an 
interest in only the profits and losses of the 
corporation and did not represent any legal interest in 
its real property assets. Thus, the statute of frauds 
does not bar Sachs's claim to a finder's fee. 
CONCLUSION 
f 54 Under Utah law, an express contract for a 
finder's fee is not enforceable where the parties have 
not had a meeting of the minds on the essential term 
of the commission or fee to be paid, and summary 
judgment was properly granted on Sachs's claim for 
an express finder's fee agreement. However, 
summary judgment was improperly granted with 
respect to Sachs's claim for contract implied in fact 
because the disputed facts could support the 
conclusion that Defendants requested performance, 
Sachs expected to be compensated, and Defendants 
knew or should have known that Sachs expected to 
be paid. Additionally, Sachs's claims for contract 
implied in fact and contract implied in law are not 
barred by UREB A because the Act does not require a 
real estate license to engage in transactions dealing 
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exclusively in corporate stock. Likewise, section 25-
5-4(l)(e) of Utah's statute of frauds does not apply to 
transactions dealing with personal, as opposed to real 
property. 
f 55 Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse and 
remand in part. 
f 56 I CONCUR: WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., 
Judge. 
f 57 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: RUSSELL W. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge. 
163 P.3d 662, 578 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2007 UT App 
169 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
TabF 
TRANSCRIPT OF 
UTAH HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Floor Debate on Second Substitute House Bill 284 on February 22,1985 
Clerk: Second Substitute House Bill 284, Real Estate Amendments by Richard J. Bradford, "Be 
it enacted by the legislature of the State of Utah." 
Speaker of the House: Representative Bradford. 
Representative Bradford: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Representatives, this bill—the initiative 
for it came from the Department of Business Regulation, the Real Estate Division. It is 
an attempt to clarify and clean up the existing statute regulating the real estate industry in 
Utah. I won't burden you with the details, all the details, of the bill. I had handed out to 
your desks a summary of the important issues that were modified as a result of this bill. 
Mr. Speaker, I'd like to yield to Representative Moody to make a floor amendment, if I 
might. 
Speaker of the House: Representative Bradford, we do not have a formal adoption record of 
Second Substitute House Bill 284. Now if that is what you are speaking to, we'd need a 
formal motion, if that is, are we at the Second Substitute? 
Representative Bradford: Yes, we are. 
Speaker of the House: Will you make that motion? 
Representative Bradford: I would make that Motion. 
Speaker of the House: It is moved and seconded that we substitute Second Substitute House 
Bill 284 for, I guess, the First Substitute House Bill 284. Those in favor, say aye? 
Voice Vote: Aye. 
Speaker of the House: Those opposed. Motion carries. Representative Moody. 
Representative Moody: Thank you. Representatives, in your book there's a pink sheet. This is 
simply language to handle the situation where agents are filling out earnest monies and 
the like and just simply clarifies that those forms are approved by the Real Estate 
Commission, Attorney General and whether or not they can be handled through legal 
counsel. 
Speaker of the House: Representative Dahl. Not to the bill? Seeing no other light, 
Representative Dahl? 
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Representative Dahl: I have another amendment. I thought Craig was mziking an 
amendment. So I have another amendment. 
Speaker of the House: Okay, Representative Dahl. What did you make an amendment? Fm 
sorry, I didn't track that. What's the amendment? I'm sorry I didn't track that. 
Representative Moody? 
Representative Moody: The amendment is on, is in the pink sheet on your book, page 26, line 
5 after "Lessor", delete "or", page 26, line 6 after "Lessee" and before the period insert, 
"or any legal counsel provided by any legal counsel, provided that the Real Estate 
Commission and Attorney General have not approved a specific form necessary to that 
transaction." 
Speaker of the House: To that motion to amend, representatives? Are their others who would 
like so to speak to the motion to amend? Representative Shmutz, to the motion to 
amend? 
Representative Shmutz: To the bill. 
Speaker of the House: Okay, others to the motion to amend? Seeing none, I'll call for the 
question? Those in favor, say aye? 
Voice Vote: Aye. 
Speaker of the House: Those opposed. Motion carries. I guess I go back to Representative 
Bradford. 
Representative Bradford: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I won't belabor this, representatives, but 
the bill is a consensus bill that initiative came from the Department thait was charged with 
the responsibility for the regulation of the industry. It has had several hearings before 
interested industry groups. It had an extensive hearing before the committee the other 
night and there have been extensive amendments made to the bill. As it stands, I believe 
it is an excellent effort to clean up language and to clarify ambiguous language in the 
current statute. So I would encourage your support. 
Speaker of the House: Thank you. Representative Dahl. 
Representative Dahl: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I move to make an amendment that is in 
your book on the pink sheet, page 22, line 20. This is an amendment 1 hat was really 
agreed on in committee, but we didn't have the proper language. And what it does is 
they've made some, in my opinion, some very extensive cease-and-desist powers and 
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other penalties to be able to take into court and all this says is that, it refers to the Equal 
Access and Justice Bill that we passed a couple of years ago, that says if your found 
innocent, then they have to pay your attorney and court costs. And I would ask for your 
support of this. 
Speaker of the House: Okay, is there a second? Shmutz second it. The floor amendment 
under Representative Dahl's name. To that motion to amend? Representative Shmutz, is 
it to that motion? 
Representative Bradford: Mr. Speaker? 
Speaker of the House: Representative Bradford? 
Representative Bradford: Could I ask Representative Dahl? Is the language that you are 
referring, the language that was discussed in committee in terms of the reference to the 
existing statute? 
Representative Dahl: Yes, I ask Avery to bring this down like what we talked about. 
Representative Bradford: As a sponsor, I would not oppose this amendment. 
Speaker of the House: Alright, others to the motion to amend? Representative Garbett? 
Seeing no other lights, then I'll call question on the motion to amend as found on the pink 
sheet, Donna Dahl's amendment page 22, line 20, as you can see there. To that motion. 
Those in favor say aye? 
Voice vote: Aye. 
Speaker of the House: Those opposed. The motion carries. The bill will be further 
amended. Representative Shmutz? 
Representative Shmutz: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Will the sponsor yield to a question? 
Representative Bradford: Yes. 
Representative Shmutz: Representative Bradford. I'm very confused. On page 7, at the top 
of the page, the new language it refers to the authority of the commission and it deals 
with the approvals of curriculum, then it goes into the provision of due process, and then 
back to the approval of instructions, what does due process have to do with the 
commissioner's power in this relationship? 
Representative Bradford: Well, I may be confused also. Let me just look at it for a moment. 
Speaker of the House: Representative Shmutz, did you have a question? 
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Representative Shmutz: Yeah I sure do, but I can't really understand it. Representative 
Dahl has been trying to explain it, but I'm not getting it. 
Speaker of the House: Representative Dahl, do you have an answer for Representative 
Shmutz to proceed? 
Representative Dahl: Yes, I can answer that. This, this is to do with real estate schools 
and in those amendments we gave them three areas where they could make rules 
pertaining to real estate school. And one of them is that they can make some rules for the 
due process of law in the event that they go in and a school and they are unhappy with 
what a school is doing and so they say, we are going to close you down. They have to 
with rules and regulations with this language make some form of due process, so that 
those people have a chance to come in and be heard and explain or be told why they are 
being put out of business. And that is what we are doing by that amendment. 
Representative Shmutz: By the school? Are the individual dealers? 
Representative Dahl: There are schools, under the law they have to have so many hours 
of education before they can get a real estate license. These schools that keep that 
education, they've been given those schools a lot of problems, and so we put this 
language in there saying these are the only specific areas where they can make rules and 
regulations for. Is those three specific areas. And one of them is the due process, so they 
can be heard if they try to put them out of business. 
Representative Shmutz: So this refers to any violation of this chapter? 
Representative Dahl: Well, but 
Representative Shmutz: Does this chapter only deal with those schools? 
Representative Dahl: No, but the previous paragraph does. If you look at the few 
previous paragraphs, it talks about 90 hours and 120 hours of education that they have to 
have in order to get a license. 
Representative Shmutz: But as I read this, you are talking about the whole real estate 
chapter, not just the school. 
Representative Dahl: Well, it says, that's the only place in the chapter that refers to 
education, so that is the only thing it can apply to. 
Representative Shmutz: Thank you. 
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Speaker of the House: Representative Garbett. Not to the amendment? I'll call for, we're 
to the bill, Representative, is that what you'd like? Representative Garbett? 
Representative Garbett: I'd like to make an amendment, Speaker? 
Speaker of the House: Received. 
Representative Garbett: The amendment would be on page 26, line 2. Bracket out "the 
closing of." Also, on line 5, after "counsel", put a bracket and then delete the language to 
line 6 with another bracket after "Lessee" and before the period and also with that 
amendment we'd have to delete the language that we just added from Representative 
Moody. So, it now reads "the principal brokers and associate brokers may fill out any 
documents associated with a real estate transaction and real estate licensees may fill out" 
[you can't hear him well...] 
Speaker of the House: Try it again. 
Representative Garbett: "may fill out real estate forms prepared by legal counsel," period. 
Speaker of the House: Okay, it has been moved and seconded to that Motion. 
Representative Garbett. 
Representative Garbett: Representative Moody's amendment was a good one, but it didn't 
go far enough. We have a Division of Real Estate that licenses Real Estate Agents, the 
language that is in there presently says we license them and we have them go to school 
and we have them take a test, but we don't want them to do anything that pertains to their 
business. My amendment would just say let them practice real estate. That is all it does. 
It doesn't restrict them the way that the Division does. 
Speaker of the House: Others to the bill? Representative Jenkins. 
Representative Jenkins: To that motion? 
Speaker of the House: Yes, to that motion. 
Representative Jenkins: I speak in favor of that. Representative Garbett hit on it a little bit, 
but just let me hit on it a little bit more. We require a Real Estate Broker and Associate 
Broker to have 120 hours of schooling before he can even sit for a test. Then he has to sit 
for a test and be tested on all items having to do with real estate law, all other kinds of 
law and so forth. They should then be able to have to fill out any forms, only those 
forms, with a real estate transaction. We're not saying any other forms, but to the real 
estate transaction. And now we are saying that real estate licensees, salesman, ought to 
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be able to fill out any form that a legal counsel, legal attorney has gone over and 
approved. And that salesman also has to go to school. This just gives them the 
opportunity to make, earn their livelihood without being encumbered unnecessarily. So 
I'm in favor of this amendment. 
Speaker of the House: Others to the motion to amend. 
Representative Bradford: Mr. Speaker? 
Speaker of the House: Representative Bradford? 
Representative Bradford: I would have to speak against this amendment. The whole effort 
behind the language in the bill relative to the authorization of Real Estate Agents to fill 
out forms in connection with real estate transactions is an exception to the general rule 
which says that if you are not a lawyer you can't practice law. This provides an 
opportunity for those practitioners in the industry to in effect practice law in a very 
limited defined area. And although this may sound as if I'm speaking against 
practitioners in my own industry, I think it is important to recognize that the whole idea 
of regulation is to protect the public interest and I believe by broadening this, the way this 
amendment would do, it would go far beyond the intent or certainly the history that we 
have had in the industry concerning the ability and the right of practitioners to in effect 
practice law by creating documents for their own interests. Obviously, those of us in the 
industry who consider ourselves reputable and professionals would not take advantage of 
this, but unfortunately, there are those in the industry that could use this to the detriment 
of the public, and so I would strongly oppose it and I'm sure I can speak for the 
Department that they would strongly oppose this amendment as well. 
Speaker of the House: Okay. Representative Allen. 
Representative Allen: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I favor this amendment, but I don't think 
it's taken, well, as Representative Garbett said it allows us to do the things that we need 
to do. And I think the public is protected. We, if there is any problem, if someone 
creates a problem, then they are not licensed very long, because they can be brought in 
and their license revoked, so the Division's got ways of policing this thing and we'll 
watch it very closely. I favor this amendment. 
Speaker of the House: Representative Garbett, for summation? 
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Representative Garbett: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. We've left in prepared by legal counsel, 
so real estate agents will not be practicing law. But the Division sends real estate agents 
to school, tests them so they are competent, represents that to the public, but then in the 
language that is in there presently says but we don't want you to do your job. We want to 
tell you what you can fill out and what you can't. This amendment just simply lets real 
estate agents practice real estate. 
Speaker of the House: Representatives, the motion is page 26, line 2, after the word 
"with" delete the words "the closing of." Page 26, line 5 and 6, after the word "counsel" 
delete the words, "of the Buyer, Seller, Lessor and Lessee." To that motion, those in 
favor say aye? 
Voice vote: Aye. 
Speaker of the House: Those opposed [you hear a couple of voices]. The ayes have it. 
The motion carries. The bill will be further amended. Others that would to speak to the 
bill? Seeing no others. Representative Bradford? 
Representative Bradford: Legislators, I believe that the bill, as I've indicated before, is an 
attempt to clarify and to clean up language in the statute. I believe it is an important bill 
to the industry. I believe that the amendment that has just been passed, however, does 
weaken that particular area and I'm not so sure that the Real Estate Division of the 
Department will continue to support the bill, but I would encourage your support and 
pass it here and let them deal with this amendment in the Senate. 
Speaker of the House: Now open on HB 284 as amended. It is a second substitute House 
Bill 284 as amended. Voting is now closed on HB 284 as amended. HB 284, Second 
Substitute House Bill 284 as amended. Having received 60 affirmative votes and 3 
negative votes, passes the House to be transmitted to the Senate for its further action. 
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Floor Debate on Second Substitute House Bill 284 on February 27,1985 
President of the Senate: Second Substitute House Bill 284. 
Clerk: Second Substitute House Bill 284, Real Estate Amendments by Representative Bradford. 
President of the Senate: Senator Overson? 
Senator Overson: Thank you, Mr. President. This bill comes from the Real Estate 
Division. It has been worked out with the real estate industry and it is basically to amend 
the real estate statutes to clarify some things we did back in 1983 with respect to the 
establishing the three classes of licensing for brokers and also add some other definitions 
so that the statute is clear. It further defines the Commission and Division role. It 
clarifies their working relationship. It clarifies the license application language and also 
it clarifies the issue of non-resident licenses. The current statute is quite ambiguous and 
this cleans up that quite a bit. It clarifies the issue of fiduciary duty and also establishes 
that forms provided by the Real Estate Commission, Office of the Attorney General, are 
those which are to be used by real estate brokers. Are there any questions? 
President of the Senate: Any questions for Senator Overson? 
Senator Overson: I move for the question. 
President of the Senate: Question has been called for. The question is shall Second 
Substitute House Bill 284 pass? 
[Voice vote was taken] 
President of the Senate: Second Substitute House Bill 284 shows 21 ayes and 1 nay, 7 
being absent. Bill passes. To be signed by the President in open session and referred to 
the House for their further action. 
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